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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Importance of the Study 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) comprise 20 countries, most of 
which do not possess the agronomic capacity or environment to efficiently produce 
enough food to meet the demand generated by population and income growth 
(Kurtzig et al., 1988). As a result, the region in general and oil exporting countries 
in particular are heavily dependent on food imports. In 1992, MENA agricultural 
imports were estimated at $29 billion (about 10% of global agricultural imports). 
The ability to import sufficient food to meet domestic requirements is largely a 
function of the economic development level and export earnings. On the one hand, 
the oil-rich economy of Saudi Arabia allows financing of food import needs from 
export earnings, while Egypt on the other hand, heavily dependent on food import 
subsidies, is primarily financed by external borrowing. 
The region's agricultural imports increased dramatically in the 1970s, 
commensurate with higher oil price and export earnings, but slowed as income 
gains weakened in the early 1980s. Due to increasing oil prices and a continuing 
population growth rate of 3 percent per year, agricultural imports recovered in the 
late 1980s. 
During the last 20 years food imports have become critical to the food 
security programs of MENA countries. With the exceptions of Turkey, Morocco, 
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and Iran, all countries in the region import at least half their food supply. In 1990, 
the cereal self-sufficiency rate (domestic production's share of total supply) of the 
major MENA food importers ranged from 22 percent in Algeria to 99 percent in 
Turkey. 
For all oil exporting countries, oil export earnings are the primary engine of 
economic growth and the major source of foreign exchange earnings to finance 
food imports. The share of oil, as a percent of total exports, ranges from well over 
90% in Iraq, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, to over 65% in Iran, Egypt, Kuwait, the 
United Arab Emirates and Libya in the 1986-88 period. Even in Algeria where 
natural gas is a major export commodity, the share of oil in total exports was 46% 
in the same period. The region's countries hold nearly 70 percent of the world oil 
reserves and over 30 percent of its natural gas reserves. The middle East exports 
over 70% of its oil output, while North Africa exports about 60%. 
Given the limitation in agricultural resources and unfavorable climate, food 
security strategies are at the forefront of national development plans in the region. 
A typical policy goal is the provision of an uninterrupted supply of cheap foodstuff 
"for all people in all time" particularly the low-income sector of the population. 
The availability of a cheap and steady food supply largely depends on oil prices. 
However, oil prices have a high variation in the short run; hence, oil is not 
necessarily a reliable source for development and food import financing. 
Furthermore, since oil is a non-renewable resource, it can not be depended for 
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sustained food supply in the long-run. For example, the uncertainty ranges for oil 
prices based on oil price of 1990 are projected to be 16.00-25.30, 17.90-31.80, and 
22.60-40.20 in 1995, 2000, and 2010, respectively (the actual price in 1991 was 
$18.40 per barrel) (Fried and Trezise, 1991). As a result, both agricultural 
production and agricultural trade (imports as a means for food security goals and 
agricultural exports as a means for diversification goals in a oil based economy) are 
characterized by extensive government intervention aimed at domestic self-
sufficiency in staple foods (wheat) in the region. 
The MENA countries offer a very rich subject to investigate food security 
issues. Due to their lack of comparative advantage in food production and 
substantial export earnings from oil, MENA countries have wider options in 
meeting their food requirements and food security (e.g., through imports) than other 
developing countries. On the other hand, because of their socio-political situation 
(e.g., threat of food embargo) food security considerations rank high on their 
agricultural policy agendas. Finally, the prominence of oil export revenues in its 
economies gives a strong link of food policy (e.g., food security) to the 
macroeconomy and to the economy of the rest of the world. This study builds on 
some earlier studies and capitalizes on this rich mix of dynamic interaction among 
variables impacting food security with the end view of uncovering useful insights 
for improving policy formulas. 
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Objectives of the Study 
The general objective of this study is to better understand the food security 
issues in an oil-exporting developing country setting, with the ultimate purpose of 
improving food policy making and planning general food policy directions and 
policy initiatives in response to the food security issue. Three countries belonging 
to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and the Organization of Oil 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), namely, Algeria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, are 
examined to provide some variation in policy response to food security issues. 
Specifically, this study aims to (a) examine the presence or absence of any 
substantial relationship, in either causal direction, between relevant macro variables 
such as oil price, domestic food production, and food imports and their relationship 
with food consumption using the Granger-Causality test, (b) determine the 
magnitude (whether large or small), direction (whether direct or inverse), k 
persistence (whether short-lived or long-lived), and permanence (whether transitory 
or permanent) of a shock in each of the relevant variables influencing food security 
by introducing a one-period shock and tracing through its effects after accounting 
for the simultaneous and cumulative lag adjustment through an impulse response 
analysis; (c) measure the relative importance of each relevant variable in explaining 
the variability of consumption including their lag structures using variance 
decomposition analysis; (d) review the food policy initiatives of the three countries 
and their food security ramifications; and (e) derive policy implication for food 
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policy relating to food security. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter II summarizes the main points of the conceptual framework for 
food security analysis and the relationship of food self-sufficiency and oil prices 
with food security. Chapter III provides an overview of natural resources and the 
climate situation in Algeria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia and traces their respective 
agricultural development and policy initiatives. Chapter IV sunmiarizes the 
causality concept and techniques used for testing and proper treatment of the time 
series properties of data including the use of a VAR model in exploring the 
dynamic relationships among food security variables. Chapter V applies a causality 
test specifically for Iran. Finally, Chapter VI offers a summary and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER IL FOOD SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW 
As more developing countries recognize the advantages of a dynamic 
agricultural sector, increasing focus is given to food policy. Among others, four 
objectives are commonly pursued: (1) efficient growth in the food and agricultural 
sector, (2) improved income distribution, primarily from the extension of 
employment, (3) adequate food and nutrition for the entire population through 
provision of a minimum subsistence floor, and (4) food security to insure against 
bad harvest, natural disasters, or uncertain world food supplies and prices (Parker, 
1989). Food security policies are extremely important to a developing country 
because they affect (a) nutritional adequacy, (b) farm income, (c) food prices and 
political stability, (d) agricultural productivity and the potential for 
industrialization, and (e) the government budget and foreign exchange reserves 
(Ender, 1983). Moreover, as Maxwell (1989) emphasized, better understanding of 
food security issues is the single greatest priority in improving food policy making 
and planning in developing countries. This is the task of this chapter. The 
evolution of the food security concept is reviewed and some definitions related to 
food security are offered from different approaches and different units of analysis. 
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Food Security: A Conceptual Framework and Preview 
During the past three decades, the focus of food security research has 
evolved from an examination of concepts such as nutrition, food production, and 
price policies to an examination of household (micro-level) and national-level 
(macro-level) food security systems and mechanisms. The literature in this area is 
extensive, including, among others Gittinger, Leslie, and Hoisington (1987), Hollist 
and Tullis (1987), Valdes and Konandreas (1981), and Bigman (1982). In tlie 
1960s, research in food security measures focused on expanding agricultural 
production and supply. The variability in food supplies in the early 1970s resulted 
in a shift in research emphasis on buffer stocks, balance of payments stabilization, 
trade polices, and food aid programs (Phillips and Taylor, 1990). As mentioned 
by Parikh and Tims (1989), tracing the history of the food security concept reveals 
an interesting process of changes in perceptions regarding the world food problem 
and food policy. 
In fact, the history of food security research shows two distinct waves. The 
first was stimulated by the world food crisis of 1972-74 which peaked in the early 
1980s (Clay, 1981). The second was catalyzed by the African famines of 1984-85 
which gathered momentum through the late 1980s (see, for example. World Bank, 
1986, FAO, 1989). It started out as a concept primarily defined at the international 
level with reference to stable world market conditions and stable prices. Logically, 
it was then extended to the national level as the disturbances in world markets were 
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traced to supply and demand instability both through national causes and as a 
consequence of national and international agricultural and food policies. Finally, 
the concept was extended to the individual and household levels and to the 
objective of securing access for all to adequate amounts of nutrition. For a number 
of reasons this study takes the national perspective of the food security issue. First, 
although some variability may originate from external sources such as instability in 
the international markets, it is at the national level where policy decision are made 
to accommodate these external shocks. Also, food security at the household level is 
largely influenced by national food security policy. Hence, the following 
discussion pays particular attention to the national food security concept. 
The concept of food security 
In 1981, at the height of the first wave of interest in food security. Clay 
(1981) argued that food security is a problem most often conceptualized as a macro 
phenomena particularly as deviations from the trend in aggregate consumption. The 
World Bank defines food security as; "Access by all people at all times to enough 
food for an active and healthy life." Its essential elements are availability of food 
and ability to acquire it. The European Community (EC) defines food security as 
"the absence of hunger and malnutrition. "The necessary condition for this to be 
possible is having enough resources to produce food or otherwise obtain it. This is 
not sufficient, however, because the resources must also be used well." Maxwell 
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(1989), proposed a wider concept arguing that: "A country and people are food 
secure when their food system operates efficiently in such a way as to remove the 
fear that there will not be enough to eat." Other definitions of food security 
consider a global unit. For example, Smith (1990) defined it as the availability and 
affordability of food, mainly grains, to meet consumption needs of people in all 
countries. On the other hand, food insecurity is the lack of access to enough food. 
There are two kinds of food insecurity; chronic and transitory. Chronic food 
insecurity is a continuously inadequate diet caused by the inability to acquire food, 
and transitory food insecurity is a temporary decline in household's access to 
enough food (World Bank, 1986). 
The concept of food security can also be considered in long-run and 
short-run horizons. In the long-run, food security depends on a country's economy 
to generate and distribute purchasing power sufficient to adequately feed all its 
citizens, from domestic production or imports as supplement of domestic 
production. On the other hand, food security in the short-run is concerned with 
how nations, either individually or collectively, cope with inadequate availability of 
or access to food (Smith, 1990). The lack of food security may result from 
transient shocks that threaten the supply or distribution of food. Such shocks may 
originate within a country from such causes as drought, floods and others, which 
can be categorized under "acts of God." For a country heavily dependent on food 
imports, the shocks may also originate from outside, mainly as "acts of man", like 
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when prices of imported food rise sharply because of changes in policy or labor 
strikes in major food exporting or importing countries. The shocks themselves may 
have nothing to do directly with food, but may compete for scarce foreign 
exchange in a country's import budget (Kennedy and Nightingale, 1989). 
Different approaches to food security concepts may have three common 
themes. First, they focus on access to food rather than simply on supply. Food 
security is therefore, concerned not just with the level and variability of food prod­
uction but also with causes and dimensions of lack of "entitlement" and with the 
effectiveness of the distribution system. The second theme pays more attention to 
variability as well as to trends, that is, variability in food production, food prices, 
food imports or ability to acquire food. The third theme, is the broad mandate of 
food security, implicit in most definitions, encompassing production, marketing and 
consumption issues and ranging across levels of analysis from the household to the 
national and international economy (Maxwell, 1990). 
Review of Previous Studies: Causes and Effects 
Causes and solutions of food insecurity have been and will continue to be an 
important research issue. Most studies treat only a sub-sector (production), not the 
whole economy, and mostly focus on the micro level, that is household access 
problems, not aggregate supply (domestic production and imports). The study of 
food security from methodological consideration can be divided into two groups: 
f 
11 
(a) causes of food insecurity and (b) effects of food insecurity. The researches on 
the causes are based on analysis of variation in food consumption, measured by 
using coefficient of variation (cv), and the probability of consumption falling 
below trend at a specific level of significance (say, 95%). Examples of this type 
include Green and Kirkpatrick (1982), Valdes and Konandreas (1981), and most 
recent by Adamowicz (1988) and Sahn and Braun (1989). 
Green and Kirkpatrick examined a food balance sheet equation (due to lack 
or limitation of data on changes in stock and/or waste, most studies use an 
incomplete equation : C = Q + F - S 
where C= Consumption, Q= Production, F= Imports, S=Export (goods and 
services). 
The variance of consumption can be written into the variance of its 
components: 
G^cc = -o2gg+2Gçf-2ogg-2Gfg (2.1) 
To measure the sources of food insecurity, they use regression analysis to test the 
explanatory power of respective components, say the relative contribution of the 
variance in imports in explaining the variance in consumption. They found that the 
variation of production has the largest effect on variation of food consumption and, 
in turn, in food insecurity. Valdes and Konandreas examined the variability of 
food supply in developing countries for 1961-76 as a function of food import bill, 
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that is 
V = M P ( 2 .2) 
where 
V = value of food imports 
M = imports of food in quantity terms 
P = price of food 
Expanding the above identity, taking expectation and expressing in variance we get 
V a r ( V )  - ' P ^ v a r  (  M )  + M ^ v a r  (  P  )  + 2 P M c o v (  P ,  M )  ( 2 . 3 )  
Furthermore, (2.3) can be further simplified as: 
p + D + p  -  P^var ( M) +M^var ( P ) +2PMcov( P, M) /n A.\ 
" " P^var ( M) ( P) ^ ^  
Rm = variation due to quantity 
Rp = variation due to price 
Rn,p= variation due to interaction 
They indicated three main causes of food insecurity: (1) shortfall from domestic 
production, (2) sudden increase in world prices for food imports, and (3) decrease 
in prices of exports (goods and services) that are used for payment of import bill. 
They focused on food imports as the most important source. They found the 
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variability in the quantity of imports as the major source or cause of import bill 
variability. They used coefficient of variation (cv) to compare variation in 
consumption among countries (including Algeria) included in their study. 
Adamowicz studied grains production and food security in Arab countries based on 
food security as a problem of short-term variability of food production and 
instability of imports. He measured food security by the size of production and 
consumption variability in relation to the long-term level of consumption and 
production, and followed Valdes* method by using the standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation (cv) as indicators of variability. He focused on variation of 
domestic production as basic source of food insecurity in Arab countries. 
Based on Adamowicz's study, Saudi Arabia and Algeria, for example, had a 
high instability of food production in per capita terms, 21.5 % and 11.6 % 
respectively. For Saudi Arabia this instability originated from an upward trend in 
production, but for Algeria it was the adverse effect of weather and other variables. 
The CV of grains production in Saudi Arabia and Algeria for the period 1973 to 
1984, were 76.2 and 24.0 percent, suggesting that Algeria may have a higher 
demand for imports of grain in that period. 
Sahn and Braun examined FAO food balance sheet data for 16 developing 
countries (including Iran). Using a methodology similar to that of earlier studies, 
they found that the level of variability in cereal production is generally greater 
than consumption variability (nearly twice) during the period 1966-80. They also 
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found that whether through trade policies, domestic stock behavior or other actions 
affecting supply, the aggregate level of variability in production is not fully 
transmitted into consumption variability. These studies, searching for the source of 
consumption variation, differ in the unit of data-in per capita terms or total terms, 
time period covered, set of countries examined and sources of data. 
One of the most recent studies on the causes of food insecurity in less 
developed countries was done by Diakosawas (1989). This study investigated 
factors affecting food consumption by using correlation between two "external" 
factors(such as value of food imports and real merchandise exports) and two 
"internal" ones (such as real per capita income and domestic food production). 
Based on cross-sectional analysis, he found that instability in domestic food 
production is the most important single factor accounting for food consumption 
instability. 
Some researchers use probability of shortfall in analyzing the causes of food 
insecurity. For example, Bachman and Paulino (1979) tested the linkage between 
population growth and trends in production and the probability of food insecurity 
for developing countries. They found that countries with more rapidly increasing 
incomes and/or lower growth in population are more likely to be self-sufficient in 
food. 
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Analysis on the effects of food insecurity 
Anderson and Scandizzo (1984) defined food insecurity in terms of 
probability of starvation. Using a cross-sectional data set on developing countries, 
they tested the relationships expressing food risk as a Ainction of normal food 
availability, distribution risk, and production risk. Among other things, they found 
variation in production and purchasing power as major factors having negative 
effect on people's welfare. 
The Macro-economy Environment and Food Security 
The macro-economy plays a major role in determining food security at all 
levels, through its impact on production (the effect of incentives), availability (the 
effect of trade and food security arrangements), and access (the effect of the 
capacity to import through export earnings and capital flow, and the effect of 
employment and income generation). These impacts, in turn, are determined 
mainly by national macro-policies which governments control (internal macro-
economy), and through parameters imposed by international environment (external 
macro-economy)(Alamgir and Arora, 1991). The main issues to be considered at 
the macro-level (national level) concerning assessment of food security include the 
aggregate levels of food production, agricultural and non-agricultural production for 
export, recent evolution and projection of these levels, and developments in terms 
of trade and variability in production and trade levels. 
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Since this dissertation is about the impacts of fluctuation in oil prices on 
some oil-exporting developing countries, we first listed factors affecting the food 
security of a specific country. Then, since all countries under study pursued self-
sufficiency in food policy, the relation of self-sufficiency to food security and imp­
act of oil price shocks on agriculture sector are considered in the next section. 
Factors aflfecting the food security of a specific country 
Based on Smith (1990), important demand-side factors affecting food 
security include: (a) population growth, (b) income growth and distribution (related 
to internal fiscal and monetary policies, world economy environment, distribution 
of rights and food assistance programs), and (c) export revenues and indebtedness 
(related to domestic and foreign monetary policies, domestic economic shocks and 
incentives for import substitution or export promotion). On the supply-side, the 
important factors which affect food security at the national level include: (a) 
weather (erratic weather is a major source of variation in domestic production of 
food), (b) production and production growth rates (depending on applications of 
technology, such as new crop varieties, tractors and fertilizers, in adequate levels 
and at appropriate times), (c) policy incentives to produce food for domestic needs 
(as influenced by world prices, internal pricing policy, adequacy of internal 
infrastructure to support marketing, such as roads and institutions), (d) stock 
behavior and (e) availability of imports (food policies of major exporters, foreign 
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constraints and reserves, and dependency level) 
Food self-sufiiciency and food security 
"Food security" is sometimes equated at the national level with "food 
self-sufficiency". This is not necessarily the meaning adopted in this study. 
Theoretically, it is possible for a country to be better off by pursuing a 
trade-oriented policy. That is, according to its comparative advantage, it may 
pursue domestic production and/or imports to meet domestic food demand. While 
some studies suggest that there is no necessary link between self-sufficiency and 
food security (see, for example, Reutlinger and Pellekaan, 1986), these do not prove 
that resort to imports will enhance food security for all vulnerable groups either. In 
this respect, food security is a direct function of how the imported food and pur­
chasing power is distributed (Alamgir and Arora, 1991). According to the World 
Bank (1986), the frequently advocated course of action to increase national food 
production for self-sufficiency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
reducing chronic food insecurity. An increase in food self-sufficiency which 
involves the reduction of food imports without having secured an equivalent in­
crease in domestic production is likely to make things worse. More food 
production is not necessary for improving food security because the domestic 
food supply can always be increased through greater imports or less exports of 
food, and existing food supplies can be redistributed. 
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More food production is never a sufficient condition in the achievement of food 
security because it does not guarantee that the people who need more food will 
have the ability to acquire it. 
For a large group of developing countries, however, the focus on food 
security at the national level tends to be bound up with concerns for national food 
self-sufficiency and dependency. Some developing countries, including oil 
exporting countries such as Mexico, were concerned that reliance on food imports, 
most notably grains, from a few exporters would create an undesirable and 
potentially difficult dependency. The tendency for some food exporters to talk of 
the "food weapon" as an international political leverage, coupled with the grain 
embargo against the former Soviet Union in 1980 and later threat of food embargo 
against some Persian Gulf countries reinforced this anxiety. Political vulnerability 
aside, most food importing countries, even oil exporting countries, face foreign 
exchange constraints for food imports. Food security, therefore, became bound up 
with the idea of increasing national production of basic food, reducing reliance on 
an unstable international market. The precise structure of national production (and 
the cost of this kind of policy) is of secondary importance (Corbett,1991). 
In addition, the consequences of the policies of major food producers and 
exporters influence the supply, price and distribution of food in food importing 
countries. Therefore, their polices play an important role in food security of food 
importers. In this respect, to reduce the threat to food security of food importing 
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developing countries from major food exporters, prohibition of export restrictions, 
among others, became an important component of agricultural reform polices, 
recently receiving high priority in the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 
(GATT) negotiations. This would allay the fears of importers that international 
trading institutions may be unreliable source of supply and negate one argument for 
food self-sufficiency as the basic of food security (Ballenger and Mabbs-zeno, 
1992). 
The two other international agencies involved in food, i.e., the World Food 
Council (WFC) and FAO argue more or less explicitly that national food security is 
fundamental to food security. For example, FAO believes the emphasis on greater 
food self-sufficiency, particularly in staples which are regarded as key contributors 
to food security, stem from important political perceptions as well as economic 
considerations (FAO, 1985). Despite their lack of comparative advantage in food 
production, some developing countries (e. g., Middle East oil exporters) followed 
industrial countries in the 1960s and 1970s in aiming for food self-sufficiency to 
insulate themselves from the world market (Broun,Golden, 1992). 
Some countries or regions of the Third World that used self-sufficiency as an 
instrument for food security goals showed some success. For example, the 
self-sufficiency objective coupled with domestic price stability measures have been 
the only mechanism by which the Southeast Asia region (e.g., Indonesia, the largest 
importer of rice in the world through most the 1970s, was able to cease importing 
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rice by the mid-1980s) avoided the destructive effects of the international price 
instability on the domestic agricultural sector development. In this context, food 
self-sufficiency in much of Southeast Asia represents a national and regional 
approach to food security and assurance of supply. This food security concern 
extended not only to assuring adequate national supplies, but also to assurance that 
food is generally available to all parts of the population to avert chronic pockets of 
hunger and shortage (Baharsjah et al., 1989). 
Oil prices and agriculture sector 
The role of macro prices such as the exchange rate and the rural-urban terms 
of trade (or food prices for short), in influencing the rate and composition of 
structural change in an economy has been emphasized as a major component of 
agricultural and food policy (see, Timmer, Falcon, and Pearson, 1983; and World 
Bank, 1986). In fact, the two oil price shocks in 1973/4 and 1979/80 offer an 
opportunity to model a major perturbation as it ripples through the macro economy 
and into the agriculture sector. No other single macro economic event in recent 
history has so opened windows of opportunity for understanding cause-and-effect 
relationships between the food and agriculture sector and basic macro prices 
variables (Timmer, 1984). As Schuh (1976) suggests, agriculture tends to produce a 
relatively large share of tradeable goods and thus oil exporting countries usually 
face a deterioration of the rural-urban terms of trade when oil prices sharply rise. 
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In response to a shock from either a resource discovery or increase in price of 
export oil, if income is spent, the consequences includes a "resource-movement 
effect", which draws factors of production out of other activities and into the 
booming sector (oil sector), and a "spending effect", which draws factors of 
production out of activities producing traded goods (to be substituted by imports) 
and into non-traded sectors (typically construction and services). The contraction 
or stagnation of the traded sector (agriculture and industry) is sometimes referred to 
as the "Dutch Disease" (see, for example, Gelb, 1989). The term Dutch disease 
was first used in the mid-1970s and referred to the adverse effects on Dutch 
manufacturing of the Schlochtem natural gas discoveries of the 1960s via their 
impact on the Dutch real exchange rate (Struthers, 1990). Corden (1982) and 
Nearvy and van Wijnbergen (1980) are two surveys of the core model of Dutch 
disease. As some studies have shown, the core model of Dutch disease is inade­
quate for addressing the impact of oil price fluctuation on traded sectors of oil 
exporting developing countries. (The World Bank study in 1984 showed the 
manufacturing sector of oil exporting countries after the oil boom of 1970s actually 
expanded and agricultural sector contracted in all cases.) The core model has been 
modified to explain this outcome. The main prediction of the modified Dutch 
disease theory consist of exchange-rate overvaluation, rapid expansion of the 
enlarged booming sector, and agricultural stagnation or decline (Majd, 1991). 
Benjamin, Devarajan and Weiner (1988), Fardmanesh (1990), Struthes (1990), and 
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Majd (1991) are four of the most recent modified Dutch disease models in the 
literature. 
However, as most researchers of the Dutch disease model suggest, this 
decline in agricultural production is not inevitable. The experience of Indonesia, 
for example, suggests that a wide range of policy tools can be used to reduce 
negative impact of oil price boom in the agricultural sector. Direct price and trade 
polices can be used to alleviate relative price movements disadvantageous to 
agricultural producers caused by "Dutch disease". But this policy requires 
substantial resources and expertise to be successful. The most powerful and 
flexible policy instruments during an export boom are probably direct government 
expenditure and investment (Scherr, 1989). 
Analysis of the impact of oil price shocks through the Dutch disease model 
has some shortcomings such as using general equilibrium methods based on the 
full employment assumption which is not consistent with developing economies of 
oil exporting countries. According to Richards(1987), in his study about food 
security in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the inflow of oil wealth 
was a "very mixed blessing" for oil exporters' agricultural sectors. He argued that 
the problem of Dutch disease have been over rated since World Bank data indicate 
that oil exporting middle income countries agriculture sectors grew at 2.8 percent 
from 1970 and 1982, whereas oil-exporting, middle-income countries agriculture 
grew at 3 percent (for high-income oil exporting the rate was 3.6 percent). Based 
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on Richards argument the ensuing model of agrarian change in the MENA region 
had the flowing elements: (1) abundant foreign exchange (due to two oil shocks), 
(2) outflows of labor from the major agricultural producers, (3) accelerating 
imports to feed the cities, (4) inputs subsidies and specialty crop promotion for the 
larger fanners, (5) migration and (some) increased commercialization for small 
farmers and the landless, (6) food subsidies for the urban population, and (7) some 
changes in the mode of finance of these subsidies, with general tendency to take 
funds for general tax revenues, now augmented by oil and aid, rather than to obtain 
the revenue by shifting the terms of trade against agriculture. 
The decline in oil prices following 1983 has put all the above models under 
considerable pressure mainly because they focus on the Dutch disease theory that 
developed to explain the effect of oil boom prices on agricultural sector in a oil 
exporting country. The Dutch disease theory besides its assumptions defect suffers 
from two main shortcomings. First, at the theoretical level it is fomulated in such a 
way as to imply that events occur automatically and mechanically; it fails to take 
account the sociopolitical process involved, particularly the role of government 
policies. Second, at the empirical level, it fails to explain the diverse experience of 
the oil-exporting countries after the price rises of 1970s and early 1980s (such as 
Algeria, Indonesia, and Iran) (Shafaeddin, 1988). 
In summary, earlier studies have contributed in establishing the impact of 
some variables on food consumption. This study extended these analysis to capture 
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the richer mix of interactions of variables impacting food security which might 
have excaped notice with the major focus on production in earlier studies and their 
common use of a single point estimate measure of covariability (e.g., the coefficient 
of variation). Moreoover, the use of cross-section data across countries may hide 
the more important influence of structural changes in the economy, gestation 
period of infrastructure invesment, and policy changes whose influence on food 
security can only be traced over a lengthy period of time. 
Chapter IV is devoted to an extended description of the methodology used in 
this study to highligh its appropriateness in explaining important issues related to 
food security. 
CHAPTER m. AGRICULTURAL POLICY: AN OVERVIEW 
Constraints and Agricultural Situation in the Region 
The political economy of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
countries in general, and of Algeria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in particular are 
dominated by three important factors: little rain, much oil, and rapidly growing 
populations. The increase in agriculture production to meet the expanding demand 
as population (see Table 3.1) and income (see Table 3.2) grow is ultimately a 
function of climate, soil condition, resources (agricultural land, water supply ) 
availability and technology. The limitation of agricultural resources in all countries 
under study is discussed in the next section. To complete that picture we consider 
available data about some of these factors in the world and MENA. 
Despite the fact that all three countries have relatively large land areas, in 
1989 the share of agricultural land in total land were only 3, 9, and 1 percent in 
Algeria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, respectively (see Table 3.3). Table 3.3 indicates 
also that the growth rates of agricultural land was extremely different among these 
countries. For example, during the 1965-1989 period, agricultural land in Saudi 
Arabia increased annually by 1.9 percent, while the growth rate in Iran was 
negative (-0.4) partly due to high rate of urbanization and increasing demand for 
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Table 3.1. Population growth and projection 
average annual growth of population 
(percent) 
1965-80 1980-90 1989-2000 
Algeria 3.1 3.0 2.8 
Iran 3.1 3.6 3.4 
Saudi Arabia 4.6 4.7 3.7 
Source; World Development Report, 1992. 
Table 3.2. Average annual change in real GNP (percent) 
1969-79 1979-89 
Algeria 6.4 3.3 
Iran 3.0 1.7 
Saudi 13.3 .5 
Arabia 
Source: WRI, 1992/93. 
Table 3.3. Changes in land use 
land area, 1989 Share of total land area Average Annual 
Country or (thousand of 1989 (%; ) growth rate 1965-89 
group sq. kilometers) (Agri. Land (%) 
Agri. Perm. Forest and 
pasture woodland Others 
Algeria 2,382 3 13 2 82 0.5 
Iran 1,636 9 27 11 53 -0.4 
Saudi Arabia 2,150 1 40 1 59 1.9 
MENA 11,305 6 22 3 69 0.1 
Source: World Development Report, 1992. 
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building sites. 
Agriculture in MENA not only suffers from lack of sufficient agricultural 
land, but also of aridity and soil condition. As indicated in Table 3.4, when soil 
with no physical and chemical problems is considered, more than 99, 62, and 96 
percent of total land in Algeria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, respectively, are arid. The 
maximum potential of arable land in the world has been variously estimated at 
between 2500 and 3000 million hectares. Table 3.5 indicates per capita cropland in 
the world and the MENA region. In 1986 world cropland available per person was 
about a third of a hectare, down from nearly half of a hectare in 1961, a very 
substantial drop of 32 percent in a quarter of century. The rate of decline in the 
MENA region was about 47 percent between 1961 and 1986. This means that, on 
average, in 1986, one hectare of cropland must feed over 3 people, while in 1961, 
one hectare of cropland must feed 2 people in MENA. 
By 1986, some 15 percent of world cropland was irrigated, up from about 10 
percent in 1960 (see Table 3.6). Irrigation, together with increased fertilizer 
application and improved seed varieties, has been the principal factor in increasing 
agricultural production in the 1970's and the early 1980's. More than half the 
increase in agricultural output in past 20 years came from new or rehabilitated 
irrigated area (Urban, 1989). 
As the agricultural sector in developing countries moves from subsistence to 
Table 3.4. Climatic classes and soil constraints 
Total Land Area 
(000 hectares) 
Percent of Total Land Area Land with No Inherent Soil Constraints(a) 
(000 hectaiBs) Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Arid Semi-arid Humid Cold 
Arid Semi-arid Humid Cold 
Algeria 238,174 92 3 5 0 96,958 99 0 1 0 
Iran 163,600 76 17 7 0 14,785 62 28 9 0 
Saudi 
Arabia 
214,969 97 2 0 0 30,579 96 3 0 0 
Source : World Resources lnstitute(yVRI), 1992/93. 
(a) No inherent soil constraints means soil that is not affected by the following constraintsrsteep slopes, shallow soil, slops, shallow soil, 
low nutrient retention, add soils, low potassium reserves,and gravel. 
Table 3.5. The cropland per inhabitant 
Per capita 
(ha) 
1961 1986 
Percentage change 
fOA 
World 
MENA 
0.44 
0.58 
0.30 
0.31 
-32 
-47 
Source: Urban,1989. 
Table 3.6. Total and irrigated cropland by region 
World 
MENA 
Cropland Irrigated area 
1961-65 1986 1961-65 1986 
1334 1474 149 228 
81 108 14 23 
Irrigated as 
percentage of 
cropland 
1961-65 
11 
17 
1986 
15 
21 
Source; Urban,1989. 
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commercial production, or in food deficit countries moves to self-sufficiency in 
food, the use of off-farm inputs increases along with the use of improved 
technologies. The increased use of off-farm inputs such as fertilizer and tractors 
reduces dependence on land resources (that is they have an important land 
substituting role) and in the MENA region, with agricultural land constraints, they 
play a vital role. Fertilizer use has become a sine qua non, as in other developing 
countries. In the MENA, fertilizer usage is projected to have a annual growth rate 
of about 5.4 in 1982/4-2000 (Alexandratos, 1988). This is lower than the historical 
growth rate of 7.8 percent during 1975-1985. This reflects unfavorable overall 
economic conditions, especially declining oil prices, limiting the possibilities to 
import fertilizers and provide subsidies for their usage. In the early 1980s, the 
MENA had the highest average fertilizer application rates among all the regions 
reported in Table 3.7. But within the MENA, especially the three countries 
included in this study, the fertilizer usage differed significantly both in amounts 
applied per hectare and in trends over time. For example, the intensity of fertilizer 
use in arable land and permanent crops in Algeria fell from 26.3 (kg/ha) in 1973 to 
23.6 in 1978, while in Iran and Saudi Arabia the rate of application increased from 
24 and 375 to 80 and 401, in the same period, respectively. After the third oil 
shock, when oil prices fell, the ratio was maintained in Algeria and Iran, while 
Saudi Arabia remarkably increased from 190.4 to 462.5 (see Table 3.8). For 
32 
Table 3.7. Fertilizers use in the region 
kg/ha Growth rate,Total fertilizer (% per year) 
1982/4 2000 961-75 1975-85 1980-5 1982/4-2000 
93 developi ping 
countries 43 78 12.4 7.1 5.7 4.6 
MENA 72 156 12.5 7.8 6.8 5.4 
Source: Alexandratos, 1988. 
Table 3.8. Consumption of fertilizer in kg. per ha. of arable land 
and permanent crops 
1961-65 1970 1973 1978 1983 1988 
Algeria 7.2 16.5 26.3 23.6 22.1 22.5 
Iran 1.6 5.9 18.8 21 69.9 69.5 
Saudi 
Arabia 
6.3 7.3 8.2 13 190.4 462.5 
Source: FAO Fertilizer Yearbooks, various years. 
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farmers to receive timely and adequate amounts of fertilizer requires considerable 
investment in infrastructure for storage, transport and marketing. Previous 
investment in infrastructure and sustained agricultural expenditures, even during 
austerity, allowed Saudi Arabia to increase fertilizer consumption at higher rates 
after 1983. Raising staple food production in the MENA region was been given 
greater priority in 1980s via increased allocation share of fertilizer to principal 
groups of crops. For example, the shares of food grains (wheat and rice) and feed 
grains (mainly barley and maize) of fertilizer usage were 37.7 and 14.7 percent 
respectively, in 1882/4. 
A feature of agricultural policy in the oil exporting countries in the region is 
the growing use of oil revenues for subsidy at the farm level. This is channelled 
through subsidy in the use of fertilizers, pesticides, improved seed, and herbicides. 
Due to lack of data on all these inputs, focus is made on fertilizers (mentioned 
earlier) and number of tractors in use in all three countries. Tractors provide 
considerably more power than, say, a bullock team, but they are dependent on 
sources from outside of the villages for spare parts and fuel. With such machinery, 
ploughing is often deeper than with traditional implements and can seriously 
disturb the soil structures. For example, in the MENA region with very arid 
condition, the practice of disc-harrowing can provide ideal soil conditions for wind 
erosion (Beaumont, 1985). 
However, the absolute numbers of tractors can not convey a realistic 
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indication of the intensity of mechanization within a country. A much better 
indicator is the numbers of tractors per unit of arable land planted with permanent 
crops. For example, in the early 1960s, as can be seen from Table 3.9, that ratio in 
Algeria was relatively high at 4 (because in North Africa, where European 
settlement was strong, tractors gained growing importance) while in Iran and Saudi 
Arabia the ratios were 0.7 and 0.4 at the same period, respectively. During the 
early 1970s, after first oil shock, massive investments were made in farm machinery 
in the region. By 1978 that ratio reached 5.6, 3.7, and 0.9 in Algeria, Iran, and 
Saudi Arabia, respectively. Even after the decline in oil price after 1983, the 
upward trend of the ratio in continued all three countries (see Table 3.9). 
Food consumption and availability in early 1980s 
Consumption and availability (domestic production + imports) of food are 
most important components of food security. In this section we analyze the 
consumption in the region in terms of per capita calories per day and indicate the 
share of cereals in total food consumption. Then the share of food production and 
food imports in total food available is examined. 
As Table 3.10 shows, food consumption per capita (in calories) in the region 
had an upward trend in all three countries. It also indicates that the shares of 
cereals were high in total consumption in 1983/5, but as the per capita income 
levels increased these shares decreased. 
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Table 3.9. Tractors in use 
Algeria 
Iran 
Saudi 
Arabia 
total number 
per 1000 ha of 
arable land & 
permanent crops(a) 
total number 
per 1000 ha of 
arable land & 
permanent crops 
total number 
per 1000 ha of 
arable land & 
permanent crops 
1961-65 969-71 1973 
27620 4233 49500 
4.0 1.1 6.9 
1978 1983 1988 
42147 50279 94000 
5.6 
.7 1.3 1.4 3.7 
.4 .7 0.8 0.9 
6.4 
1.3 
12.5 
11300 20167 25000 55000 95000 113000 
7.6 
247 617 850 1000 1500 1850 
1.6 
Source: PAO Production Yearbooks,various years, 
(a) Ratio calculated by author. 
Table 3.10. Food consumption and direct human use of cereals 
per capita( calories) 
total By major commodities, 1983/5 
1961/3 1969/71 1979/81 1983/5 Cereals Roots and Livestock Other 
plaintains 
MENA 2222 2371 2845 2985 1724 55 260 946 
Algeria 1767 1825 2618 2712 1524 60 316 812 
Iran 1968 2218 2883 3115 1880 60 277 898 
Saudi 1832 1887 2827 3092 1324 19 540 1209 
/Arabia 
Source: Alexandratos,1988. 
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Increasing oil revenues in oil exporting countries during the 1973-80 period 
(see Table 3.11) not only generated much of the rapid increase in food demand, but 
also brought substantial shifts in food consumption patterns in the region. The per 
capita income in oil exporting countries increased rapidly at an annual rate of 10.5 
percent (on the basis of constant 1980 US$) between 1973 and 1980. Based on 
Khaldi's study, this increment of per capita income from oil revenues alone 
contributed an additional 7 percent to total food consumption. Table 3.12 shows 
the consumption of total meat in all three countries increased at high rates over 
time. For example, Iran with 9% and Saudi Arabia with 12% experienced the 
fastest growth in consumption in the region in the late 1970s. Consequently, feed 
grains (e.g., barley) use also grew, exceeding the rate of grown in the consumption 
of food grains (e.g., wheat). Between 1966 and 1980, wheat consumption expanded 
at the annual rate 5.4 percent (55 percent of total utilization of basic staple food), 
while feed grains consumption increased with a 7.5 percent per year. Consumption 
of eggs in MENA in 1966-80 increased at 7.8 percent, annually. But in oil 
exporting countries the egg consumption nearly tripled by the late 1970s. This 
production-consumption gap in eggs made Algeria the world's largest importer of 
eggs in that period (MENA Outlook and Situation Report, 1984). Table 3.12 also 
shows the presence and increasing food production-consumption gap in all three 
countries. As Table 3.13 indicates, the self-sufficiency ratio (SSR) for major food 
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Table 3.11. Government oil revenues 
(million US dollars) 
Year Algeria Iran Saudi Arabia 
1963 44 398 502 
1964 65 470 561 
1965 102 522 655 
1966 145 593 777 
1967 200 737 852 
1968 262 817 966 
1969 299 938 1008 
1970 325 1093 1200 
1971 320 1870 2160 
1972 700 2308 3107 
1973 1100 5600 7200 
1974 3500 22000 29000 
1975 4000 20500 27000 
1976 4500 22000 33500 
1977 5000 23000 38000 
1978 5400 20900 36700 
1979 8746 19186 62855 
1980 12647 13286 105813 
1981 12985 12053 116183 
1982 10770 19233 75534 
1983 9467 19255 42809 
1984 9189 12255 34243 
1985 9170 13115 24180 
1986 4819 7183 16975 
1987 6057 10515 19271 
1988 4988 8170 20500 
1989 3800 14000 16000 
1990 12300 15240 40700 
Source: the MIDDLE EAST and NORTH AFRICA, various years. 
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Table 3.12. Consumption and production of cereals, meat, and eggs 
1966-70 and 1976-80 averages 
Algeria 
1966-70 
1976-80 
prod, 
cons, 
prod, 
cons. 
total cereals total meat 
(1000 metri ric tons) 
90.6 1689.7 
2247.8 
1789.5 
3765.2 
94.2 
132.5 
147.2 
eggs 
11.4 
12.0 
18.1 
49.7 
Iran 
1966-70 
1976-80 
prod, 
cons, 
prod, 
cons. 
5928.7 
6128 
7919.6 
10607.2 
285.7 
290.3 
584.1 
741.1 
48.6 
49.4 
133.6 
152.0 
1966-70 
Saudi Arabia 
1976-80 
prod, 
cons, 
prod, 
cons. 
456.8 
755 
321 
1690.7 
11.3 
35.7 
27.9 
215.2 
6.8 
10.2 
19.1 
32.6 
Source: Khaldi,1984. 
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Table 3.13. Food self-sufficiency ratio for major food items, 
1970 and 1981 
Cereals Meat 
1970 1981 1970 1981 
Algeria 73 40 97 87 
Iran 98 66 90 66 
Saudi 
Arabia 22 7 38 27 
Source: Shapouri,1984. 
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items (cereals and meat) decreased in 1970-1980 period in all three countries. 
One of the most serious problems facing MENA is rising imbalance between 
consumption and domestic production of food. Rapidly escalating effective demand 
and sluggish domestic supply response have made MENA one. of the least food self-
sufficient regions in the world. Food security consequently dominates discussion of 
food policy in the region (Richards, 1987). As can be seen from Table 3.14, 
through the mid 1980s, the growth rates of demand for agricultural products, all 
uses, exceeded the growth rates of agricultural production in the region and in all 
three countries as well. The Table also shows the rate of decline of the self-
sufficiency ratio (SSR) in all three countries was higher in 1970s than in the 1960s. 
Many countries in the region including oil exporting countries (e.g., Algeria), were 
food self-sufficient or nearly self-sufficient in the early 1960s. 
The common reaction to the imbalance of domestic supply and demand for 
food was more imports. In Chapter V we discuss the causes of increasing imports 
of food in oil exporting countries. As Table 3.15 indicates, the growth rates of 
agricultural imports substantially increased after the first oil shock in 1973/4. Table 
3.15 also shows the share of food imports in total imports. For example, the food 
import shares in Algeria and Iran increased markedly, making these countries more 
dependent on outside food suppliers, while in Saudi Arabia that ratio decreased in 
the same period. 
Table 3.14. Growth rates of total agricultural demand and production and self-su£Bciency ratios 
Growth in total demand Growth in total production Seff-sufRdency ratios 
(all uses) (% annually) (% annually) (%) 
1961-70 1970-80 1980-5 1961-85 1961-70 1970-80 1980-5 1961-85 1961/3 1969/71 1979/81 1983/5 
Algeria 2.9 8.1 3.8 5.9 0.9 0.2 2.4 0.9 106 85 44 41 
Iran 4.7 6.7 3.8 5.7 4.8 4.2 2.1 4.1 98 97 79 73 
Saudi 
Arabia 
6.1 14.3 11.7 11.7 3.1 5.1 20.8 7.2 64 59 25 32 
MENA 3.4 5.3 3.8 4.3 3.0 3.1 2.4 2.9 101 97 80 76 
Source: Alexandratos,1988. 
Table 3.15 Growth rates of total agricultural imports and shares of agriimports 
in total imports 
Growth rate in agri. imports Share of agri. imports in total 
(% annually) imports (%) 
1961-70 1970-80 1980-85 1961-85 1969/71 1983/5 
Algeria -1.4 14.8 7.0 8.1 16 21 
Iran 0.8 19.0 7.1 13.5 9 20 
Saudi 
Arabia 9.7 18.3 6.0 13.3 30 14 
MENA 2.6 12.7 6.1 8.8 20 18 
Source: Alexandratos,1988. 
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Food consumption and availability: 1981-1993 
After 1980, some events such as invasion of Iran in 1981 and Kuwait in 
1991 by Iraq and declining oil prices in mid-1980s had remarkable effects on 
production and imports of agricultural products in the region. The region's 
agricultural sector also continued to be affected by policy reforms, as a main part of 
adjustment economic policies, during the 1980s. Common features of the reform 
for many countries in the region have been the sharp reduction or elimination of 
guaranteed prices, the privatization of input supply, liberalization of agricultural 
trade, and a reduction or removal of input subsidies. The political instability 
problems in some countries (e.g., Algeria) not only prevented reduction of 
consumer price subsidies in basic food and bread, but also created disincentives for 
sustained private investment in agriculture. Weather continued to be a major 
determinant of farm output in countries with mainly rain-dependent agriculture 
(poor weather in North Africa, e.g., Algeria, reduced yields). 
However, due to implementation of some agricultural policies and the high 
priority given to agricultural sector, most countries in the region in last decade 
increased their agricultural production. For example, cereals production had an 
upward trend and wheat production reached 44.3 million tons in the region in 1992. 
In spite of achievements in some countries in the region, the gap between 
production and consumption is still increasing, resulting in continued dependence on 
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external supply sources to satisfy a fast-growing demand (UN and FAO, 1992). 
Therefore, the region was forced to import, for example, 22.8 million tons of wheat 
to meet wheat consumption in 1992. In 1992, imports of agricultural commodities 
in MENA were estimated at $29 billion, about 10 percent of global agricultural 
imports (Rosen and Parker, 1993). As mentioned in previous sections, due to 
decline oil prices in mid-1980 the growth rate of agricultural imports decreased. 
But it recovered in the late 1980s due to higher demand brought about rising oil 
export earnings and a continuing population growth rate of 3 percent. In the period 
1983-1992, Saudi Arabia was the major MENA importer, followed by Egypt, 
Algeria, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Turkey. 
Food consumption in the region increased by 5 percent annually in the 
1980s. This is partly due to high population growth rate and partly due to 
government polices. The average daily diet for the region to over 3,100 calories, 
reflecting the higher income, subsidies on staple foods, policies limiting price hikes 
for foods not covered by subsidies, modernized and more efficient marketing, and 
urbanization (Rosen and Parker, 1993). Cereals (including wheat, feed grains, and 
rice) remain the most important agricultural imports to met the food production-
consumption gap. The cereals self-sufficiency ratios in major food imports in the 
region ranged from 22 percent in Algeria to 99 percent in Turkey in 1990. Also, 
the MENA countries are highly depended on oil vegetable imports, with self-
sufficiency ranging from 2 percent in Saudi Arabia to 62 percent in Turkey in 
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1990. 
Wheat is the staple food of the region, and wheat imports are a use of major 
foreign exchange. To reduce or elimination wheat production-consumption gap 
most countries in the region have actively stimulated wheat production. Despite 
reduction in oil prices after 1983, some production policies in wheat including 
maintaining domestic wheat producer prices above world market, import restriction, 
and input subsidies have been continued. The producer support policies helped 
stimulate an average annual increase in wheat output of 3.3% in the Middle East 
and 3.8% in North Africa in the 1980-1992. Most of the increase was due to 
improved yields (Burfisher, 1993). Strong production gains relative to consumption 
growth rate have enabled the region to slightly increase its wheat self-sufficiency 
ratio. In 1992, Middle East wheat production equaled 91 percent of its 
consumption, compared to 80 percent in 1980. North Africa production equaled 39 
percent of its consumption compared to 36 percent in 1980. Regional wheat self-
sufficient reflects varying performance by individual countries. Saudi Arabia after 
1984 has become a major exporter, exporting about one-half its crop. Productivity 
in the wheat sector in Algeria has been hampered by a shortage of inputs, an 
uneducated work force, poor marketing infrastructure, and lack of irrigation. Yields 
are low and harvested area declined nearly 25 percent between 1980 and 1991. 
Wheat self-sufficiency fell from 70 percent in 1970 to 31 percent in 1992 
(Burfisher, 1993). 
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For the majority of oil exporting countries, petroleum provides most of their 
foreign exchange earnings. For example, the share of oil as a percent of total 
exports in the period 1986-88 were about 46, 84, and 92 percent in Algeria, Iran, 
and Saudi Arabia, respectively. As mentioned in the previous section, in the 1970s 
as oil prices rose sharply two times and oil export earnings from oil soared 
agricultural imports by the region increased dramatically. Based on study by Urban 
and Kurtzig (1993), the strong correlation between oil price and agricultural imports 
in the region diminished in 1980s, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, whose major 
investment in the agricultural sector has increased food self-sufficiency and 
somewhat reduced imports. Following the decline in oil price in 1983, the effects 
of oil price on agricultural imports and investment varied among countries. As 
Urban and Kurtzig point out, in general agricultural imports did not decline. In 
fact, they increased, although at a slower pace than in previous decade. In high 
income oil exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia, agricultural imports were not 
greatly affected. This was primarily because their oil exports revenue are 10 times 
greater than their agricultural imports bill. High middle-income and middle-income 
countries such as Iran and Algeria remained large food importers. In fact, due to 
the geo-political situation in the region, most governments in the MENA in spite of 
declining in oil prices in 1980s from 'national security' and 'food security' 
considerations are very reluctant to curtail public expenditure for defence and food 
programs. 
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Algeria: Physical Features and Natural Resources 
Algeria, with 2,381,741 square kilometers, more than four-fifth of which is 
desert, is the largest of three countries in north-west Africa that comprise the 
Maghreb (with Morocco, and Tunisia), known as the region of mountains, valleys 
and plateaux lying between the Mediterranean sea and the Sahara desert. Most of 
Algeria's arable land is concentrated in the northern part of the country, between 
the Mediterranean Sea and the southern slope of the Saharan Atlas Mountains. 
The climate of northernmost Algeria, including the narrow coastal plain and 
the Tell Atlas (the country's heartland) southward to the margin of the High 
Plateaux, is of "Mediterranean" type with warm, wet winters and hot, dry summers. 
The average annual rainfall on the coast is more than 500 millimeters. Rainfall 
increases as one moves east from Oran (360 mm.) to Algiers (more than 700 mm.). 
In the High Plateaux, the average is about 300 millimeters per year and decreases 
sharply as one moves farther south. As in many other MENA countries, 
precipitation is quite irregular and highly variable, not only from year to year, but 
also seasonally. 
As a result of low and uneven rainfall combined with high rates of 
evaporation, the rivers tend to be short and to suffer large seasonal variations in 
flow. The longest perennially flowing river is the Oued Chelif, which rises in the 
High Plateaux and crosses the Tell to reach the Mediterranean Sea east of Oran. 
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The surface water resources are close to 13 billion cu. m. most of which is surface 
runoff running in seasonal streams. In 1990, 1.0 billion cu.m. were put to use by 
some 20 dams, while the rest drained to the sea. The annual ground water 
resources are estimated at about 2 billion cu.m, 1.7 billion cu.m. of which are put to 
use. The traditional water system contributes to the irrigation of 22 percent of the 
agricultural land (Baasiri, 1990). 
According to the most recent population census, April 1987, Algeria has a 
population of 22,971,558 (this increased to 25.1 million in mid-1990. World 
Development Report, 1992). The great majority of the inhabitants live in the 
northern part of the country, particularly along the Mediterranean coast. The 
overall population density is about 10 persons per square kilometer. However, the 
average provides a misleading impression of the population density. Because of 
aridity and limited rainfall, the population density is enormously varied from more 
than 100 per square kilometer in north to less than one person in the middle of the 
Sahara. 
Algeria has rich mineral resources and, even before the petroleum era, mined 
and exported high-grade iron ore, phosphate, lead, zinc, and antimony. Production 
of crude petroleum in Sahara on a commercial scale began in 1958. In early 1990 
Algeria was producing more than 700,000 b/d. Algeria oil is light and with low 
sulphur content, which is attractive to foreign refiners. Proven reserve of petroleum 
at the end of 1988 were assessed at 9200 million barrels, sufficient for about 
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another 39 year of production at 1988 levels. Algeria's proven recoverable 
reserves of natural gas, mostly nonassociated with oil reserves, are the fourth largest 
in the world after the former Soviet Union, Iran, and the United States. 
Agricultural Development 
Lower petroleum prices in 1983, cut Algeria's export earnings by 7 percent 
from the 1982 level. Despite the slip in hydrocarbon sales, the Algeria economy 
performed well in 1983. Real GDP increased 3% and per capita GDP increased 
from $1980 in 1980 to $ 2400 in 1983. 
In 1983, cold winter and a drought in spring and summer stemmed the grain 
harvest at 60 percent of the average of the five previous years. Wheat production 
fell to 810,000 tons; imports of wheat reached 2.7 million tons, to cover projected 
consumption of 3.65 million tons in 1983/4. Based on FAO index of agricultural 
production, using 1979-81=100 as the base period, total agricultural production 
increased in 1983 and 1984 to 103 and 110. But when measured on a per capita 
basis it fell to 94 and 97 in 1983 and 1984, respectively. For livestock production, 
using the same base period, indices show an upward trend on both total and per 
capita basis, but the per capita trend is less impressive in the 1980-1984 period. 
The livestock production index, increased from 101 in 1980 to 127 in 1984, while 
on a per capita basis, it increased from 101 to 112. 
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Algeria's food subsidies, which reached $ 1.5 billion dollar in 1983, were not 
enough to significantly reduce the production-consumption gap. For instance, the 
15 percent increase in the producer price of wheat in 1983 was offset by an 
increase in consumer price from 100 percent in 1980 to 132 percent in 1983. 
Therefore, the grain self sufficiency ratio fell during 1980-83 from 49 percent to 26 
percent. In 1985, grain output was low, but continued to respond to improved 
producer incentives. New records were reached in poultry meat and egg production 
(MENA, Situation and Outlook Report, 1987). 
During the 1980s, some adjustment to the centerlized economic strategy 
occurred in Algeria (see economic plan section in this chapter). Fundamental 
market-oriented economic reforms, of which agricultural reform is a cornerstone, 
have been undertaken since 1987. The food deficit, even in favorable harvest years, 
has been a major structural problem over past three decades (the State food and 
agriculture, 1991). Despite increased investment, agricultural output in the 1980s 
was poor, owing to drought. With high levels of food imports, agriculture is 
considered to be crucial in the future. The value of food imports has increased 
from about 11 percent of total imports in early 1970s to more than 20 percent in 
1988, and by 1990 the country produced only 25% of its domestic cereal 
requirements. Total agricultural imports, consisting largely of wheat, coarse grains, 
dairy products, and edible oils, grew at an annual rate of 28 percent during 1970s, 
but showed little growth in 1980s (see Table 3.16). The Government aims to 
Table 3.16 Algeria : Agricultural trade summary 
Commodity Total imports Growth rates 
1969-71 1979-81 1986-88 1970's 1980's 
$ million percent 
All merchandise 1164.9 10081.5 7930.0 24.1 -3.4 
Ag. products 182.5 2097.9 2138.7 27.7 .3 
Live animals 5.4 5.2 81.0 -.4 48.0 
Meat & prep. .5 40.7 30.8 56.4 -3.9 
Dairy prod. & eggs 28.8 295.9 353.6 26.2 2.6 
Wheat & flour 39.8 595.7 529.1 31.1 -1.7 
Coarse grains 1.1 85.4 211.9 54.6 13.9 
Edible oils 22.5 188.7 172.7 23.7 -1.3 
Source : FAO and UN data. 
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achieve 80 percent self-sufficiency by the year 2000, when the population is 
expected to be about 37 million (MENA, 1992). 
Algerian Agricultural Policies Review 
Since independence in 1962, Algeria's agricultural sector has dominated 
economic and policy considerations. Algeria's development strategy of rapid 
industrialization has been made possible by petroleum and gas revenue and has 
emerged as the economy's engine of growth. On the other hand, Algeria's 
agricultural sector is small (only 3 percent of its land is suitable for cultivation) but 
important since it is responsible for producing food for people and employment for 
a large portion of the population (in 1990, agricultural population was 24% of total 
population) (see Table 3.17). Algeria faces two food security issues: failure to 
feed itself through its own agricultural production and its increasing inability to 
cover the cost of food imports and food subsidies (Swearings, 1992). The 
imbalance in Algerian economy, due to the strength of one sector, industry, that has 
been initiated by the weakness of another sector, agriculture, can be seen by 
considering the development plans. 
Table 3.17. The importance of agriculture in the economy 
Agri. GDP AgriPop. Agri. Imports 
% of total As % of total As % of total 
GDP population Imports 
1965 Ï978 1985 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 
Algeria 15 7 8 13 49 24 19 28 
Iran 26 9 .... 21 38 27 26 22 
Saudi 
Arabia 8 17 3 8 60 39 13 19 
Source: World Development Report and the State of Food and Agriculture, FAO, 
various years. 
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Agriculture and economic plans 
The "industrialization-first" strategy has its theoretical roots in the notion of 
industrialization as articulated by Bemis, a French adviser to Algerian industry. He 
argued that given Algeria's limited agricultural resources, the rural population could 
not maintain a reasonable standard of living and therefore had to find employment 
in the industrial sector. In any case, history had shown that an agricultural 
revolution followed, never preceded, an industrial revolution (Entelis, 1986). The 
implementation of this strategy, industrialization first, was begun with a "pre-plan" 
(1967-69) with modest objectives. During three years the structure of a state-
directed economy was created and most foreign assets were nationalized. The 
industrialization that began in the first four-year plan (1970-73) accelerated 
dramatically with a quadrupling of oil prices at the start of the second four-year 
plan (1974-77). Table 3.18 shows the sectoral balance in the Algerian economy 
during the first three plans, 1967-77. As can be seen from this table, actual 
investment in the agriculture and social infrastructure fell short of their planned 
shares. The bureaucratic system, due to the centrally planned policy, made it more 
difficult for the agriculture sector to reach its targets. Conflict in objectives of 
plans and inefficiencies caused the government to fall back to a single year plan for 
1978. In the first two four-year plans, the bulk of investment funds went to heavy 
industry. Algeria started considering light industry and agriculture in the first five-
year plan (1980-84), by allocating 12 percent of the budget for exploration of water 
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resources and agriculture. The share to industry of total investment was reduced to 
23.5 percent, compared to 45 percent in the (1970-73) plan. Policymakers called 
that investment strategy "planting Algeria's oil" since by using petroleum revenues 
they hoped to create a strong industrial base. The first five-year plan, 1980-84, was 
intended to overcome many problems, such as hyperurbanization, unemployment, 
and neglected domestic food production. Under the Benjedid regime that took 
power in 1979, Algeria moved toward reliance on market forces for resources 
allocation. Falling oil prices in the early 1980s, imbalances in earlier development 
strategies and concerns for preparing for "life after oil" forced Algeria to adopt a 
second five-year plan for 1985-90. Despite the fact that the absolute amount 
allocated to agriculture was nearly doubled, it would still represent only 14.4 
percent of the total budget under the new plan. The yearly growth rate of 
investment in agricultural production was expected to be 4.5 percent and was 
insufficient to meet the rate of growing food demand (not the rate of growing 
population) that was in turn due to the high rate of increasing urbanization and per 
capita income (e.g., growth rate of total agricultural demand was, annually, 5.9 in 
the 1965-85 period). 
In the mid 1980s, GDP (at current prices) in Algeria was 16 times its level at 
independence (1962), placing Algeria among the upper middle-income countries. 
The first oil shock in (1973-74) and the second oil shock in (1979-80) helped 
considerably in its development efforts. During 1985, the price of crude oil, which 
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had been hovering around $30 per barrel began to slip. By the summer of 1986, 
the price had fallen below $10, and in early 1987 recovered slightly. The 
catastrophe was compounded by the rapid fall in the value of the dollar, which lost 
more than 40 percent of its value against European currencies. It was these 
currencies that Algeria depended on for roughly two-thirds of imports that came 
from the Common Market (Ruedy, 1992). In the 1980s, GDP growth slowed and 
then turned negative (see Table 3.19). The state budget fell to a state of chronic 
deficit in 1986, helping trigger double-digit inflation that was worsening as the 
decade ended. Unemployment grew to 25 percent by 1988 and per capita 
consumption fell. 
Agricultural policies and food security crises 
Food riots are the most ominous symptoms of the food security crisis in 
North Africa today. Week-long riots in Algeria during October 1988 were a part of 
this common pattern. As a symbol, during the riots, the Algerian national flag over 
a prominent government building was replaced with an empty wheat sack. The 
Algerian food security crises was rooted in the variability of domestic food 
production and oil revenues that finance food imports. Also, the conflicts and 
trade-offs between the goals and tools in agricultural policies for self-sufficiency 
through increasing domestic production on the one hand and the role of imports in 
supplying the food requirement of the population on the other may contribute to the 
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Table 3.18. Planned and actual investment, 1967-1977 
1967-69 1970-73 1974-77 
Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual 
(percentage) 
Hydrocarbons 41.9 50.9 36.9 47.1 40.6 48.6 
Capita goods 47.0 40.6 48.9 46.2 47.6 44.5 
Consumer goods 11.1 8.5 14.2 6.7 11.8 6.9 
Total indushy 48.7 55.3 44.7 57 43.6 62.0 
Agriculture 16.9 16.4 14.9 13 13.2 4.7 
Infrastructure 34.4 28.3 40.4 30 43.2 33.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source; Lawless, "Algeria; the Contradictions of Rapid Industrialization," in North Africa; 
Contemporary Politics and Economic Development (1984). 
Table 3.19. Percentage growth of GDP in Algeria 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
5.2 2.7 0.6 -1.4 -2.7 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (1989). 
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food security crises. To analyze the failure of the agriculture sector, we explain, 
briefly, the agricultural goals and the means to achieve them. 
Analysis of failure in agricultural policies 
Given physical limitations in Algerian agriculture, why, in spite of the 
Algerian government's long-standing emphasis on food self-sufficiency, has the 
country's food situation become so precarious? The role of the major contributing 
factors is clear, grouping those under three factors: insufficiency of investment, 
asymmetry of sector, and government pricing policies. 
1. Shortage of investment for agricultural development. Despite the ideological 
and political significance of the agrarian sector in post-revolution Algeria and 
despite food self-sufficiency as a main goal in agricultural policies, the 
agricultural sector has been allocated only a small portion of total 
development funds. Paradoxically, the consideration given to agriculture has 
been decreasing while the consideration given to national food security has 
been increasing. For example, in the 1967-69 plan the share of agriculture 
was 25.8 percent of total investment. This percentage dropped to 14.8 
percent in the 1980-84 plan (Swearing, 1992). This share in the 1985-89 
plan was only 5.5 percent and, in fact, the additional share, that was 
allocated for water development 7.5% mainly went for dam construction, 
mostly to provide water for urban-industrial purposes. As Swearingen 
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pointed out, this shortage of government funding for agriculture has produced 
a panoply of conditions that have been highly inimical to food production 
and this shortage has been one of the major reason why Algeria's food 
security situation has become so precarious and problematic. 
2. Asymmetry of sector. There are imbalances not only between the industrial 
sector and the agriculture sector, but also within the agricultural sector itself 
These imbalances are rooted in government controlled and privately held 
lands. Algerian agriculture is comprised of three sectors: the socialist, the 
agrarian revolution, and the private sector. The socialist sector emerged in 
1962-63 when the Ahmad Ben Bella government nationalized the abandoned 
colonial farms and provided for government-regulated "self-management." 
Until 1972 when that state sector was extended, the self-managed farms 
received the vast majority of the funds accorded to agriculture. The agrarian 
revolution was initiated in the early 1970s, to redistribute land holdings in the 
nonsocialist sector. It was expected that the agrarian revolution was a way 
both to benefit landless and land-poor farmers and to help the country meet 
its critical goal of agricultural self-sufficiency by 1980. In 1973, the agrarian 
revolution entered its second phase, that of redistributing over 650,000 
hectares of private land to 60,000 landless peasants (fellahin). Those 
receiving land were to be granted permanent use of it, on condition that they 
belonged to one of the new cooperatives. Through these they were to be 
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given government loans and assistance in the form of fertilizers, seed, and 
farm machinery. By early 1979, 22,000 absentee landlords had been obliged 
either to cultivate their land or to turn it over to peasants, and more than 
6000 agricultural cooperatives had been established (MENA, 1992). 
Unfortunately, the Algerian government's commitment to agricultural self-
sufficiency temporarily fell by the wayside in the mid 1970s, when the 
quadrupling of world oil price in 1973-74 produced a huge windfall of oil 
revenues. The Algerian government began to rely on these unexpected 
revenues both to finance industrialization and to cover the cost of food 
imports. The new regime of Benjedid government introduced sweeping 
changes both in the public and private sector. In 1980, the government made 
credit available for the first time to private farmers and also allowed them 
more freedom in marketing their output (USDA, 1983). A new bank, the 
Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development (BADR) was established in 1983 
expressly to serve the rural areas and the agriculture sector, improving 
agricultural production whether socialist, state-owned or private. One of the 
first projects that BARD focused upon was heavy lending designed to make 
Algeria self-sufficient in egg and poultry production. 
From 1986 to 1988, the government allowed agricultural prices to rise, 
thus increasing incentives to farmers. It reduced subsidies on basic consumer 
goods in order to cut the fiscal deficit and encouraged state firms to set their 
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own prices, thereby letting supply and demand determine the allocation of 
resources (Roe, Roy, and Senyupta, 1989). Following OPEC s decision in 
December 1985 to campaign for a "fair share" of the world oil market, the 
slump in oil prices gave an added pressure to promotion of non-hydrocarbon 
exports. For example, in 1987/88 Algerian non-hydrocarbon exports reached 
2500 million dinars, 2000 million dinars short of the targeted figure in the 
1985-89 plan. The adjustment policy, including raising administered prices, 
cutting imports by fiat, and diversification of exports reduced GDP growth to 
1 percent in 1986 and 1987 and created a decline in per capita GDP. 
However, agrarian reforms may have allowed for higher returns to the farmer 
in the countryside, but their effect on the price of foodstuffs in the urban 
areas had been troublesomely, especially for the poor (Rummel, 1992). 
3. Pricing Policies. Since independence, the government has successfully 
maintained low producer prices in its self-management sector. For example, 
when adjusted for inflation, government prices for staple food crops, such as 
wheat and barley, held practically constant from independence after 1976, 
despite major increases in the cost of imports (Bendrari, 1982). According 
to a World Bank study, the producer prices for these crops were only one-
fifth to one-half of what they would been without government price-fixing 
(Cleaver, 1982). In addition, until the late 1970s, these prices were far 
below world market prices. The government has two motives for 
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maintaining low producer prices: first, to provide subsidized, cheap 
foodstuffs to industrial workers, and second, to provide inexpensive food for 
the urban poor, which is important for internal security. The price policy, 
sometimes called "dilemma pricing" greatly discouraged production of cereals 
and other price-controlled staple foods. Farmers tended to grow only enough 
food for their own consumption, earning money outside their farm (rugs and 
carpets, etc.) for other needs. By contrast, more prosperous farmers tend to 
invest in production of higher value speculative crops instead of investing in 
cereals or other basic food crops. 
There are two ways to increase agricultural production: by increasing area 
and by increasing yield. A study by USDA indicates that Algeria in cereal output 
has not responded in relation to high-value agricultural products. For example, 
average area and yield response to producer price for green bean and wheat in the 
1975-87 period were 3.47 and .16, respectively. 
In summary, from independence in 1962 until recently, Algeria pursued a 
socialist path of development, emphasizing industry and rigid price controls, while 
exporting oil and gas, with a per capita income of $2060 in 1990. The growth of 
GNP had a downward slope in the 1980s. The economy depends on oil revenues, 
and when oil prices fell in 1985 it cost Algeria 15 percent of its GNP in lost 
revenues. This dependency on oil and gas for 98 percent of its foreign exchange 
and increasing dependency on foreign food has made the food security situation in 
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Algeria dangerous. By increasing investment in agriculture and instituting a more 
efficient pricing policy, the country might be able to achieve its agricultural goals, 
such as wheat self-sufficiency, or at least stop the downward trend in its production. 
Wheat, which accounts for 55 percent of Algeria's cereal production and 
nearly two-thirds of the average daily caloric intake is a critical commodity in any 
plan for food self-sufficiency. The hope is that an appropriate agricultural policy, 
i.e., realistic goals and suitable means, such as a price policy, more comprehensive 
than that instituted in the mid 1980s under the banner "truth in pricing," will 
stimulate agricultural production and thus help the country to achieve food security. 
Iran: Physical Features and National Resources 
Iran is a large country with a total area of 1,648,000 square kilometers. It is 
a one of the world's most mountainous countries, consisting of an interior plateau, 
ringed on almost all sides by mountain zones of varying height and extent. The 
Iranian plateau is triangular, set between two depressions-the Caspian Sea to the 
north and the Persian Gulf to the south. Two great deserts, the Dasht-e Lut and the 
Dasht-e kavir, occupy a large part of the central plateau and together account for 
one sixth of total area of Iran. 
The climate of Iran is one of the great extremes. Owing to its southerly 
position, adjacent to Arabia and near the Thar Desert, the summer is extremely hot. 
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and in the southwest accompanied by high humidity. Most of Iran is arid, but in 
contrast, parts of the north-west and north receive considerable rainfall, up to 2000 
m. m. along parts of the Caspian coast. The Caspian shore is hot and humid. This 
region is by far the most densely populated of the whole country. The extreme east 
and south, where rainfall is very scanty, were for long extremely lightly populated, 
except in the few parts where nomadic groups settled due to availability of water. 
The water shortage is intensified by unequal distribution of water owing to the 
seasonal rainfall pattern. According to most recent estimates, surface water in Iran 
is about 85,000 million cu. m, only 71% of which is used in agriculture (Jomhori 
Islami, 1993). To make the best use of the limited amounts of water, the Iranians 
centuries ago developed man-made underground water channels called "qanat" 
which are still in use. The main advantage of the qanats is that its underground 
location prevents most of the evaporation to which water carried in surface 
channels is subject. The country is also under constraint in regard to cultivated land 
resource. More than half of Iran's land surface (165 million hectares) is 
uncultivated. 
The 1988 agricultural census reported that there were 56 million hectares of 
cultivable farm land, 16.8 million hectares of which are actually being cultivated. 
Some a 9 million hectare of cultivated area is dry-farmed, purely dependent on 
water supplied by rain. This farming system is predominated in the western area of 
the country (MENA, 1992). 
According the national census, the 1986 population of Iran was 48,181,463. 
This total included 2.6 million refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq. Based on World 
Bank Report (1992), the country's population reached 55.8 million in mid-1990, 
and government records indicates that the number of refugees living in the country 
reached 4 million in 1992. Its population annual growth rate, 3.6 percent in the 
period 1976-1986, puts Iran's population growth among highest in the world. The 
average population density for the country was 32.9 persons per square kilometer at 
mid-1989. In some regions, such as Caspian coast, it is significantly higher than 
the national average, while in the more arid regions of Central plateau and south­
west it is 12 or fewer persons per square kilometer. 
Apart from oil and gas, Iran's mineral wealth includes chromite, lead, zinc, 
copper, coal, gold, tin, iron, manganese, and tungsten. Iranian copper deposits are 
among the world's largest (Iran a country study, 1989). Iran's non-oil mineral 
export were valued at $ 90.2 million in 1988. Based on 1989 data, the proven 
crude oil reserves in Iran were estimated to be 92.9 billion barrels at year-end, and 
based on 1987 production rate, it is expected to continue for more than 96.5 years. 
With proven reserves of 14,000,000 m. cu. m, Iran is the world's second richest 
country in gas resources, 12.6% of the global reserve. 
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Agricultural Development 
In 1983, oil revenues which was about 19 billion dollars provided funds for 
strong upsurge in imports needed for the war with Iraq. Erratic rainfall in the 
winter and spring of 1982/3 lowered wheat and barley yield. This situation, plus 
reduced availability of fertilizer, chemicals, and machinery, party due to port and 
transportation difficulties, caused a decline in agricultural production in 1983. The 
indices of FAO show that the agricultural production fell from 106 in 1982 to 100 
in 1983, on per capita basis, using 1979-81 as base period. Despite a high 
procurement price for wheat (about $250 per ton), plus easy credit, some of most 
fertile irrigated land was shifted from wheat to vegetables (e.g., watermelon) and 
alfalfa. Therefore, total cereals production decreased from 10,261,000 tons in 1982 
to 9,255,000 tons in 1983. A drop in grains output is reflected in the lower 
government procurement of domestic wheat, which was about one million tons in 
1977 and 1981 but dropped to 60 percent of that volume in 1983 (probably due to 
the declining purchasing power of the rial, transportation problems and rising non­
governmental market prices) (MENA, Outlook Situation and Report, 1984). 
The output of livestock in 1982 was about a third below the 1978 peak. A 
modest rebound occurred in 1983 as more imported feed grains were distributed to 
cooperatives. Meat production, for example, increased from 682,000 tons in 1982 
to 697,000 tons in 1983. 
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Iran's economy rebounded in 1985, as some industries in the war area 
previously occupied by Iraq reopened and agricultural production recovered from 
the deep drought of 1984. Lower oil prices were not fully offset by higher volume, 
and total oil export earnings declined to $13 billion in 1985 from $19.2 billion in 
1983. 
In 1985, agricultural production rose about 8 percent, following a 4 percent 
decline in 1984 when drought reduced yields in western Iran. Wheat output 
rebounded 18 percent and reached 6.6 million tons. Prices of wheat, barley, and 
rice were above world average at the official exchange rate (MENA, Outlook and 
Situation Report, 1986). Output of livestock rose about 4 percent, based on FAO 
indices, from 117 in 1984 to 123 in 1985, but shortages of meat and eggs remained 
severe. 
Iran's oil export earnings dropped to only $7.2 billion in 1986. The value of 
Iran's total imports declined from $11.63 billion in 1985 to $10.52 billion in 1986. 
Favorable weather and greater use of improved seed and farming methods 
contributed to a 8 percent increase in agricultural output. Cereal production 
increased from 10.79 million tons in 1985 to 12 million tons in 1986. The 
agricultural production indices were 113, 115, and 119 in 1984, 1985, and 1986, 
respectively. The greatest weakness in Iran's agriculture lies in the livestock sector. 
Meat production in 1983 increased to 720,000 tons, but still was below 1978's 
(before Islamic Revolution) 738,000 tons. The per capita index of livestock, using 
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1979-81=100 as base period, shows an increase to 100.44 in 1986. Then it fell to 
99 and had a flat trend by 1990. 
Agricultural consumption during 1980s increased. For example, wheat 
consumption, for all uses, increased from 6.8 million tons in 1980 to 10 million 
tons in 1990. The per capita consumption of cereals grew annually by 3.7 in the 
1980-1987 period. In the mid-1980s, the economy deteriorated markedly following 
several significant events: the ensuring nationalization of many industries, the costly 
war with Iraq, the imposition of trade and financial sanctions from the West, and 
the decline of oil prices. Farm sector gains stemmed from positive government 
support and the fact that shortages of capital and foreign exchange had less negative 
impact than on other sectors. Pricing, credit, and subsidy polices increased 
productivity, food security, and rural welfare (Developing Economics, USDA, 
1990). However, despite the support of import substitution policy in agricultural 
production in 1980s, Iran continues to be dependent on imports of cereals, as well 
as other foods. In the 1980s, major farm product imports were cereals, meats, 
edible oils, dairy products, and sugar. Due to problems and agricultural policies 
mentioned above, the growth rates of almost all items in food imports declined in 
the 1980s in comparison with 1970s rates (see Table 3.20). 
The Iranian economy experienced turbulent events beginning with the 
revolution in 1979, leading to the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Among 
others, these included a protracted and costly war with Iraq, various trade and 
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financial sanctions imposed by the West, and instability of the world oil market. 
These developments brought profound institutional and structural changes in the 
economy, one of which was the growing significance given to agriculture. Article 
43 of the new Islamic Constitution specifies a number of "regulations" on the basis 
of which the Government must "achieve independence in national economy", uproot 
poverty and impoverishment, fulfill growing human needs, including food, and 
securing employment. The new Constitution also makes "systematic and sound 
planning" a tool of economic management (Article 44). The agriculture sector 
provides food and employment to a large part of the population (see, again. Table 
3.17) and became an "axis of development" and is considered important in 
economic development plans. 
Agricultural Policies in Development Plans 
Iran is characterized as an oil based economy and it might be fairly 
asked why agricultural development should be a matter of concern in a country that 
is blessed with large oil and gas resources and substantial revenue arising firom oil 
exports. In the long-run, relying on a nonrenewable source (i.e., oil) with variable 
revenue means no guarantee for economic growth in the future. Experience, both 
in Iran and elsewhere, suggests that for oil based economy development would be 
assisted if agriculture were made profitable and productive (Meier, 1976). 
Table 3.20. Iran: Agricultural trade summary 
Commodity Total imports Growth rates 
1969-71 1979-81 1986-88 1970's 1980's 
$ million percent 
All merchandise 1766.7 11938.5 9863.7 21.1 -2.7 
Ag. products 165.8 2266.8 1792.0 29.9 -3.3 
Live animals 7.2 75.4 15.2 26.5 -20.5 
Meat & prep. 7.2 298.1 267.0 45.2 -1.6 
Daily prod. & eggs 11.4 352.2 186.9 41.0 -8.7 
Wheat & flour 26.3 201.9 356.6 22.6 8.5 
Coarse grains 5.3 200.5 101.3 43.7 -9.3 
Edible oils 38.7 308.1 193.4 23.0 -6.4 
Source: FAO and UN data. 
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Agriculture has a particular importance as a sector for development because it is 
able to absorb a relatively large number of workers at low unit cost. This reason is 
even more important if we consider the high growth of the population and the 
demographic pattern of Iran. 
By 1992, the Iranian government had implemented seven development plans 
five before the Islamic Revolution (1979) and two plans after the revolution. Since 
our analyses in this study cover 1960-1991, and the third plan was the first 
comprehensive plan, we start our analysis with the third plan. 
The third development plan (1963-67) 
Traditional agrarian systems are generally associated with outmoded methods 
of production, low land and labor productivity, and rural poverty and inequality. 
This is especially true for the traditional tenancy systems which covered most 
agricultural land and population in the developing countries of Asia and the Middle 
East. The Iranian agrarian system in the early 1960s was such a system (Amid, 
1990). In the third plan, primary emphasis was placed on the growth target of 6 
percent annual growth in GNP, increased employment possibilities, more equal 
distribution of income, stabilization of prices and equilibrium in the balance of 
payments. 
The most important policy action in the agricultural sector during the 1960s 
was the adoption of a major land reform program something that was not even 
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mentioned in the 1963-67 development plan. The official claim for the program 
was that it would boost production by freeing the agriculture sector from the fetters 
of the "feudal" land structure and ultimately benefit the "great mass of needy" 
peasants. The Shah's land reform program mirrored the principal characteristic of 
his modernization or Westernization policy. It failed to take sufficient account of 
the actual factors and specific structures of land tenure that were hindering 
development and failed to recognize the potential for development in the traditional 
structure of Iranian village (deh), instead pursuing an extreme reform course that 
was inconsistent and contradictory (Schirazi, 1993). Between 1962 and 1974, the 
number of peasants who became landowners as a consequence of land reform 
program was 1,766,625. It increased from one- third to two-thirds of total peasants 
who were landowners. It increased from one-third to three-fourths the amount of 
total arable land under cultivation. As Schirazi mentioned, land reform smashed the 
traditional organizational structure of agrarian production in Iran without replacing 
it with a new and adequate one. For example, it changed the village system (deh), 
which regulated the relationship of the peasants to the land and water as well as to 
one another as cooperating producers. That system was broken by land reform and 
replaced with a fragmented holding system that proved unworkable without 
sustained assistance from the government for the provision of crucial inputs such as 
irrigation and credit. Due to the limitations of space and scope in this study, we 
will not evaluate the land reform here. However, as Karshenas (1990) says: "The 
Shah's land reform, a reform from above, originated in economic and political 
developments outside Iranian agriculture itself. The implemented reform took more 
than a decade to be completed. Minimal participation of the peasantry at the village 
level amounted to a surgical operation whereby the absentee landlords were 
removed from the apex of agrarian socio-economic hierarchy, without creating 
major changes in the distribution of holding and with minimum disturbance at the 
village level". Moreover, there was a major departure from the objectives of the 
plan in areas of irrigation projects, which due to the land reform, absorbed at least 
13.6 percent of total expenditure on agriculture and irrigation. As a result of this 
change in objectives and means, 80 percent of the actual investment in irrigation 
was absorbed by large-scale and capital-intensive dams (which were stressed in the 
second plan; the third plan claims to change this emphasis). Only 4 percent of 
frinds were allocated to small dams and "qanats" (a traditional irrigation method) 
with minimum dependence to outside technology. On the other hand, in the third 
plan only 1 percent of total expenditure in the agriculture sector was allocated to 
training and research. Mofid (1987) mentioned that construction of prestige-giving 
projects seems to have been more important than investing in people. The original, 
revised, and final allocations of the third plan are shown in Table 3.21. As shown 
in the table, within the sectoral allocations of the public investment programe, 
agriculture, industry and services were equally emphasized. However, the planned 
4.1 percent growth rate of agriculture, the only sectoral growth rate to be included 
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in the plan as a target, was not achieved. Agricultural growth reached only 3.0 
percent. 
The fourth development plan (1968-72) 
The overall objectives of the plan can be summarized as: 
1. To increase the rate of economic growth by gradually increasing the relative 
importance of industry, through raising its productivity; 
2. To achieve a more equitable distribution of income through employment and 
welfare policies; 
3. To decrease the nation's dependence on foreign countries in meeting its basic 
requirement (needs), this coupled with a diversification of exports. 
Contrary to previous plans, the period of the fourth plan saw no wild 
fluctuations among the social, political, and economic variables and no exogenous 
shocks to the national entity. As the data in Table 3.22 show, in contrast to 
previous plans, the industrial sector received the highest priority, i.e., 20.3 percent 
of actual expenditure as compared with 8.4 percent in agriculture. The fourth plan 
was to increase real GNP by 9.3 percent per year. It was expected that foreign 
exchange receipts during the plan would be $9,448 million (in current prices), 
$7,032 million of which was to be from oil revenues. As can be noted from Table 
3.22, the outstanding feature in that plan belongs to services, especially transport 
and communications. Agriculture in comparison to other sectors was the "poor 
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Table 3.21. Sectoral distribution of planned and actual public development 
outlays by the public sector during the Third Plan period 
(1962-67) (Billion rials) 
Planned Actual -
Plan Frame Plan Frame Final allocations (at current prices) 
(at '60 prices) (Revised) (at current prices) 
Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % 
Agriculture & 
Irrigation 41.8 22.0 45.0 22.5 49.0 21.3 47.3 23.1 
Irrigation (11.8) (6.2) (16.5) (8.2) (22.0) (9.6) (21.7) (10.6) 
Industry and 
Mining 34.5 18.1 21.9 10.9 29.1 12.6 17.1 8.3 
Power and 
Fuel 19.2 10.1 27.0 13.5 35.0 15.2 32.0 15.6 
Transport & 
Communications 46.2 25.3 50.0 25.0 60.0 26.1 53.8 26,3 
Housing and 
Construction 13.0 5.7 12.2 6.0 
Social 
Aflairs (40.9) (21.5) (48.6) (24.4) (43.9) (19.1) (42.2) (20.7) 
Education 15.7 8.3 17.9 9.0 18.0 7.8 17.5 8.6 
Manpower 5.3 2.8 8.0 4.0 3.3 1.4 2.8 1.4 
Health 12.3 6.5 13.9 7.0 13.5 5.9 13.2 6.5 
Urban 
development 6.0 • 3.1 8.0 4.0 7.5 3.3 2.7 3.5 
statistics 1.6 0.8 0.8 0.4 1.6 0.7 1.5 0,7 
Unspecified 5.6 3.0 7.5 3.7 - - - -
Total 190.2 100.0 200,0 100.0 230.0 100.0 204.6 100,0 
Source; Mofîd, 1987. 
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cousin". This unbalanced growth strategy had a negative effect on agricultural 
sector performance. The agricultural sector's growth was slightly faster than the 
population's, 3 percent annually, in the third plan periods. This agricultural growth 
was different among different products. For example, the cash crops like cotton 
and raw sugar were mostly responsible for the growth rate. The growth of wheat 
and barley during the fourth plan periods were -1.9 and -7.0 percent, respectively 
(Table 3.23). 
Finally, during 1968-72, agricultural production was not sufficient to satisfy 
domestic needs and about 79.6 billion rials agricultural products were imported. 
Table 3.24 shows the relative decline of the agriculture sector as a share of GDP (in 
constant 1959 prices). That is, during 10 years the agriculture share of GNP fell 
from 26.6 percent to 16.1 percent in 1972. 
The fifth development plan (1973-1977) 
The fifth plan was basically a continuation of the fourth plan, since the first 
oil shock took place in 1973-74 and it was the last plan of the Shah's regime. 
Analysis of this plan is very important to understanding economic reasons for the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979 and most recent economic policies in Iran. Even 
though the initial fifth plan was very ambitious, it was abandoned in favor of an 
even more ambitious version as oil prices rose in the last quarter by about four fold. 
The oil revenue which was $2,400 million in 1973 jumped to $5,066 million in 
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Table 3.22. Sectoral distribution of planned and actual public 
development outlays during the Fourth Plan 
(1968-72) (billion rials: at curmt prices) 
Sector Approved Credits Final Revision 
Original Share Amount Share 
(Amount) % % 
Agriculture 60.5 13.2 46.7 8.4 
Industry & Mines 98.9 21.6 115.6 20.9 
Oil and Gas 26.3 5.8 61.7 11.1 
Water 48.5 10.6 45.3 8.2 
Power 38.0 8.3 42.2 7.6 
Transport & Communications 79.6 17.4 84.3 15.2 
T elecommunications 20.3 4.5 46.5 8.4 
Rural development 8.8 1.9 10.3 1.9 
Urban development 7.0 1.5 9.1 1.6 
Housing & construction 23.0 5.0 43.0 7.8 
Education 19.4 4.3 19.0 3.4 
Culture 1.8 0.4 1.5 0.3 
Tourism 3.6 0.8 3.5 0.6 
Health 12.4 2.7 15.7 2.8 
Social Welfare 4.9 1.1 5.7 1.0 
Statistics & other 4.1 0.9 4.4 0.8 
Total 457.1 100.0 554.5 100.0 
Source: Mofid, 1987. 
Table 3.23. Agricutural output and growth ( 1968-72) 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Annual average growth 
(1000 tons) rates (1968-72) 
Wheat 4400 3900 3800 3870 4034 -1.9 
Barley 1160 1200 1200 800 800 -7.0 
Rice 1000 1046 1138 1046 1015 .4 
Cotton 160 155 150 148 208 6.7 
Sugar 478 540 566 580 625 6.9 
Meat 240 252 240 239 263 2.4 
Milk 1900 1800 1900 1900 1900 1.0 
Source: Mofid, 1987. 
Table 3.24. The Distribution of GDP by sector 
(%) 
1962 1967 1972 
Agriculture 26.6 20.9 16.1 
Manufacturing 12.4 13.6 13.4 
& mining 
Services 35.9 35.2 37.4 
Oil 20.2 24.0 26.7 
Source: Mofid, 1987. 
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1974 and reached $21 billion in 1975 (Rashidi, 1992). These higher oil revenues 
allowed some revisions in the development plan. This revised version was prepared 
hastily and with great optimism over future oil revenues. The main objectives of 
the revised fifth plan (1973-77) can be summarized as: 
1. To raise the quality of life for all social groups; 
2. To maintain rapid, balanced, and sustained economic growth, together with 
minimum price increases; 
3. To fully utilize foreign exchange resources so as to remedy domestic shortages 
and check inflationary pressures, for foreign investment and for the creation of 
sources of national wealth to replace the depletion of oil resources over time. 
More specifically, the plan was based on an overall growth target in real 
GNP of 25.9 percent annually. When the expected population growth rate of 2.9 
percent per annum is considered, the target per capita GNP growth rate amounts to 
22.3 percent. Data shows the growth targets for the value added of each major 
sector at 1973 prices. The average annual growth rate for oil output was set at 15.0 
percent and agriculture was once more the very "poor cousin" at 7.0 percent. In 
fact, more than 50 percent of growth belonged to the oil sector (51.5%). When 
comparing the figures given in the original and revised plans, we can note that the 
projected total receipts rose over 148 percent. However, the Iranian budget, which 
had consistently registered a surplus, showed a deficit in 1975. Two reasons can be 
cited: (a) total expenditures were rising at an increasingly rapid rate and (b) the oil 
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revenues were not rising at the anticipated rate (oil revenues had a shortfall of 
19.5%). The shortfall in oil revenues and resulting budget deficit forced Iran to 
turn to the international money markets for survival (143.8 billion rials were 
borrowed in 1977). The financing of the deficit and cost-push pressures increased 
prices by 25.1 percent in 1977. Food prices were perhaps one of the most 
important elements in this cost-push inflation during this period. 
It is a well documented fact that the agricultural sector during the fifth plan, 
as in other plan periods, was neglected. The disproportionate emphasis on 
agribusiness was not in harmony with Iran's agricultural tradition and culture [see, 
for example, Katozian (1981)]. We will concentrate our attention on the 
consequences of agricultural policies during the fifth plan in agricultural domestic 
production and imports, as well as in major agricultural prices. As can be noted 
from Table 3.25, between 1973 and 1977, on average, the price of food increased 
by 13.3 percent annually. The highest price increases were recorded for meat 
products (18.5%). As in other oil exporting countries, Iran's government heavily 
subsidized food prices ($1 billion a year from 1974 to 1976) significantly reducing 
the inflation rate for food. On the domestic production side, the production of 
staple crops (including com) had a positive growth rate, while industrial crops' 
negative growth rate worsened between 1973 and 1977. These figures, in absolute 
terms and in isolation, may be misleading if we do not consider the trends in 
population growth during the plan periods. Between 1973 and 1977, population 
82 
grew at 2.7 percent per year. Table 3.26 shows the growth rate of total food 
production during the same period. The table indicates that during 1974/5 and 
1977/8, total food production grew by 4.1, 5.5, -3.5, and 5.6 percent annually. The 
annual population growth rate, on average, was 2.7 in the same periods (Mofid, 
1987). 
Moreover, as mentioned by Katuzian (1981), given the general neglect of the 
agricultural sector and poor policies by the government, such as the forced 
settlement of nomadic populations (a major source for domestic livestock 
production) and monopolization of pastoral land by the state, the total number of 
livestock in Iran during the plan periods declined. The facts and figures for the 
period under study show that even though agricultural production and imports 
increased much faster than the rate of population growth, the country faced food 
shortages and price increases. The following is an attempt to outline some of the 
reasons for such an outcome. 
As a result of its agricultural and industrial policies, especially after the first 
oil shock in 1973-74, there was a significant internal migration from rural to urban 
areas. It has been observed that in the fifth plan period the rural exodus reached an 
average of 25,000 per year. These migrants were transformed from net producers 
to net consumers of food in a market which was already stretched. This would not 
have been a source of problems if the market were able to provide and distribute 
food adequately and efficiently. But, given bottlenecks in the infrastructure and as 
Table 3.25. Annual average changes in consumer price index for agricultural 
products: 1973-1977 (%) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Average 
Food 8.3 19.2 5.6 12.9 20.6 13.3 
Dairy products 
&eggs -0.1 16.6 6.2 8.9 13.7 9.1 
Bread &rice 5.1 24.1 1.9 14.2 22.0 13.5 
Meat & pouldy 22.3 25.8 6.2 14.3 21.6 18.5 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, 1977. 
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Table 3.26. Growth rates of total food production 
percent per year (%) 
Period average 
1967-70 5.0 
1970-78 3.2 
1970-74 4.8 
1974-75 4.1 
1975-76 5.5 
1976-77 - 3.5 
1977-78 5.6 
1974-78 2.9 
Source: Mofid, 1987. 
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there were too many activities taking place simultaneously in all sectors, the market 
was not able to cope with the rapid increase in demand. In addition, due to 
increases in oil prices and oil revenues, the wages increased in the cities, further 
increasing food demand. A great quantity of agricultural products was wasted 
through bad storage and inefficient transport and marketing practices. Based on one 
estimation, this wasted food production was about $2 billion during the fifth plan 
(Graham, 1980). In summary, food-price inflation was mostly due to structural 
inefficiencies and excessive waste contributed to large-scale food 
shortages. In the fifth plan, the growth rate did not exceed 4.6 percent. 
Agricultural policies in post-revolution development plans 
The Islamic government that took power in Iran after the Revolution of 1979 
was determined to change the orientation of socioeconomic policies that prevailed 
under the Shah's regime. Since 1979, the government attached the highest priority 
to the rehabilitation and development of the agricultural sector, and policies have 
been aimed at increasing productivity, food security, and rural welfare. A number 
of internal and external factors constrained progress toward these goals. These 
included the invasion of Iran by Iraq in 1981, interruptions in the supply of 
domestically produced agricultural machinery, cuts in development expenditures, 
recurrent droughts, and uncertainty over property rights. Generally, the agriculture 
sector performed better than the rest of economy during the 1980s, primarily due to 
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the positive public attitude toward agricultural development that was declared to be 
the "axis of development" and the fact that shortages of capital, skills, and foreign 
exchange (due to capital flight after revolution) affected this sector relatively less 
than other sectors. Rapid population growth and food subsidies in the country have 
created dilemmas for the management of the agricultural sector as a source of food 
supply. In this section, we discuss the agricultural policies after the Islamic revolu­
tion for 1981/82 and for 1987/88. This period includes two years after the revolu­
tion and the first Islamic plan (1983/89-1987/88). In fact so far, Iran has two plans. 
To distinguish them, we call the first one the Islamic plan (1983/84-1987/88) and 
the second one the First Five-Year Plan (1989/90-1993/94). 
In Iran, as well as other oil exporting countries where the government has 
direct control over the disposal of a large part of national income in the form of 
foreign earnings ft'om oil exports, the plan document is an important publication for 
analyzing government intervention in the economy and sectoral policies. 
In 1983, while Iran was still suffering from the economic consequences of the 
embargo and its continuing war with Iraq, a revised version of the first plan (the 
Islamic plan) was submitted by the Iranian Parliament. The general objectives and 
orientations in the first plan were as follows: 
1. Expansion of education and culture; 
2. Securing the interests of the Mostazafan (the down-trodden people); 
3. Provision of food, clothing, and housing. 
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The most important priorities of the plan were: 
a) prevention of consumerism and emphasis on investment; 
b) agriculture as the "axis" of development; 
c) utilization of current spare capacity in industry and increase in productivity; 
d) expansion of non-oil exports. 
The plan targeted GDP to grow at an annual real rate of 8.9 percent during the plan 
period. The highest annual growth target belongs to the oil sector, 15.9 percent, 
and for agriculture the growth rate was expected to be 7.0 percent. The non-oil 
component of GDP is planned to increase by 6.9 percent, on average, per year. 
The projected share of various sectors in GDP is given in Table 3.27. As we can 
note, the share of agriculture remained constant between about 15 and 14 percent in 
the plan period. The population is projected to grow at 3.1 percent per year. Per 
capita GDP was projected to increase on average by 5.8 percent, while the increase 
for per capita non-oil GDP would be 3.9 percent per year. 
Total government revenue is programmed to rise at 14.5 percent per year, and 
the oil share in this is expected to be 58 percent. It is projected that oil revenues 
rise by 14.4 percent on average, i.e. increase from $20.3 billion in 1983/84 to 
$34.8 billion in 1987/88, in 1983 constant prices. Also, the planned growth rate of 
15.9 percent for the oil sector, as a financial source, was very high too, considering 
the low probability of a rapid expansion of the world economy, the persistent world 
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oil glut, and the pressure on OPEC members to reduce their oil production, because 
of the Iran/Iraq war (Mofid, 1987). 
Based on official data in the 1980s, the share of agriculture in GDP was 
constant, about 15 percent up to 1986, and then increased to about 23 percent for 
the remainder of the decade. Agricultural output from 1986 to 1989, despite the 
intensification of the war and the impact of drought, rose at an average annual 
growth rate of 4 percent. Production of food grains (wheat, rice, and barley) rose 
by about 5 percent during 1986-88. Although some crops were adversely affected 
by unfavorable weather in the latter years, rice and barley crops fared well, both 
recording an increase of 8 percent. Despite the limited availability of cultivable 
land, the area under food grain production, of which 73 percent is devoted to 
wheat, increased by about 2.5 percent annually. Partly due to scant rainfall in many 
parts of Iran in the late 1980s, the crop yields remained relatively low. While some 
progress has been made toward achieving increased productivity and enforced food 
security, results from rural-urban income expenditure surveys suggest that between 
1982/83 and 1987/88 annual income (nominal) of rural families increased by 85 
percent. Compared with a 62 percent increase in the income of urban families, on 
the other hand, the average cost of living for rural families increased by 80 percent 
compared with 69 percent for urban families in the same period. Income of rural 
families as percent of income of urban families increased from 55 percent in 1982-
83 to 63 percent in 1987-88 (Central Bank of Iran, 1990), 
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Table 3.27. Projected share of sectors in GDP 
(%) 
1983/4 1984/5 1985/6 1986/7 1987/8 
Agriculture 15.3 15.1 14.8 14.5 14.2 
Industry 20.3 21.6 22.9 24.4 25.9 
Services 45.9 43.9 42.0 39.8 37.7 
Oil 20.3 21.6 22.9 24.4 25.9 
Source: Mofid, 1987. 
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The First Five-Year Plan, covering the period 1989/90-1993/94, was approved 
by the Majlis (Parliament) on January 31, 1990. Some of the macro targets of this 
development plan that cover the reconstruction era (following the war with Iraq and 
economic adjustment period) were: 
1. The GDP shall have an average growth rate of 8.1 percent annually at constant 
1989 prices, and per capita product shall increase by an annual rate of 4.9 percent 
on the average. 
2. Investment shall grow by an annual rate of 11.6 percent on average; 
3. Oil and gas exports shall amount to $19,200 million in 1993 and $80,090 
million for the entire plan period; 
4. Non-oil exports shall increase during the plan, to make possible a diversification 
of foreign exchange resources of the country. They shall total $17,836 million over 
the plan period. 
Major sectoral target in agriculture were: 
a) The irrigated area under cultivation of crops shall increase from 6,300,000 
hectares to 6,700,000 hectares. 
b) Operations aimed at improving water convergence along traditional streams over 
an area of 750,000 hectares, along with increasing irrigation efficiency in farms 
over an area of 50,000 hectares, shall be completed during the plan period. 
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c) Wheat production (irrigated and dry farming) shall increase by an average 
annual rate of 9.5 percent from 7.012 million tons in 1989 to 11.049 million tons in 
1993. 
d) Rice production shall increase by an average annual rate of 3.8 percent from 
1,701 thousand tons to 2,055 thousand tons. 
e) Red meat production shall increase by an average annual rate of 3.4 percent 
from 52,500 tons to 620,000 tons. Over the same period, white meat production 
shall increase by 11.6 percent annually. As Table 3.28 indicates, the average 
annual sectoral growth rates during the plan period are envisioned as follows; 5.8 
percent in agriculture; 9.7 percent in oil; 14.3 percent in industry and mining; and 
6.7 percent in services. 
Within the agricultural sector, major increases in output are foreseen for 
sugar beet and sugarcane (100 percent), wheat (88 percent), oil seeds (83 percent), 
and feed (52 percent) over five years (see Table 3.29 ). Based on the most recent 
official reports of performance of the agricultural sector in the First Five-Year Plan 
(1989/90 to 1993/94), the following conclusions may be reached: 
Wheat. The production of wheat which was 7,012 thousand tons in 1989/90 
reached about 10,354 thousand tons in 1993, giving an annual giowth rate of 10.2 
percent. The annual growth rate targeted in the plan is 9.8 percent. The actual rate 
of growth of wheat production exceeded the planned rate. 
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Rice. Rice production in 1989/90 was 1,700 thousand tons and 2,500 thou­
sand tons in 1993 giving an annual growth rate of about 10.1 percent. The project­
ed increase in rice production in the First Five-Year Plan was 4.8 percent per year. 
Sugar beets. The production of sugar beets in 1990 was about 4,446 thousand tons, 
and 6,000 thousand tons in 1993, an increase of 7.8 percent. This fells short 
compared with the projected growth rate of 9.2 percent. 
In 1992, the per capita daily consumption of animal protein was about 19.9 
grams, 16.8 grams of which was provided by domestic sources and 3.1 grams by 
outside sources (imports). The share of meat in per capita consumption of animal 
protein was about 59 percent, including 5.28 grams of red meat, 3.89 grams of 
poultry, 2.49 grams of fish, 6.48 grams of milk products, and 1.84 grams of eggs. 
The 19.9 grams compares favorably with other developing countries, 12.7 grams 
(Jihad, 1992), but not when compared with the F AO estimate of 24 grams of 
animal protein. It seems that Iran in the future, given a high rate of population 
growth, needs to improve the per capita consumption of protein to meet established 
levels recommended for good nutrition. 
Red meat. Red meat production rose firom 525 thousand tons in 1989 to 625 
thousand tons in 1993. The actual growth rate of red meat production of 4.5 
percent is greater than the planned growth rate of 3.4 percent. 
Poultry. The production of chicken meat increased from 300 thousand tons 
in 1989 to 520 thousands tons in 1993, an actual growth rate of 14.7 percent. This 
Table 3.28. Economic indicators in Iran p^i. 
1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 
Rates of growth 
(Annual percentage changes) 
Real GDP (market prices) 7.9 14.4 10.3 3.3 4.2 -8.4 -1.1 1.7 4.4 
Oil sector 8.9 121.9 3.1 -19 l.I -14.6 13.8 6.5 21.4 
Agriculture II.O 9.7 3.5 7.3 8.0 4.3 2.6 3.9 2.7 
Industry 15.0 -7.9 14.3 8.7 -1.6 -6.2 -5.2 -l.l -6.1 
Services 6.0 5.3 10.5 6.9 63 -10.8 -3.9 1.6 2.4 
Share of total GDP 
Oil sector 9.5 9.5 18.5 17.5 13.8 13.4 12.4 14.3 14.9 17.4 
Agriculture 14.8 15.1 14.5 13.8 14.4 14.9 17.0 17.6 17.9 17.7 
Industry 21.4 22.6 18.3 19.2 20.3 19.2 19.6 18.7 18.1 16.4 
Services 54.3 52.8 48.7 49.5 51.5 52.5 51.0 49.4 49.1 48.5 
Source: Cetral Bank of Iran, 1990. 
Table 3.29. Islamic Republic of Iran; Major targets of the agricultural sector 
under Five-Year Plan (1000 tons) 
1989/90 1993/4 Percent change 
Wheat 4.500.0 6,459.0 88.0 
Rice 1,701.0 2.055.0 20.8 
Sugar 115.0 231.0 100.9 
oil seeds 156.0 285.0 82.7 
Cotton 359.7 452.0 25.7 
Feed 9.819.5 14.898.0 51.7 
Source; Central Bank of Iran. 1990. 
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is greater than the planned rate of 11.4 percent. 
Eggs. The actual growth rate of egg production, matched the projected rate 
of 11.8 percent. Production of eggs rose from 280 thousand tons in 1990 to 390 
thousand tons in 1993 (Ettela'at, 1993). 
Saudi Arabia: Physical Features and Natural Resources 
The Arabian Peninsula is a strongly marked geographical unit, delimited on 
three sides by sea—on the east by the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, on the south 
by the Indian Ocean, and on the west by the Red Sea-while the other remaining 
side is mostly composed of desert. The largest state in that peninsula is Saudi 
Arabia, which has a land area of 2,240,000 square kilometers (865,000 square 
miles). 
Saudi Arabia's latitude dictates that its climate is hot. There is, however, 
remarkable variation in the climate among the various regions of the country. The 
north and central regions of the country enjoy a continental climate: summers are 
quite hot, winters quite cool, and all season are dry. On the coasts the humidity 
can be high but the seasonal variations in temperature are moderate. The 
mountainous regions of the southwest are the only regions which receive apprecia­
ble amounts of rainfall. Because of its land-locked nature, the winds reaching 
Arabia are generally dry, and almost all the area is arid. The winter season 
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precipitation falls at the following rates: 30-90 m. m. in the north, 85-110 m. m. in 
the central regions, and 50-70 m. m. in the east. The western hills receive a rainfall 
rate of 300 m. m. . In general, rainfall is very limited and lacks uniformity in 
distribution in terms of both time and space. In the western hills rainfall may come 
as intense storms, causing destructive floods. 
Surface water is available in the form of quick floods, varying in flow rate 
and distribution (mostly found in the Asir mountains, southwest). The total surface 
runoff is estimate at 2.2 billion cu. m. of which 1.6 billion cu.m. run through the 
coastal valleys to the Red Sea. The ground water resources vary, depending on the 
water bearing formation. The Quaternary sedimentary rocks in the Red Sea coast 
and the sedimentary rocks in the region of the valleys provide a volume of 470 
million cu. m of water, while the other water formations provide some 430 million 
cu.m. of water (Baasiri, 1990). The area of arable land is concentrated essentially 
in the coast strip in the Tahama plain, in the Oasis region in the east coast, and in 
the internal Oasis. 
Based on United Nations estimate, 1987 population of Saudi Arabia for mid-
1990 was 14,870,000. An estimated 67% of the population reside in urban areas in 
1980, with remaining 33%, including settled farmers (clustered around Oases) and 
the bedouin (nomadic desert dwellers), living in rural areas. The total expatriate 
population in 1985 was estimated at 4,563,000. However, two factors have led to 
recent decline of the expatriate population to 1 million. First, the economic 
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recession and the reduction in construction projects due to declining oil prices have 
reduced the demand for labor. Second, the government has vigorously attempted to 
restrict the number of expatriates partly due to rapid population growth rate. 
Like other countries in the region, the population density of Saudi Arabia is a 
product of its climate. It is very low and very unevenly distributed across the 
country. Large chunks of the peninsula are virtually uninhabited. While there are 
teaming cities dispersed throughout the country, they are found disproportionately 
along the coasts. 
Saudi Arabia is the richest, yet possibly the most enigmatic country in the 
Middle East because of much publicity owing to its crucial role in the world supply 
of petroleum. Little is known about other economic resources in Saudi Arabia. In 
fact, it has only been fairly recently that non-oil minerals have attracted much 
attention. For example, gold is now commercial mined. In 1991, 31 sites out of 
495 in the country were estimated to contain more than 1000 kg. each of gold. 
Saudi Arabia is the biggest oil producer within Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), claiming 27% of OPEC's output in 1990, and is the 
third biggest producer in the world, with about 10.3% of world output in 1990. 
Saudi Arabia proven reserves of petroleum were officially declared to be 255,000 
million barrels in January 1990, allowing 133 more years of production at 1989 
levels of extraction (MENA, 1992). 
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Agricultural Development 
The first Saudi Arabian budget deficit in decades took place in 1984. As the 
leading oil producer in OPEC, Saudi Arabia suffered from declining oil prices. Oil 
export earnings fell from 76 billion dollars in 1982 to about 43 billion dollars in 
1983. At the same time, agriculture showed some growth, creating more jobs than 
the construction sector. Efforts to reduce dependency on oil revenues were 
intensified and new projects in certain industries were persuaded. For example, 
fertilizer exports reached 2 million tons in 1983. In response to a procurement 
price of $28 bushel for wheat, output of wheat doubled to almost 700,000 tons in 
1983. This response made Saudi Arabia self-sufficient in wheat in 1984, but it 
crowded out expansion of feed grains and some vegetables. The cereals production 
increased from 489,000 tons in 1982 to 1,444,000 tons in 1984. 
The oil revenues in 1984 and 1985 decreased to $24 billion and $17 
billion, respectively from $34billion in 1983. Saudi agricultural production 
increased 21 percent in 1985, compared with 31 percent in 1984. Livestock 
production had an upward trend in 1980s. Meat production, for example, increased 
from 218,000 tons in 1982 to 402,000 tons in 1985. This improvement in 
agricultural production is largely attributed to massive investment in agriculture 
(e.g., irrigation system, marketing facilities) made in earlier periods. In 1986, Saudi 
Arabia experienced its worst balance of payment deficit as export earnings declined 
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by 25 percent to $17 billion. Despite revenue shortfalls, elaborate subsidies for 
agriculture and consumers remained unchange. Saudi polices curtailing wheat 
production, such as decreasing producer price of wheat from $1,000 per ton to 
$570, slowed the rate of overall agricultural growth in 1986. Agricultural 
production increased 11% compared with 21% in 1985. Wheat production in 1986 
grew by 10%, while it doubled in 1982, 1983, and 1984. However, surplus of 
wheat made the country a net exporter in wheat after 1984, For example, wheat 
production in 1985 was about 2.14 million tons, while the wheat consumption was 
1.3 million tons (International Wheat Council, 1992). The F AO index of overall 
agricultural production in Saudi Arabia had a upward trend in 1986-1991 period on 
both an aggregate and a per capita basis. The cereals increased on average by 43.7 
percent annually between 1980 and 1987, while the meat production grew at 19.2 
percent per year during the same period. Therefore, the grains self-sufficiency rate 
increased from 12 percent in 1983 to 26 percent in 1987. 
As will be discussed in the next section, Saudi Arabia's agricultural goal in 
the 1980s, was to reduce import dependency in almost all foodstuffs. The 
Government of Saudi Arabia used several instruments to achieve its agricultural 
objectives. These included large investment in irrigation projects (for example, 
irrigated land increased from 555,000 hectares in 1980 to 900,000 hectares in 
1990), land reclamation, land redistribution, price supports, and a system of 
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comprehensive inputs and credit subsidies (annually $3 billion, on average) 
(Developing Economics, USDA, 1990). 
Saudi Arabia was one of the leading world importer's of agricultural 
products, particularly of feed grains, in the 1970s and 1980s. Imports of agricul- . 
tural products expanded rapidly in 1970s but contracted in 1980s as oil revenues 
sagged and domestic farm output expanded. Major agricultural imports were coarse 
grains rice, fruits and vegetables, live animals, meats, and dairy products (see Table 
3.30). 
The geography, climate, and topography of Saudi Arabia have perhaps their 
greatest impact on the country's agriculture. However, the past two decades 
witnessed monumental changes in the location and the nature of Saudi Arabia's 
agricultural sector. In 1970, this sector employed some 70 percent of the country's 
population, primarily in the manner of farming that had been practiced for 
generations. By 1980, the fraction had fallen to 60 percent. In 1990, agriculture 
contributed only about 8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), although the 
sector employed an estimated 40 percent of total population. Its contribution to 
GDP increased from 3.3 percent in 1984, mainly as the result of the decline in oil 
revenues from beginning in the mid-1980s. In 1988 agricultural exports accounted 
for about 40% of non-oil exports. On the other hand, agricultural imports as a 
percentage of total imports increased from 13 percent in 1980 to 19 percent in 1990 
(again, see Table 3.17). 
Table 3.30. Saudi Arabia: Agricultural trade summary 
Commodity Total imports Growth rates 
1969-71 1979-81 1986-88 1970's 1980's 
$ million percent 
All merchandise 757.5 29967.7 20336.8 44.5 -5.4 
Ag. products 223.5 4121.4 3667.2 33.8 -1.7 
Live animals 25.2 388.4 416.6 31.4 1.0 
Meat & prep. 6.2 428.8 325.8 52.8 -3.8 
Dairy prod, & eggs 20.6 341.2 370.4 32.4 1.2 
Wheat & flour 13.8 224.6 45.0 32.2 -20.5 
Coarse grains 5.2 554.9 643.7 59.7 2.1 
Edible oils 4.0 129.9 77.3 41.5 -7.1 
Source: FAO and UN data. 
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Agriculture Sector in the Development Plans 
Historically, the sector has received scant attention from authorities due to their 
belief that Saudi Arabia's comparative advantage was not in agriculture and 
relatively cheap food could always be bought from the world's surplus countries 
with export revenue from its highly valued hydrocarbon, exports. Some events in 
1979 such as the emerging world-wide food shortage, the emergence of veiled 
threats of a food embargo by many supplying countries (presumably to counter oil 
price increases), and the realization that industrialization in the Kingdom would not 
be adequate to provide sufficient jobs to employ a rapidly growing Saudi work 
force made the policy makers pay more attention to the agricultural sector in their 
second (1975-80) and especially third development plan (1980-85). Along with the 
increased investment and use of new technology in agriculture, three other factors 
have dramatically affected Saudi Arabian agriculture. First, consumption patterns 
have changed partly because more consumers are expatriates and partly because the 
huge jump in incomes has resulted in significant changes in consumption patterns. 
The second factor is that cities attract many workers from farming. This attraction 
stems in a large part from the relatively high-paying jobs that are available in the 
urban areas, but also from the availability of superior services, such as education 
and health care in the cities. Finally, the cities themselves are encroaching on 
agricultural lands. Riyadh and Al-Medinah are two cases in point. In both cases, 
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development of the city involves destruction of parts of the oasis that were the basis 
for traditional sedentary agriculture. The determination of objectives and designa­
tion of the most effective methods of achieving them are the core of a development 
plan. And the success of planning depends on the comprehensiveness and 
consistency of these objectives and the invariability of means such as producer price 
policy. We will highlight the agricultural policies of each development plan and 
briefly describe their achievements through agricultural policies. 
First plan (1970-75) 
The objectives of the agricultural sector plan were as follows: 
1. Improvement in efficiency and increase in output for agricultural products. 
2. Increased productivity and utilization of resources for the welfare of present and 
future generations. 
The plan was very modest in size, that is, only about SR 80 billion (Saudi Riyal, 
since 1986 the official rate has been fixed at US$1=3.745 riyals) was invested, 
mainly for infrastructure and public utilities, and about SR 33 billion of which was 
invested in economic and social development. Consequently, agricultural produc­
tion grew slowly in that period. Subsidization of agriculture under this plan went to 
supplement research and extension programs. The growth of value added in the 
agriculture sector under the first plan was about 3.6 compared with a target of 4.6 
percent. However, after the first oil shock in 1973/4, the Government found itself 
103 
in possession of vast financial resources and determined to embark on a massive 
program of industrialization and modernization. 
Second plan (1975-1980) 
The objectives of the agricultural sector can be summarized as follows; 
1. Raise per capita income and improve the welfare of rural people. 
2. Minimize the country's dependence on imported food. 
3. Release surplus agricultural labor for employment in other sectors. 
As a direct result of the first shock in oil price, the government expenditure 
increased almost nine-fold over the first plan, reaching SR 700 billion. As 
mentioned earlier, by using capital intensive techniques, the agricultural sector 
released about 96,000 persons. However, the sector still remained the largest 
employer with about 40 percent of the labor force. Due to huge investments and 
support in the agricultural sector, irrigated land increased by 16 percent and 
production grew by 5 percent. Despite the pessimism of the most foreign 
commentators, the Saudis pursued the goals of the Second Plan with great 
determination, and the results have been, on the whole, successful. The infrastruc­
ture grew remarkably, endowing country with the basic transport and communica­
tions facilities required by a modem developed state (MENA, 1981/82). By the end 
of the second plan, Saudi Arabia was almost 90 percent self-sufficient in vegetables, 
70 percent in fresh milk, and 27 percent in wheat. 
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Third plan (1980-85) 
The agricultural objectives in this development plan were as follows: 
1. Establish and maintain self-sufficiency in food production, while recognizing 
both producer and consumer interest. 
2. Provide opportunities for attaining reasonable agricultural incomes and raise the 
welfare of rural people. 
3. Optimize the use of land and agricultural water sources. 
4. Improve the skill level in the agricultural sector and protect the agricultural 
environment. 
Due to the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the price of oil jumped up 
(second oil shock) enabling Saudi Arabia to embark on an ambitious investment 
plan, about SR 783 billion (about $325,000 million) in the third plan. This total 
investment did not include defense spending, which was the largest item of 
expenditure under the previous plan. By improving the agricultural support system, 
such as easy agricultural credit, agriculture's contribution to the GDP grew at 8.7 
percent annually, in comparison to its target growth of 5.4 percent. The third Five-
Year Plan (1980-85) was intended to shift the emphasis from infrastructure projects 
to productive sectors, with particular importance accorded to agriculture with the 
aim of achieving "food security" by being less dependent on imported foodstuffs 
(MENA, 1992). Hence, the most significant production achievement in that plan 
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was a nine fold increase in wheat production that made the country self-sufficient in 
wheat in 1984. 
Fourth plan (1985-90) 
The objectives of the agricultural policies in this plan can be summarized as: 
1. Achieve broad-based improvement in the welfare of the rural population. 
2. Improve the efficiency of agricultural production and marketing and attract 
private capital investment into agriculture through the provision of loans with 
easy terms. 
The fourth plan envisaged a total expenditure of SR 1,000,000 million at current 
prices, SR 500,000 million of which were allocated to development projects in the 
civilian sector. By mid-1988, the fourth Development Plan was widely considered 
to have fallen short of its targets mainly as a result of the steep decline in oil 
revenues following the sharp decline in oil price in 1986. The implementation of 
many projects, in particular those involving public utilities, had been delayed. It 
was estimated that the agricultural sector output growth in real terms was 6 percent, 
which is lower than the 8.7 percent experienced in the third plan. The fourth plan 
emphasized diversification of the economy from a nonrenewable source, oil, to a 
renewable sector, agriculture. The plan is expected to rase of the rural standard of 
living, giving a positive influence on the rural-urban population balance and food 
security in general. 
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Fifth plan (1990-1995) 
This plan emphasized expansion of the private sector and manpower. Two-
thirds of the SR 753 billion ($200.8) planned expenditures are allocated to civilian 
use fifteen percent or SR 73 ($19.46 billion) of this is directed to economic 
resources development, which partly covers spending by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Water. The major objectives of this plan are as follows: 
1. Expanding government revenues for the purpose of increasing non-oil revenues. 
2. Insuring economic stability and maintaining it through stable government 
expenditure. 
3. Increasing the dependency of the national economy on business-sector activities. 
4. Increasing the emphasis on achieving balanced development among the 
country's regions. 
Agricultural GDP grew by 13.88 percent in total over the 1980-90 period, 
and is targeted to grow by 7 percent during 1990-95 (The Middle East Review, 
1992), The rapid growth of agricultural output, as a main goal to achieve food 
security in Saudi Arabia is mainly the result of the application of intensive modem 
methods of cultivation and irrigation. Since scientists express doubts about the 
capacity of the Kingdom's ecology to support this kind of intensive production, 
such as center-pivot irrigation, the 1990-95 plan promises intensive study of water 
resources, with completion of a National Water Plan (abandoned in 1983). 
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Strategies and tactics: subsidies and support 
The support for agriculture starting in early 1970s began at the level of 
research and development. At the other end of the production process the 
government purchased many farm products at prices which are well above the 
world market price. The government's program of incentive consists of three parts: 
subsidized purchase of machinery and equipment; provision of imports such as 
electricity, fertilizer and seeds below cost; and direct output subsidies, typically in 
the form of price floors. 
However, increasing oil price in 1973/4 allowed the government to design a 
20-year long-range agricultural policy, which is laid out in the Second Plan(1975-
80), under "National Agricultural Policy" with three aims: (1) "Develop strategic 
self-sufficiency in important food and fiber commodities and develop price, import 
and production programs to further such self-sufficiency," (2) "Establish the means 
by which farmers are encouraged and allowed to remain in farming,....;" and (3) 
"Encourage agricultural production and agribusiness." Subsidies, in all forms 
mentioned above, were the tools to achieve these goals. The Agricultural Bank 
provided subsidies valued at SR 321 million in 1983. This represented a 35 percent 
increase over the previous year. The provision of engines and pumps accounted for 
over 35 percent of this total, with subsidies for animal feed purchases accounting 
for another 33 percent and another 28 percent for agricultural machinery. The 
remainder was allocated to the financing of poultry and dairy farm equipment and 
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to transportation cost for importing cattle (SAMA Annual Report, 1403 (1983) pp. 
87-8). 
By far the most important price support program involves wheat. The 
hugely expensive wheat growing policy has in some respects been too successful. 
The self-sufficiency target was surpassed for the first time in 1984 and there have 
been massive surpluses ever since. Not only does the kingdom now grow more 
than twice as much wheat as it can consume, it also suffers from a critical shortage 
of silo storage space. 
Directly resulting from generous state subsidies, wheat production has risen 
from 3,297 tones in 1978 to 1.3 million tones in 1984, and about 2 million tones a 
year in 1985 and 1986. Domestic consumption is about 800,000 tones a year. The 
water-intensive, center-pivot irrigation systems favored by Saudi farms, whereby a 
large circle of land is watered by a continually revolving sprinkler, has aided the 
success. Even in the fourth plan (1985-90) the Government subsidies continued. 
For example, 9,209 interest free loans valued at SRI55 million was distributed by 
the Agricultural Bank in 1985/6. Also, chemical fertilizers, domestic or imported, 
were distributed at half-price, and the government paid about 45% of total cost of 
farm machinery purchased by local farmers. 
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Petroleum earnings and agriculture 
In 1986, Saudi Arabia experienced its worst balance of payments deficit as 
export earnings declined by a fourth to $21 billion and imports remained at $29 
billion. Only six years previously (in 1980) the country had a $78 billion trade 
surplus. Gains from industry services and agriculture were not sufficient to offset 
losses in petroleum revenues, and the country's GNP declined by a fourth to about 
$73 billion—about half that of 1982. Despite revenue shortfalls, elaborate subsidies 
for agriculture and consumers remained. However, efforts to maintain a relatively 
normal business environment and the usual subsidies resulted in a $13.5 billion 
budget deficit. 
Subsidies for feed and facilities contributed to a striking rise in poultry meat 
output from 82,000 tones in 1982 to an estimated 305,000 tones in 1986. Demand 
for poultry meat increased more rapidly than forecasted, causing large imports to 
continue despite expansion in the domestic output. In 1986, egg output was 
210,000 tones and imports of some hatching eggs continued. 
The trend of a lower petroleum revenue continued in 1986 as world prices 
declined. However, continued use of investment income to diversify development 
and temper the private sector slowdown is expected. Efforts are being made to 
diversify investments and reduce dependence on petroleum exports. 
The procurement price of $85.50 per ton of barley is considered too low an 
incentive to shift 100,000 hectares of wheat to barley, although such a move would 
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eliminate the wheat surplus and make a small dent in massive barley imports. The 
50 percent feed subsidy and auxiliary subsidies for feedlot operators are under 
review as part of an effort to reduce the budget deficit. 
In spite of budget deficits, Saudi food imports remained high for several 
reasons. As a conservative monarchy—surrounded by instability in a volatile region 
of the world—the Saudis make domestic political stability a high priority of the 
government, and elaborate consumer subsidies are a primary mechanism to 
distribute the national income derived almost totally fi'om petroleum. These 
consumer benefits include large direct subsidies on many basic foodstuffs. 
Furthermore, about 70 percent of the Saudi labor force is composed of 
foreign workers whose wages are many times higher than those in their homelands. 
Food subsidies are available to them, and their consumption levels are high 
(recently the tract of replacement of unskilled workers from Asia by skilled workers 
of Japan increased). In fact, per capita consumption of higher valued food, such as 
meat and dairy products, is increasing rapidly. Finally, another reason is competi­
tion among crops for limited land base has led to production decline in sorghum, 
barley, and millet, while as mentioned before, wheat output has expanded( see 
chapter V for more detail). 
Based on several factors, such as $15 billion annual interest income from 
previous investment of surplus income, Saudi Arabia will probably continue 
agricultural imports at the recent trend, to maintain present consumption levels and 
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to ensure the domestic political stability inherent in consumer prosperity. Note that 
expenditures of imported food have changed very little since their 1982 peak of 
$5.2 billion. 
In contrast to the above analysis, Tunday and U. Yanas (1983) several 
years ago have said: "At the present and for the foreseeable future, Saudi Arabia's 
oil wealth provides the necessary hard currency to finance imports of food. 
However, it should not be forgotten that there is a "window of time" for Saudi 
Arabia for diversifying its revenue base which at the present time comes from the 
export of one depleting source, crude oil. Developing a modem and effective 
agricultural sector to usher Saudi Arabia towards self-sufficiency in food is one 
avenue open to the government planners. However, the real challenge facing Saudi 
Arabia is to arrive at this development objective long before the "window in time" 
closes. They believe rapid expansion of the agricultural sector along the lines 
achieved in the third planning period is a luxury that even the Saudi Arabia will be 
unlikely to be able to continue to afford. 
Agricultural policies and food security 
Food security has been a major goal of the Saudi government since the 
beginning of its agricultural development process in the mid 1970s. As mentioned 
earlier, the government supported the agricultural sector by giving direct or indirect 
subsidies, which included the following: 
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(a) Free land to farmers and agricultural companies, up to 400 hectares per 
investor. 
(b) Interest-free and easy-term loans (in 1990, the total value of loans was 
SR 854 million). 
(c) Substantial support, including guaranteed producer prices, for major 
crops such as wheat and barley and dates; these supports have been a major factor 
in boosting domestic agriculture, etc. (Foreign Agriculture, 1991). In spite of the 
marked increases, agricultural production has not kept pace with overall food 
demands. In addition, the food sector is dependent upon imports of some items, 
such as seeds, and its increased dependency on feed product such as barley made 
Saudi a leader of importing feed grains in the world. The government has 
constantly stressed attainment of greater food security as the main justification for 
its agricultural policies—the third plan called for "a prudent level of self-sufficiency 
in food production" and recently the Minister of Agriculture declared "to produce 
your own food on your own land, it is a matter of security". Clearly, less reliance 
on food imports is considered synonymous with greater food security. The apparent 
success in reaching more self-sufficiency in certain food items, achieved at such 
tremendous costs, has not materially increased food security (Nowshirvani, 1987). 
But Saudi officials have a very different view of their wheat policy, one that is 
reasonable for the most part (Near East, South Asia, 1986): 
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Wheat is a strategic commodity just like oil, but more important. Saudi Arabia, 
as well as other exporting countries, has been threatened by the United States 
with possible embargoes on wheat, if an oil embargo is imposed. 
The price of wheat has increased in recent years to between $200 and $117 per 
ton, creating uncertainty about the volume of foreign exchange required to 
import the kingdom's requirements. 
Saudi programs achieved self-sufficiency in wheat and expanded to cultivated 
areas in the countryside job opportunities and good utilization of resources. In 
addition to saving at least $300 million a year from reducing wheat imports, 
and using this amount for wheat consumers, as subsidy prices, and paid to 
producer when cultivated, in riyals, not dollars. 
If Saudi Arabia did not encourage agriculture in general and wheat in particular, 
it would have to create tens of thousands of job opportunities for those now 
working in agriculture. If they emigrate to cities, they would increase the 
burden on the government's already rising deficit and force billions of riyals to 
be spent on expanding urban facilities. 
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CHAPTER IV. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
Methodology and Model 
The review of literature in Chapter II described the conribution of earlier 
studies and common focus and method. The use of a single estimate of the 
covariability of variables impacting food security, such as coefficient variation (cv), 
which does not have great prediction power and generally explains only a small 
proportion of variation in variables hides some useful information. This approach 
fails to account for some persistent residual variability that might not be due to the 
initial shock in the variables but rather to the dynamic adjustments that ensure in 
the economy as it moves toward some new equilibrium point after the initial shock. 
Capturing this rich dynamic adjustments is one of the strengths of the Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) methodology employed in this study. The model-a dynamic 
simultaneous equation model—in the VAR representation can capture the rich causal 
relationships in the most important variables impacting food security. Whereas 
earlier studies impose a priori exogenity classification of variables thereby closing 
any exploration of dynamic feedback interactions, the VAR is primarily intended to 
capture this interactions. What follows is a detailed description of the methodology 
used in this study, highlighting its appropriateries and contribution to the study of 
food security. 
In the absence of a theoretical consensus regarding causal relationship, any 
attempt to explore and evaluate oil price impact on food security variables must 
employ an empirical method most appropriate for making causal inferences. It is 
universally recognized that the results of standard econometric analysis (e.g.. 
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correlation and regression) are not adequate in and of themselves to permit the 
drawing of causal inference (Kinsella, 1990). Since data can speak only through 
models, it seems a vector autoregression (VAR) that makes minimal theoretical 
demands on the structure of a model is appropriate for this purpose. On the other 
hand, since theory building is a multistage process, in the second stage, i.e., after 
identification, those tenets are translated into equation. Imposing fewer and weaker 
restrictions may be a more advisable using the VAR approach in the study of food 
security. VAR focuses on the causal relationships implied by the estimated reduced 
form of what is essentially an unknown structural model and on certain of that 
model's dynamic properties (Freeman et al., 1989). 
In Chapter V, we explain the causality concept and other relevant issues. 
Here we briefly explain the causality definition. Granger (1969) proposed an 
operational definition of causality: Y^j is caused by X,.j if Y,.; can be better 
predicted using all information than if the information apart from X,.j is used (j > i). 
The most common method of applying causality is VAR, based largely on the work 
of Sims (1980), where the joint behavior of a vector and variables of interest is 
examined by regressing each variable on the lags of all variables in the system, 
including itself Let us consider a bivariate first-order VAR model, where the 
longest lag length is one, for illustrating the causality relationships and dynamic 
properties between variables: 
~ ^'lO ~ ^\2^t Pu -I Pl2^/-l  +  ( 4 . 1 )  
Y I  = 020 <*21X, + Pai-Xf-l + P22^f-l + ( 4 .  2 )  
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where it is assumed: (i) and Y, are stationary processes, that is, their mean, 
variance, and covariance are invariant with respect to time; (ii) error terms, e,t and 
€2, are white noise processes with standard deviation a, and a-i, and (iii) ei, is 
uncorrected with for all leads and lags. The structure of this model can present 
the lagged and contemporaneous effects of one variable on the other variables. For 
example, -a,2 is the contemporaneous effect of a unit change in Y, on X, and 6,2 is 
the lagged (past) effect of a unit change in Y, on X,. In VAR terminology, the 
error terms en and ejt are innovations (or shocks) in X, and Y„ respectively. 
To show the Granger causality condition more clearly, let us assume a,o = 
«20 = 0 and focus just on the first equation, 4.1. Based on Granger's causality 
definition if we assume all information apart from Y, and Y,., is presented by Xj., 
then the hypothesis "Y Granger causes X" implies either that «,2 or 6,2 is nonzero. 
Similarly, for the second equation, 4.2, "X Granger causes Y" if either «21 or Bji is 
nonzero. Equations 4.1 and 4.2 are not in reduced form since both X, and Y, have 
contemporaneous effects on each other. In practice, to fit that VAR model with 
ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques we rewrite the model in reduced form as 
% (1 ~ «12 <*21 ) ( Pll ~ ^12 P21 P12 (*12 P22 P2I ~ Pll'*21 P22 ~ P12 (*21 
r^r-l l  1 - a,2 e u 
Y . - i .  -«21 1 Gz,.  ) 
Which can be simplified as: 
Till 1^2 Ml,  
,%1 7122 -1. H t .  
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where and jH;, are serially uncorrelated, but might be contemporaneously 
correlated. 
As mentioned by Kinsella, some of the difficulties associated with this 
Granger causality concept have been pointed out by Jacobs et al. (1979) and Cooley 
and LeRoy (1985), among others. Consider the hypothesis "Y Granger causes X" is 
rejected if 7r,2 = 0 in the reduced form model. This implies 6,2 = «12^22 which is 
possible even if a,2 and 6,2 are not zero. In addition, as long as 622 is zero it does 
not need a,2 to be zero. When ir,2 is not zero, we can not be sure whether it is 
current or lagged Y, (or both) that is causing X^. 
By observing the correlation between estimates of error terms /ti,, and /X2t, we 
get an indication of presence or absence of instantaneous causality. For purposes of 
this study only the (i) Impulse Responses Function (IRF) and (ii) Forecast Error 
Variance Decomposition (FEVD) are applied to measure the dynamic interactions 
among the variables in the system. 
Identification 
Given appropriate lag length and choosing the relevant variables, due to 
feedback inherent in the prime model (4.1) and (4.2) and correlated error terms, e„ 
and €2, with y, and X,, respectively, one cannot use OLS to estimate the parameters 
in that model. One can apply the OLS method to be reduced form since there are 
no contemporaneous variables in the right-hand-side and all equations have the 
same regressors. In other words, based on the correlation of error terms in both 
models and identification problems, one cannot recover all information presented in 
(4.1) and (4.2) by the reduced form model. 
To clarify, compare the number of parameters of the structural model (4.1) 
and (4.2) with the number of parameters in (4.3) and (4.4). In the latter model, we 
estimate four coefficients and calculate values of var (/t,,) and var (/t^J and Gov 
/ijt)- However, the primitive system (4.1) and (4.2) contains eight parameters 
(four autoregressive coefficient (B's), the two feedback coefficients (a's), and two 
standard deviations and jy). Since the number of parameters in the structural 
form, is greater than the number of parameters in the reduced form, by imposing 
one restriction in structural model (4.1) and (4.2) we will have an exactly identified 
or simply a identified system. In the spirit of Sims (1980) recursive model, we 
impose a restriction on (4.1). For example, if we believe a prior that X, has no 
contemporaneous effect on Y„ then «ji = 0 in that model and rewrite restricted 
(4.1) and (4.2), again without intercepts, as: 
~  P u - 1  (  4 .  1 )  
Y ,  =  + P 2 ,  +  6 „  ( 4 .  2 )  
and in reduced form: 
%rl 
Y .  
Pn '''12P21 P12 ~ ^^12 P22] -1 
P21 P22 ^/-i 
K - a„e 12 = 2; 
•2t 
( 4 .  3 )  
( 4 . 4 )  
By identifying the parameter 
have a system of equations: 
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in (4.1) and (4.1) with (4.3) and (4.4)', now we will 
^11 = ^11 - «lAi 
^12 = Pl2 - «12^22 
^21 = P2I 
^22 = P22 
and by using the relationships between error terms (shocks), that is, 
Ml, ~ " <*12^2» 
^2, - ^2t 
we can calculate the three distinction elements of variance/covariance matrix of 
error terms, E, as: 
v a r  ( f i i , )  =  ( a ;  +  a î z O ? )  
v a r  ( H 2 » )  =  o ?  
cov (Hi, ,  MzJ = =•£([(€!,  -  «1262,)  (Sz,  ) ])  = -ai2£ei,  = -a^^y 
Now, we have seven parameters in left-hand-side of equations that can be used to 
solve for a's and fi's. Decomposing the observed values of fXi in terms of e, based 
on imposing restrictions on the model is called Choleski decomposition. It is one 
method for identifying the system. 
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The properties of data 
The validity of the VAR representation in the above model in both forms, 
structural and reduced, rests on the particular stationarity property of time series X, 
and Yf There are three possible cases, namely: 
(1) X, and Y, are stationary. In this case the VAR model in levels is 
appropriate, if there is not a linear combination between them that is 
stationary, i.e., they are not co-integrated, 
(2) X, and Y^ are nonstationary but differencing makes them stationary. A first 
differenced version of the model is appropriate for this case. 
(3) X, and Y, are nonstationary, but they are co-integrated. Then the appropriate 
model is an error-correction model (ECM). 
The economic time series is a collection of economic data observed 
periodically with equal time intervals, and by their nature they are stochastic 
processes. In other words, we assume that each value X,, X2....X-r in the series is 
drawn by random fi"om a probability distribution. When we begin to develop 
models for these time series, we should know if the underlying stochastic process 
that generated them can be assumed to be invariant over time. A stochastic process, 
Xt, is called covariance stationary or just stationary if the characteristics of the 
process do not change with respect to time or if it satisfies the following conditions: 
1. The expected value (mean) of X, is constant for all t and k 
£(X,) = J = 
2. The variance of X, is constant for all t and k. 
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£[(X, - = £[(X,.,  -  = oî 
3. At two time points, the covariance is constant and only depends on the time 
interval 
^ [(%, - i^t-k - M) ] = - Mx) ( -P;) ] = Y« 
If the stochastic process X, is stationary, then we can model the process via 
an equation with fixed coefficients that can be estimated from past data and use that 
model for explanation and forecasting. Nelson and Plosser (1982) were unable to 
reject the hypothesis of "nonstationary" (single unit root test) in the autoregressive 
representation of a wide variety of macroeconomic time series (Rudehusch, 1992). 
Therefore, one would suspect that many of the time series that one encounters in 
economics are not generated by stationary processes. Fortunately, many of the 
nonstationary processes have the desirable property that if they are differenced one 
or more times, the result is a stationary process. The number of differencings that 
are necessary is called the "order" of integration (X ^ 1(d)). Nelson and Plosser 
(1982) also show the distinction of time trend and difference Stationary Process 
(SP). These two types of non-stationarity can have important implications for many 
questions in macroeconomics. For example, a shock in a Trend Stationary Process 
(TSP) has no long-lived effects while a shock to a Difference Stationary Process 
(DSP) has persistent effects. To show how these effects work, consider two simple 
processes as examples for the TSP and DSP processes: 
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=  %  +  O i  f  +  (  T S P )  
X ,  = pX,., + 6, { D S P ,  i f  p = 1) 
If we assume p = 1, i.e., unit root, this process is called a random walk, with E(e,) 
= 0 and E(e, ej = 0 for t#s. As a classical example of nonstationary process after 
first-differencing, consider the random walk process transformed to a stationary 
process: 
Ù X f  =  X ,  -  X , . I  = e, 
Since the e, are assumed independent over time, it is clearly a stationary process. 
Let us consider a process containing both (TSP) and (DSP) components such 
that 
Z ,  =  a  +  f i t  + p Z f . i  +  6,  
where e, is white noise and p is assumed to be o < p < 1. If there is an e,, shock at 
time T, 
{ € . , =  e - ] -  i f  t  =  T  
=0 otherwise 
The solution of this first-order difference equation, 
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We can write the solution for the (TSP) case as: 
Zr-i  = (a  + P(r-i))  
Z j  = (a + P7) + eT 
Zr+i = ^ [ p (a + P(T+1)) + per 
Zt*s = 2 -  p (G+ P(f+a)) + P^Er 
Therefore: 
Since 0 < p < 1, if s approaches infinity, then approaches zero. 
Cointegration and error correction models 
The idea of cointegration is that if, in the long run, two or more series move 
closely together, even though the series themselves are trended, or in more 
generally are not stationary, a linear combination between them is stationary. In the 
cointegration literature all that is meant by long-run or equilibrium relationships is 
that it is an observed relationship which has, on the average, been maintained by a 
set of variables for a long period. Formally, we can define cointegration as: The 
components of the vector Z,, Z, = (Xj, Y J, say, are said to be cointegrated of order 
d, b [denoted ^ CI(d,b)] if: 
(i) all components of Z, are 1(d); e.g., X, _ 1(1) and Y, _ 1(1), i.e., both are 
nonstationary; 
(ii) and, there exists a vector a(=/= 0) such that e, = a" Z, ~ (d-b), b > e.g., 
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€, = [Y, - fix,], then e, ~ I(d-b). Thus, if two or more variables yields a linear 
combination that has a lower order of integration the vector a,[l,-B], (or any 
multiple of it) is a "cointegrating vector." In the bivariate case, the order of 
integration, d, should be the same in two variables. Otherwise, one would expect 
the "error" (Yt-BXJ between them to become infinitely large over time. To clarify 
the error correction, suppose that X, and Y, are random walk process, 1(1), but a 
linear combination of them, e„ is 1(0). Then an equation in first differences is of 
the form 
AT, = flM, + a(y, - px,) + y ,  (4.5) 
Since AY„ AY„ (Y-BXJ, and V, are all 1(0), stationary, this is a valid equation. We 
can distinguish between a long-run relationship between Y, and X,, that is the 
manner in which the two variables drift upward together, and the short-run 
dynamics, that is the relationship between deviations of X, and Y^ fi-om their long-
run trend (Greene, 1993). Equation 4.5 captures both the long-run and short-run 
relationship between Y, and X,. The "error", (cp), in this equation is called 
equilibrium error. When X, and Y, are cointegrated, the short-run dynamic process 
through which the series adjust toward their long-run equilibrium are presented by 
constrained Error-Correction-Model (ECM's). The ECM's specify that the first 
differences of Y, and X, are functions of distributed lags of first differences of both 
variables as well as the once lagged equilibrium error, e„ referred to as the "error-
correction" term (Denbaly and Torgerson, 1992). By the definition of cointegration, 
since two series are cointegrated, the error-correction is stationary and matching the 
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1(0) first differences. In the bivariate case, such as our model for illustration, the 
cointegration vector, [1,- B], must be unique since any other parameters, say (2 6 + 
c), introduces the additional nonstationary term, c X,. When more than two 
variables are involved, the cointegration vector(s) may not be unique. Engle and 
Granger suggest estimating, fi in the long-run equation by ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and substituting it in the short-run equation to estimate the other coefficients, 
i.e., the speed of adjustment, X, and the coefficient of AX,. This two-step 
procedure assumes a unique cointegration-vector, so one could not distinguish 
between the existence of one or more cointegrating vectors. Johansen and Juselius 
(1990) provide a maximum likelihood method to estimate the parameters and 
explore the number of cointegrating vectors. If we assume in our bivariate AR (I) 
model of X, and Y, that there is one cointegrating vector, the ECM may be 
expressed as : 
~ **10 Pny -j Pi2y -y ~ •*" (4.6) 
AK, = (*20 + Ù X f  . j  + !fc p22yAy,.y .1 - py,-1] + ^2f (4.7) J -\ y =1 
Equation (4.6) and (4.7) are ECM representation of the dynamic system in primitive 
system, (1), because, for example, the evolution of Y, over time is explained by its 
own past changes (i.e., lag of the first difference AYJ and an adjustment term to 
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correct for past equilibrium efforts (i.e., fiyt.i). 6 is the cointegrating vector and a, 
and «2 measures the speed of adjustment from past equilibrium errors. 
The impulse response function 
For a certain form of dynamic analysis, the autoregressive representation of 
data can be inverted to give a moving average representation (MAR). The MAR, 
as an essential feature of Sims (1980) approach to VAR, allows us to trace out the 
time path of various innovations (shocks) in the VAR system (Enders, 1993). Since 
the MAR expresses the series in terms of accumulated current and past shocks in 
the system, a simulation can be performed in which a variable is perturbed and the 
resulting response of the system is generated (Freeman et al., 1989). To illustrate 
this impulse response, let us return to the bivariate first-order VAR in reduced 
form: 
% Till 71,2 Pt- l l  
7^21 #22, Pz, .  
or in moving average form as : 
00 
= E '^11 '^12 
K  f^U-K 
k=0 ^ 21 '^22, f^2t-K, 
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It is insightful to write the innovations in reduced form, and /Li2t> terms of 
structural innovations form, e,, e;,. That is 
Ml, 
Mzf 
1 
1 - «12 (*21 
1 -a,2 El,  
-021 1 62, .  
let us define the 2x2 matrix 0,^ with elements 0ji(K) such that 
^1 
«21 
n -«12 
«21 1 
and obtain MAR with plug </>k in moving average form of model 
X ,  
Y ,  E *=0 
4)ii ( ^) 4*12 ( 
4^1 (^) 4^2 ( 
=  l r  -  k 
=  2 f  - k  
-If k =0 
where Z, = (X,, Y,)', that can be present the responses to one-time unit shock 
("impulses") to particular variables. Setting all innovations and levels of the vector 
equal to zero except Cq and Zq, one can trace out the response of the Z vector over 
time (Bessler, 1984). For instance, 0,2 (0) is the instantaneous (at k=0) impact of 
one-unit change in e„ on Xt, and simply 0,,(1) and 0,2(1) are the one lag period 
impact of effects of unit change in e,, and Ci, on X,, that is at one period ahead 
(K=l). Thus, after n-periods, the cumulated sum of the effects of €2, on series X, is 
given as: 
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È (|)l2( fc) 
k =0 
This period-by-period "simulation" can plot out to response of the VAR to a one­
time-only shock in a particular series (oil price in this study). This simulating 
response of the shock that filters in a VAR system may be misleading if the 
historical data have a strong contemporaneous correlation among innovations. To 
solve this problem the VAR model can be transformed via the Choleski 
decomposition method (Doan and Litterman, 1986; Bessler, 1984) as: 
AZ, = i47t,Z, .J + /IttjZ, .2 + . . . .  +  / 4 e ,  ( 4 .  8 )  
Matrix A is sought, such that A e, = has a variance-covariance matrix equal to 
the identity I. A triangular matrix is one that has only zeros either above or below 
the main diagonal. If the zeros are above the diagonal the matrix is lower 
triangular. Z denotes variance-covariance of error terms before transformation and 
A = H"' and H is a lower triangular unique matrix of rank m which selected so that: 
2 = H H' and [recall (H) ' = (H ')' ] 
so: 
H ' L (H ') = H ' H H (H)-' = I 
This transformation sets up a "Wold causal chain" among current variables of the X 
vector, as a contemporaneous model of innovations, alleviating the problem of 
contemporaneous by correlated errors. In fact, the Choleski decomposition 
constrains the system such that an e„ shock has no effect on the entire y^ series if 
we impose, «21 = 0 in the model. To show how this transformation changes the 
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autoregression representation in a "p" order system we consider reduced form of our 
example and the relation between errors term after imposing constraint: 
fl «12] %1 1 «12 
0 1 0 1 J 
1 «12 
0 1 
nii(P) 
^21 ( f) 
7tn( 1) 
ît2i( 1) 
ni2(P) 
^22 ( P) 
1ll2( 1) 
7t22( 1) 
X , . ,  
v' 
1 <*12 C
O 
' -p. 0 1 82, 
As /U2t = €21, a unit shock in is equivalent shock of one standard deviation of f;,. 
Note the left-hand side of above equation Y, has no other current period X, 
in its AR representation. However, X, has current Y, in its AR representation. 
Thus, the causal chain in the current period runs from Y to X (Y —» X) since the 
contemporaneous system of errors can be written as: 
~ " <*12 ^2/ 
M2( - ^2f 
Of course, if the contemporaneous correlation between residuals (innovations) is 
weak, the off-diagonal elements of S are close to zero, then the resulting causal 
chain is not sensitive to the ordering of variables in the model. In other words, 
when little correlation exists between variables, the order of factorization makes 
little difference. However, when ay (for i =/= j) is not zero, the analyst must rely on 
a prior knowledge in selecting the ordering in a VAR and where economic theory is 
informative on instantaneous correlation, it should be used. 
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Forecast error decomposition 
The purpose of decomposition of forecast error is to determine the proportion 
of each of the variable's forecast errors that is attributable to each of orthogonalized 
errors (shocks) in the VAR model. If we forecast a variable it will have an error 
forecast that comes partly from past errors of this forecasting and other variables in 
a VAR model. Therefore, the standard error of forecasting increases as the forecast 
horizon increases. By decompositing the variance of forecast error we can measure 
the effects that variables have on each other over time, that is, the decomposition 
provides an estimate of the amount of influence variables in a dynamic response to 
shocks in a particular variable. From Granger and Newbold (p. 229) the optimal 
forecast by using autoregression and information available in period t for k periods 
ahead may be expressed as: 
The matrices ( f >  and H are defined as before and assumed to be known. The k 
periods ahead forecast error is : 
Where <f> = IH. This expression gives the k th period ahead forecast error of X, as 
a moving average process with order k-1. The variance of this error can be written 
as: 
t =0 
( 4 .  9 )  
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V { k )  = ^ ( J ) , ( j ) / .  
I =1 
As mentioned above the decomposition of forecast error variance presents the 
variation in series i accounted for by shocks in series j. Hence, the percentage of 
forecast error variance in series i that is explained by the shock in series j can be 
expressed as : 
X 4) ( *) ' 
' 
ij 
where m refers to number of series in the system. 
In the bivariate VAR (1) example, if shocks in the second process, Y„ i.e., Cj,, 
explain none of the forecast error variance of X,, we can say that X is exogenous in 
the system. Decomposition of forecast errors provides an interesting alternative to 
the usual test of Granger causality. While Granger causality is defined in terms of 
difference of variance forecasting error (see Chapter 5) in a given information set, 
forecast error decomposition is defined in terms of forecast error variance with a 
full information set. Thus, for example, for some i and j, finding (0) = </>ij (1) = 
</>ij (k-1) = 0, will generally not be equivalent to the statement "series j does not 
Granger cause series i." The PPEy give us a useful measure of strength of 
"explanation" at different forecast horizon, while the standard F-test of causality 
will not provide such dynamic information. In other words, the standard causality 
test allows the researcher to make existence-type statements, i.e., the causality 
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linkage exists or not, while forecast error decomposition allows inferences with 
respect to strength and timing of similar relationships (Bessler, 1984). 
Empirical Results 
Model specification 
To explore the dynamic relationship among the most important vaiables that 
influence food security in an oil exporting country and show the impact of a shock 
in one of those variables on other variables, we construct a five-equation VAR that 
can be represented as a reduced form by: 
OP, = AliD OP, + AhL) Y, ^AliD Q, + AI{D A f  +  A ^ L )  C ,  +  ( 4 .  1 0 .  1 )  
Y ,  =  A h L )  O P ,  +  A h D  Y ,  +  A h L )  Q ,  +  A f  +  M i l )  C ,  +  H y  ( 4 .  1 0 .  2 )  
Q  =  A h L )  O P ,  +  A h L )  Y ,  +  A h L )  Q  +  A h L )  M  +  A h L )  C ,  +  [ i ç  ( 4 .  1 0 .  3 )  
M  = A h L ) O P ,  ^  A h L ) Y , +  A h L ) Q ,  + A ^ i L ) A i  + X ^ ( 1 ) Q +  ( 4 . 1 0 . 4 )  
C , =  A h L ) O P ,  ^ A l i L ) Y ,  ^ A h L ) Q ,  +  * A h L ) C ,  +  M c  ( 4 . 1 0 . 5 )  
where OP is oil price; Y is real per capita income; Q is domestic food (wheat) 
production; M is food imports; and C is food utilization. A/(I) is a lag 
polynominal operator for i, j = 1,...5. By construction, the residuals (innovations), 
fi,, are serially uncorrorelated, but may be contemporaneously correlated. The 
system to facilitate discussion, may be written compactly as. 
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X, = /I (L) X, + n, (4. 11) 
where X is a 5X1 vector of variables, A(L) is 5X5 lag polynominal matrix and /i is 
a 5X1 VAR residual vector (shocks vector), and we assume: 
A { L )  =  A x  +  A 2 i L )  + / 4 3 ( Z , ^ )  
E ( H , )  =  0 
=  S  
£ ( H , H s )  = 0  / o r  t  * s  
E(XtHs) =0 for all t <s 
Error (shock) structure 
In general, the covariance matrix of innovations, is nondiagonal 
symmetric since the unrestricted VAR residuals may be contemporaneously 
correlated. Some effort must be made to account for this correlation if a realistic 
simulation is to be performed. If we assume they are independent, as one 
possibility, we ignore the important informaiton that could be obtained from 
estimation. It is useful to transform these correlations into contemporaneous effects 
by applying an appropriate factorization method, such as the Choleski 
decomposition mentioned in the previous section and set the decomposing error 
covariance matrix, as a comtemporaneous model, into a "chain causal" form. 
This kind of organizing of the contemporaneous effect based on orthogonalization 
of the remaining error is justified by the presumption that behaviorally distinct 
sources of variation should be independent of another (Freeman et al. 1989). The 
choice of ordering of a causal chain of contemporaneous effects is very important 
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since the results usually are sensitive to this ordering. Since Choleski 
orthogonalization has a lower triangular factor, the shock as the first variable has an 
"immediate" impact on all other variables in the system. Shocks as a second 
variable, on the other hand, have an "immediate" affect on all but the first variable 
in that ordering, and so on. If we applied Choleski decomposition and chose the 
ordering as OP, Y, Q, M, and C the system is of the form: 
M r ,  o p  ~  ® o p  
= 
PiM,  , op 
PsM, , op + Ps^r.y  + ZQ 
Mf.Af  =  P4M,,  . op + Ps^r.y  +  Pô^f .Ç + 
Mr.c =  P7M,,  op + PsHr.y Pg^f , (? PioPf .M 
All e's are structurally orthorgonalized innovations; that is £( e, e,) is a 
diagonal matrix and P's are the coefficients linking underlying shocks to reduced 
form error, /li's. In the above chain of causality among the shocks in any given 
year, we assumed the shock or surprise movement in oil price effects all other 
variables, and shocks in per capita income have two components: Pi|i,,op, which 
reflects the intra-year effect of oil price shock and ey, which represents the 
underlying random shock in income at time t. We assumed n, ^ has three 
components: _ gp to reflect the intra-year effect on Q of shock to oil price; 
PaM;, y, to reflect the intra-year effect on Q of random shock in Y; and eg to 
represent the remaining surprise movement in Q at time t. The other equations 
have similar explanations, the last variable in this ordering, C, has an immediate 
impact only on itself 
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Testing of properties of data 
The procedure to build an Error-Correction Model (ECM) for causality test 
of all variables under study in a food security context, involves three steps. First, 
the order of integration for each time series is determined. If a variable is 
nonstationary, with a unit root, it will be successively differenced until stationarity 
is obtained. Most economic time series after first-differencing will be stationary. 
Second, if variables are nonstationary but some linear combinations between these 
are stationary, that is, they are cointegrated, then by applying some techniques such 
as Johansen-Jelesius Procedures, we can identify the number of cointegrating 
vectors. Finally, we estimate error and correction VAR and using that to explore 
Granger causality linkages and present the dynamic responses of variables due to a 
shock in each variable. 
Stationarity test (unit root test) 
In the Box-Jenkins' identification stage, there are three ways to test if the 
stationarity requirement is met: 
(i) Examine the realization visually to see if either the mean or the variable 
appears to be changing over time, 
(ii) Examine the estimated Auto Correlation Function (ACF) to see if it moves 
rapidly toward zero, 
(iii) Examine any estimated AR coefficients to see if their sum is less than one 
(Pankratz, 1983). 
A visual test of all variables, based on the above guidelines shows, they are 
nonstationary, except wheat production in Algeria. As a formal test, the procedure 
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of the unit root test developed by Fuller (1976) and Dicky and Fuller (1979) are 
applied to examine the order of integration of variables. If we write the time series 
model in the following way it can express both types of processes we discussed 
earlier, i.e., (TSP) and (DSP) processes: 
Under p < 1 and aj 0, X, is said to be a trend stationary process while X, is DSP 
if p = 1 and aj = 0. The usual t-statistic for testing p = 1 by OLS can lead one to 
incorrectly reject the nonstationary hypothesis. One can reparametrize equation 
4.12 into 4.13 by subtracting X,., from both sides of equation (4.12). 
where A X, is the first difference of X at time t, AX, = X, - X,.,. By applying the 
ordinary least square (OLS) method we can estimate the model and compare p-1 
with the critical value provided by Fuller (1976, p. 373). Since in this Dickey-
Fuller (DF) test, it is assumed the error terms are serially uncorrorelated, we may 
account for this assumption and rewrite (4.13) as: 
X, = a, + 02 t  + pX,.I + e, ( 4 .  1 2 )  
M, =  a ,  +  d g f  +  (  p - 1 )  X, .1 + e, ( 4 .  1 3 )  
n 
(4,14) 
and choose n so that the residuals are uncorrelated. Again the critical values 
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to compare with statistics used for the test, are contained in by Fuller. This 
procedure is called augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. In both cases, i.e., the DF 
and ADF, Dickey and Fuller (1979) consider three regression (a pure random walk, 
with drift but without time trend, and with time trend) equations that can be used to 
test for the presence of a unit root. We applied the regression equations with and 
without trend to test nonstationary for all variables in ADF and only without trend 
in DF procedure and the results reported in Table 4.1. We used one lag length to 
remove the problem of serial correlation. 
To reject the null hypothesis of unit root for both DF and ADF test, the 
statistic of coefficient of X^., must be smaller than critical values that calculated 
based on suggestion of MacKinno (1990) and reported in Table 4.2. 
Since Dickey-Fuller tests assume that the errors are statistically independent 
and homogenous, we apply, as a secondary test, the Philipps and Peron (1988) test 
which allows for fairly mild assumptions concerning the distribution of the error 
(see Enders, 1994). The critical values for the Phillips-Peron statistic use precisely 
those given for the Dickey-Fuller test. In summary, as Table 4.1 shows, at 5 
percent and 1 percent significance levels, for all vairables, expect wheat production 
in Algeria, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in DF, ADF, and 
Phillips-Peron tests. The results of unit tests after first-differencing the data 
reported in Table 4.3 indicate that each series is characterized as a nonstationary 
1(1) process after first differencing it will be a stationary process. 
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Table 4.1. Unit root test (1960-1991) 
[levels] 
Series DF 
(with trend) 
(a) 
ADF 
(with trend) 
(b) 
Z 
(no trend) 
Z 
(with trend 
AQ -5.46 -4.88 .01 -5.75 
IQ -4.09 -3.57 -1.28 -4.33 
SQ -0.80 0.42 3.34 0.76 
AM -2.79 -3.03 -0.17 -2.90 
IM -3.68 -2.75 -0.82 -3.84 
SM -2.10 -1.24 -2.09 -1.97 
AC -3.78 -2.23 0.81 -3.96 
IC -3.92 -2.94 0.60 -4.10 
SC -2.31 -2.01 0.90 -2.41 
AY -3.35 -2.87 0.01 -3.52 
lY -1.23 1.44 -1.59 -1.38 
SY -0.22 -1.25 -1.32 -0.60 
AOP -0.94 -1.35 -1.50 -1.19 
lOP -1.07 -1.04 -1.52 -1.15 
SOP -2.54 -2.01 -2.14 -2.63 
(a) First order autocorrelation adjustment is used for ADF test. 
(b) One lag length is used for the Philips-Peron test. 
For the sample size of 25, at 1%, 5%, 10% critical values with time trend 
are -4.38, -360,3.24 and for no trend regressions are -3.75, -3.00, -2.62 
that given in Fuller(1976). Also, see critical values that calculate 
by auther in table 4.2 based on MacKinnon(1990). 
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Table 4.2. Critical values (Sample size = 32) 
0%) (5%) (10%) 
no-trend -3.66 -2.96 -2.62 
with trend -4.28 -3.56 -3.21 
Calculated based on MacKinnon(1991) 
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Lag length test 
One basic issue in VAR analysis is the choice of appropriate number of lags. 
Several methods have been forwarded to determine a desirable length. 
Sims(1980) has selected lag length based on sample size, and arguing that 
conventional likelihood ratio test is too conservative in favor of acceptance of null 
hypothesis. He suggested a modified likelihood ratio statistic: 
L { 1 )  = i T - Q  { L n l H ^ I  - L n l \ l )  ( 4 . 1 5 )  
where T is the number of observations, C is a correction to improve small sample 
properties (He recommended that C equal the number of parameters estimated in 
the unrestricted system), and and are determinants of variance/covariance 
matrix of the residuals in restricted and unrestricted models, respectively. 
Under null hypothesis, this statistic, L(I), converges to x2(df) where the 
degree of freedom, (dt), is the number of linear restrictions. Table 4.4 contains the 
results of optimal lag length test. According the lag length test, one lag is 
appropriate for the Algeria and Iran VAR models. For the Saudi Arabia VAR 
model, the test results suggest longer structural lags than one, but due to data 
limitations (i.e., exhausting the degrees of freedom with longer lags and 
inconsistency of dynamic responses of VAR model with higher order than one) we 
specify a VAR( 1 ) model for all the countries in the study. 
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Table 4.3. Unit root test (1960-1991) 
[first difference! 
(a) (b) 
Series DF ADF Z Z 
(with trend) (with trend) (no trend) (with trend) 
AQ -8.06 -5.86 -8.86 -5.86 
IQ -6.98 -5.23 -7.43 -7.44 
SQ -4.59 -2.99 -3.04 -4.83 
AM -6.14 -4.54 -6.23 -4.54 
IM -7.70 -7.00 -8.26 -8.46 
SM -8.51 -4.48 -8.72 -9.02 
AC -9.55 -5.90 -9.96 -5.90 
IC -8.90 -7.09 -9.56 -10.08 
SC -6.05 -5.66 -6.08 -6.40 
AY -5.50 -3.75 -5.72 -3.75 
lY -4.60 -3.34 -4.70 -4.85 
SY -3.43 -3.06 -3.46 -3.64 
AOP -4.28 -3.49 -4.37 -3.49 
lOP -5.45 -3.42 -5.47 -5.74 
SOP -6.58 -4.24 -6.96 -6.95 
(a) First order autocorrelation adjustment is used for ADF test. 
(b) One lag length is used for the Phillips-Peron test. 
For the sample size of 25, at 1%, 5%, 10% critical values with time trend are 
-4.38, -360,3.24 and for no trend regressions are -3.75, -3.00, -2.62 that 
given in Fuller( Also, see critical values that calculated by author in 
table 4.2 
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Table 4.4. Lag length test 
Model 1 VS. 2(a) 2 VS. 3 1 VS.3 
Algeria- VAR Model 28.84 30.54 50.64 
(0.270) (0.205) (0.446) 
Iran- VAR Model 37 32.96 58.83 
(0.058) (0.131) (0.184) 
Saudi Arabia- VAR Model 46.3 47.66 81.78 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) 
(a) Numbers are Likelihood Ratio statistic, L(l); numbers in parentheses are 
marginal significance levels. 
Critica values of Chi - Squared for 25 and 50 degree of freedom are 37.65 
and 67.50, at 5%, respectivly. 
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Testing for cointegration 
Engle and Granger (1987) offered several tests for cointegration, but three 
have emerged as the most popular choices. The cointegration regression 
Durbin-Watson (CRDW) test, the Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey Fuller, 1979 and 1981). If there is a unit root, that is, 
if a linear combination between X, and Y, is nonstationary, then there is no 
cointegration. Based on previous discussion about TSP and DSP, we can use a 
general model, 
X, = a, + «2^ + I + e, (4. 16) 
where is random error term with constant mean and variance. If p = 1 and aj 
= 0 then X, has a unit root and is thus nonstationary in levels, but stationary 
after first differencing, i.e., it is a DSP. If p < 1 and aj is non-zero, then X, is 
nonstationary in levels and stationary in deviation around the trend, i.e., after 
detrending, it is a TSP. X, should be stationary itself if p < 1 and a, = 0. The 
usual t-statistic for testing the null hypothesis that p is equal to one is not valid 
here. Therefore, we can reparametize equation 4.16 into 4.17 by adding X,., on 
both sides of equation 4.16. 
AX, = a, + 42 f + ( p-1) X,., + e, (4. 17) 
where A = (1-L) and L is the lag operator. In this DF test, we estimate the 
equation 4.17 with the ordinary least squares (OLS) method and compare the t-
statistic of coefficient of X,., with the critical values provided in Fuller (1976, 
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p.737). The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test provides a single generalization 
of the DP test to allow for the possibility of higher-order autoregressions 
Ù X f  =  a, +  a 2  t  +  i  p-1) + S b j  A X ,  . j  +  n ,  (4. 18) 
where K, the number of lagged differences, is chosen so as to eliminate any 
autocorrelation in the residual, /i,. Another "conventional" cointegration test 
suggested by Engle and Granger (1987) (also called the two-step procedure) 
involves testing for unit roots to determine the order of integration of the individual 
series. If all the variables are integrated of the same order, such as in our study 
d=l, then OLS regression can be applied to obtain the cointegration vector, say a. 
After the cointegrating vector is found, testing for cointegration amounts to 
applying unit-root tests to the residuals obtained from the cointegration equation 
and checking whether they are l(d-b), where b > 0. The hypothesis is no 
cointegration against the hypothesis of cointegration. As mentioned earlier, when 
more than two variables are involved, the cointegrating vector may not be unique. 
Consider the two variables case again. Suppose each of which is cointegrated of 
order one, X, ~ 1(1) and Y, ~ 1(1). Now if (X, YJ cointegrated with parameter a 
then: 
e, = X, - aY, (4. 19) 
where e -1(0) and a is unique. To see this uniqueness, suppose we had another 
cointegrating parameter (3: 
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0) = X, - py, ( 4 .  2 0 )  
0) -1(0), by adding and subtracting jSY, in 4.19, we have 
e, = X, - ( a - P) K, - py, ( 4 . 2 1 )  
that is. 
e, =0) - ( a - P) y, ( 4 .  2 2 )  
By assumption, e, and co, are both 1(0) while Y, is I( 1 ). The latter three conditions 
can bold only if a = /3 that is a is unique. In more than two variables, in N 
variables case, each integrated of same order, then there can be up to (N-1) 
cointegrating vectors (Cuthertson, 1992 ). Because all variables in this study are 
1(1), except Algeria wheat production (AQ), if they are cointegrated, one or more 
distinct linear combinations of these time series could be stable in the long-run. To 
test for cointegration, the Johanson-Juselius maximum likelihood procedure is 
applied. The method begins with an unrestricted VAR of N-dimentional variables 
X in the levels of the variables: 
where each of the 11, is an (N x N) matrix of parameters, and e is an independent 
and identically (normally) distributed vector of disturbances. The procedure is 
based on the error-correction version of the equation: 
X, = n-1 X, _! + + -it + e, ( 4 . 2 3 )  
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AX, = + r, M,., + . . . . + r^,. + g, (4.24) 
where 
= - / +  n ,  + . . . . +  n , ,  i  = \ , . . .  , k  
Thus, now defined the long-run "level solution" to 4.24. Consider an Nxr matrix 
jS such that P' X, ~ / ( 0). If all the elements of X, are 1(1), the column of j(3 
must form cointegrating vectors for and hence X, are not cointegrated, then jS 
must be a null matrix. Now define another (N x r) matrix o: such that: 
n = % = -aP' (4.25) 
The number of cointegration vectors can be determined by applying identification 
of rank of the 11 matrix. 
Johansen and Juselius show that if the rank is zero, the variables are not 
cointegrated. However, if the rank is r, there are r unit possible independent 
stationary linear combinations. For example, if we assume there is only one 
cointegrating vector, r = 1, then we need to consider only the first column in the 
system of a and jS, and 4.23 can be written: 
+ Fz + (-a,Z,.* ) + e, (4. 26) 
Z, = P,%, - 7(0) 
Table (4.5) shows the results of Johansen and Juselins test for all VAR models for 
all countries under study at the 5 percent level. Table indicates that there is only 
one cointegrating vector in each model, and therefore, one correction term is 
included in the estimation VAR model for each country model. Diagnostic test 
statistics for the models are presented in Table 4.6. Based on Ljung-Box Q 
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Table 4.5. Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Algeria model Iran model Saudi Arabia model 5% Critlcî il Values 
max Ho Trace (a) max (b) Trace max Trace max Trace 
r=0 95.17' 48.55* 61.62 34.41 133.49* 50.46* 70.60 33.32 
r<=1 46.63 24.09 27.22 17.98 83.04* 44.51* 48.28 27.14 
r<=2 22.53 18.50 9.24 5.91 38.52* 23.46* 31.53 21.04 
r<=3 4.03 3.95 3.32 3.32 15.06 12.11 17.95 14.9 
r<=4 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.02 2.95 2.95 8.18 8.18 
(a) * indicates rejection at 5% of the nuii hypothesis of at most r stationary iinear combinations 
of the series against the aitemative of possible stationarity of all series. 
(b) * indicates rejection at 5% level of the null hypothesis of at most r stationary linear combinations 
of the series against the alternative of at most r+1 such combinations 
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Table 4.6. Diagnostic tests for EC - VAR models 
Equation 
Algeria Model 
Ljung-Box(a) Jarque-Bera(b) 
Q-Statistic Normality Test (a) 
Iran Model 
(b) 
S. Arabia Model 
(a) (b) 
OP 2.80 4.14 4.49 30.20* 10.96 2.34 
Y 2.88 5.99 2.52 15.21* 7.67 1.98 
Q 6.72 17.33* 9.66 2.76 5.8 2.79 
M 6.33 11.52* 6.13 4.62 3.51 .37 
C 10.33 3.30 6.33 7.43 22.02* 2.84 
(a) Ljung-Box Q-Statistic is distributed as X (7). The null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation is rejected at 5% significance level if the Q-statistic is larger than 16.01. 
(b) Jarque-Bera statistic is distributed as X (2). The null hypothesis of 
normality is rejected at 5% significance level if the test statistic is larger 
than 7.38. 
* significant at 5%. 
149 
statistic, the estimated equations are free of serial correlation problems of 
significance at a 5 percent level, except for wheat consumption in Saudi Arabia. 
The null hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected for SC equation at the 5 
percent significance level, but not at the 1 percent level. Jarque-Bera statistics 
indicate that most estimated residuals pass normality test, a relatively important 
assumption in Johansen and Juseling maximum likelihood test. However, based on 
Q-statistics, for purposes of this study, the estimated equations seem adequate. 
The causality test and error-correction models 
On an intuitive level, as mentioned earlier, the standard Granger Causality 
test examines whether past changes in one variable, Y, help to predict changes of 
another variable, X, over and above the using past changes of Y. If not, the 
conclusion is that Y does not Granger cause X. It is assumed X, and Y, are 
stationary but when this is not the case and these variables are cointegrated, we 
know the X,., and Y,., are also cointegrated and there is Granger Causality in at 
least one direction between two variables concerned (Granger, 1988). Cointegration 
itself has nothing to say about direction of causality between variables, for tjis 
reason testing for causality is required. 
Granger (1983) and more recently Engle and Granger (1987) provide a more 
comprehensive test of causality, which allows testing of causality in the cointegrated 
variables case. This alternative to the standard test for Granger causality considers 
the possibility that the lagged 'level' of a variable, Y, may help to predict the X, 
even if past changes in Y do not. Such causality linkages may not be detected by 
standard Granger Causality testing, which examines the past changes in one 
I 
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variableto predict another variable. More formally the standard causality Granger 
test is based on the following regression order (n): 
= a, ^ ^2 p„ AX, .J + & p,, AK, , + (4. 27) 
where A is the first-difference and AX and AY are stationary. The null hypothesis 
that "Y does not Granger Cause X" is rejected if coefficients jSij are jointly 
significantly different from zero based on a standard F-test. In this standard, 
procedure the finding no causality in either direction is ruled out when the variables 
share a common trend, that is they are cointegrated (Miller and Russek, 1990). In 
case the variables are cointegrated and ECM is used for testing the direction of 
causality such as; 
M, = a„ Ply àX,.j p2y Ay, + a,e,.i + n, (4.28) 
where X, and Y, after first-difference are stationary and cointegrated and where e,., 
is the lagged (past) value of error term from the following cointegration equation; 
Y, = P%, + e, (4.29) 
By including en in the previous model and get ECM for using in causality Granger 
test allows for finding that Y Granger cause X, even if the coefficients on lagged 
changes in Y are not jointly significant. In other words, based on ECM, the null 
hypothesis that "Y does not Granger cause X" is rejected not only if are jointly 
significant, but also if the coefficient on e,., is significant. 
Based on causality test and using F-statistic for single-equation in the EC 
VAR model in each country, we can summarize the causality results as; in Algeria, 
151 
per capita income is Granger cause of wheat production at 10 percent level of 
significance. The oil price and consumption itself, at 1 percent level and per capita 
income, at 10 percent level of significance, are Granger cause of wheat 
consumption. 
In Iran, wheat consumption is Granger-cause of wheat imports, at 5 percent 
level of significance, and the error-correction terms also are significant. 
In Saudi Arabia, at 10 percent level of significance, wheat imports is 
Granger-cause of wheat production. 
Forecast error variance decomposition 
Tables 4.7 through 4.9 present the percentages of the forecast error variation 
of three series that are explained by themselves and other variables in the system. 
The results for oil price and per capita income shows that their variation is 
explained only by themselves, that is these two series are exogenous in the system. 
Hence, only the results for the other three variables are reported. 
As can be seen in Table 4.7, about 56 percent of the forecast error 
variation for wheat production in Algeria, (DAQ) is explained by innovations in the 
series by itself in the short run (one year) and about 43 percent by income shock. 
In the long run the impact of the DAQ variation decrease while of income increase. 
Innovations in the wheat production and income explain about 28 percent of 
forecast error variation in wheat imports, while the shock in wheat imports 
attributed 43 percent by itself at one year period ahead. In the short run, the 
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Table 4.7. Percentage of forecast error variance K year(s) ahead 
each innovation (a) [Algeria] 
Standard 
Innovation 
Series K Error DAOP DAY DAQ DAM DAC 
DAQ 1 400.16 .85 43.13 56.02 0.00 0.00 
3 459.76 1.91 47.77 47.15 .27 2.90 
5 463.51 2.79 47.16 46.47 .45 3.13 
7 463.69 2.83 47.13 46.44 .47 3.13 
10 463.67 2.83 47.13 46.44 .47 3.13 
DAM 1 312.73 .17 28.16 28.22 43.44 0.00 
3 367.72 5.03 27.55 27.18 38.67 1.57 
5 370.97 5.36 27.44 27.18 38.02 2.01 
7 371.25 5.42 27.42 27.16 37.96 2.04 
10 371.27 5.43 27.42 27.15 37.96 2.04 
DAC 1 205.33 7.36 3.34 30.13 18.23 40.95 
3 286.47 36.70 3.89 18.41 12.19 28.80 
5 288.48 37.05 3.93 18.19 12.24 28.59 
7 288.54 37.06 3.93 18.18 12.25 28.58 
10 288.54 37.06 3.93 18.18 12.25 28.58 
(a) DAOP = Oil Price ; DAY = Income ; DAQ = Wheat Production ; 
DIM = Wheat Imports; DAC = Wheat Consumption 
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Table 4. 8. Percentage of forecast error variance K year(s) ahead attributed 
to each innovation (a) [Iran] 
Standard 
Innovation 
Series K Error DlOP DIY DIQ DIM DIG 
DIQ 1 611.38 4.21 5.08 90.71 0.00 0.00 
3 641.74 7.23 7.78 84.35 .42 .22 
5 642.81 7.26 7.86 84.20 .43 .25 
7 642.83 7.26 7.86 84.19 .43 .25 
10 642.84 7.26 7.86 84.19 .43 .25 
DIM 1 536.31 14.60 .24 31.50 53.66 0.00 
3 605.00 12.70 8.38 28.36 44.08 6.49 
5 607.45 12.60 8.69 28.49 43.74 6.48 
7 607.53 12.61 8.69 28.49 43.74 6.48 
10 607.54 12.61 8.69 28.49 43.73 6.48 
Die 1 428.73 2.91 .27 4.18 54.37 38.26 
3 502.81 6.39 7.21 4.19 49.51 32.69 
5 504.36 6.34 7.36 4.25 49.40 32.62 
7 504.40 6.36 7.36 4.25 49.40 32.62 
10 504.41 6.36 7.36 4.25 49.40 32.62 
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percentages of the unexpected variations in oil price, wheat production, and wheat 
imports account for 7, 30, and 18 percent of variation in wheat consumption in 
Algeria, respectively. 
In the short run wheat consumption variation explained about 41 percent of 
its own variation. After 2 years, oil prices appear to play increasing role in 
explaining the variation in the wheat consumption, 36%, and in long run this 
proportion is sustained at 37% and represents the dominating source of variation in 
food security in Algeria. On the other hand, as reported in columns 4, 5, and 6 
(Table 4.7), the importance of wheat production, wheat imports, and wheat 
consumption shocks decreases after first period and remain stable over time. 
The results for the Iran data are reported in Table 4.8. The fourth column of 
Table 4.8 indicates that the wheat production shock exerts a very significant impact 
on unexpected wheat production variation, 91%, in short run, while the share of 
shocks of other variable are relatively insignificant. Within one year the shocks in 
oil price, wheat production, and wheat imports accounts for about 15%, 32%, and 
54% of the unexpected variation in wheat imports, respectively. The impact 
decrease after year 1 and remains stable over time. The Table 4.8 also indicates 
that 38% of variation in food (wheat) consumption is explained by its own 
innovations. In the first, year wheat imports are the predominant "other" variable in 
explaining wheat consumption variation and this major impact is sustained over 
time. A shock in the oil price exerts only a modest effect on wheat consumption 
after the first year. 
The forecast error variance decomposition of food security variables in Saudi 
Arabia is reported in Table 4.9. Column 2 shows that oil prices shock exerts a 
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Table 4.9. Percentage of forecast error variance K year(s) 
ahead attributed to each innovation (a) [Saudi Arabia] 
Standard 
Innovation 
Series K Error DSOP DSY DSQ DIM Die 
DSQ 1 129.63 21.49 3.10 75.41 0.00 0.00 
3 166.01 15.10 13.88 58.00 0.42 0.22 
S 170.66 15.86 14.27 55.41 0.43 0.25 
7 170.87 15.95 14.27 55.27 0.43 0.25 
10 170.87 15.95 14.27 55.27 043 0.25 
DSM 1 177.01 0.08 33.74 26.43 53.66 0.00 
3 208.44 1.41 33.94 23.05 44.08 6.49 
5 209.88 1.82 33.78 22.79 43.74 6.48 
7 209.91 1.83 33.77 22.78 43.74 6.48 
10 209.91 1.83 33.77 22.78 43.73 6.48 
DSC 1 57.57 0.23 3.33 5.50 54.37 38.26 
3 64.93 11.00 5.06 9.67 49.51 32.69 
5 65.13 10.95 5.25 9.74 49.40 32.62 
7 65.15 10.95 5.26 9.74 49.40 32.62 
10 65.15 10.95 5.26 9.74 49.40 32.62 
(a) DSO = Oil Price; DSY = Income; DSQ = Wheat Production; DSM = Wheat Consumption; 
DSC = Wheat Consumption 
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modest impact on wheat production and wheat consumption (except in the initial 
period) and has a very insignificant impact on wheat imports. The shock in wheat 
production accounts as a major source of variation in wheat production, 55% even 
at year 10. The Table 4.9 also shows the forecast error variation in wheat imports; 
mainly explained by itself and income and production of wheat, respectively. In 
short run wheat consumption nearly looks exogenous, while in long run wheat 
production and oil prices have a modest effect on variation of food(wheat) 
consumption. 
Column 1 in forecast standard error increases towards a upper bound for 
each of the series. This indicates that the system is stationary. To sum up the 
discussion so far, the results indicate the oil price shocks have the most impact on 
food consumption in Algeria in the short and long run, and have lowest impact in 
the short run in the Saudi Arabia and in Iran in long run. In the short run, the main 
source of variation in wheat consumption is wheat consumption itself in Saudi 
Arabia and Algeria, while in Iran this source is wheat imports. In the long run, the 
main source of instability in food security in Algeria is oil prices, in Iran is wheat 
imports, and in Saudi Arabia is wheat consumption. 
Impulse Responses 
The VAR system can uncover the total impact of the changes in the variables. 
Given the moving average representation of the model, the impulse response 
functions trace out both the contemporaneous and cummulative lagged adjustments 
on standard deviation (typical) shock of a single variable, say oil price, to another 
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variable. This provides the important information about not only the magnitude of 
total impact (large or small), but also the direction of relationship of variables 
(direct or inverse), and the persistance of the effect of the given shock over time 
(short-lived or permanent). The VMAR is used to generate the impulse response 
function, and variance decomposition. The equation ordering used to orthogonalize 
the itmovations (shocks) for impulse responses was OP-Y-Q-M-C. To facilitate 
comparability, the response of each variable was divided by the square root of its 
residual variance so that responses are expressed in terms ofiiumber of standard 
deviations. 
Figures 4.1 through 4,3 show the responses of the five variables involved in 
food security to a one standard deviation (typical) shock in the oil price in Algeria, 
Iran, and Saudi Arabia, respectively. Each function was traced through 10 time 
periods (years). This time frame was considered long enough for most responses to 
occur, equivalent to two economic planing periods in each country. 
Figure 4.1 report the responses of all variables in the system to a one standard 
deviation shock in oil price in Algeria at year 1. The impulse response function 
suggests that the impact of a shock in oil price is an immediate .28 standard 
deviation decrease in real per capita income (AY) suggesting the importance of oil 
export earning in Algeria's economy, but that the impact in third year is positive 
and thereafter is not significantly different fi-om zero and, completely disappear 
after year 5. The oil price shock generates a negative response only in the second 
period indicating the lag response. Thereafter, wheat production follows an 
oscillatory path toward zero lasted more than AOP and AY responses. The initial 
response of consumption and import are positive and osillats thereafter. The 
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impulse response for AM and AC follow each other directly for early years and 
after year 3, consumption response follow imports with a lag. The increased oil 
price initially increase wheat consumption but decreased substantially at year 2 and 
return to preshock levels at year 5 and beyond. 
Figure 4.2 shows the responses of all variables in Iran to a one standard 
deviation shock in oil price at year 1. The figure present initially that an increased 
oil price has a positive impact on all variable in the system except wheat production 
(IQ). This seems to be consistent with "Dutch Disease" problem, that is when the 
oil price increased sharply the resources from traded sector of economy, i.e., 
agricultural and industrial, moved to oil sector and this movement of resource 
decrease the production of traded goods including wheat. The impact of shock in 
oil price on wheat consumption is large in the short run and disappears beyond 3 
years. 
Figure 4.3 shows the impact of shock in oil price in Saudi Arabia. The initial 
shock in oil price results to a positive impact on all variables in the system. Two 
interesting parts are: the production responses to oil price shock is more 
sustainable, i.e., one or more year after the initial shock, and in spite of the oil price 
falling down after year 1, the wheat consumption increased substantially. This 
appears consistent with the "permanent income" hypothesis in oil revenue. 
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Figure 4.1. Responses to an oil shock in Algeria 
(a) oil price and per capita income responses 
(b) wheat production, wheat imports, and consumption responses 
160 
(a) 
q a o a a a— 
J I I 1 L 
1 2 3 4 
• oil price 
5 6 7 
Year 
o per capita income 
8 9 10 
-
(b) 
1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 f  1 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
• Wheat production * wheat consumption 
o wheat imports 
Figure 4.2. Responses to an oil price shock in Iran 
(a) oil price and per capita income responses 
(b) wheat production, wheat imports, and consumption responses 
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Figure 4.3. Responses to an oil shock in Saudi Arabia 
(a) oil price and per capita income responses 
(b) wheat production, wheat imports, and consumption responses 
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CHAPTER V. OIL PRICE AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY: IRANIAN 
CASE 
Iran, with an area of 1,468,195 square kilometers, has a total farmland area 
of 17 million hectares (20% of the country) of which about 32 percent or 5.5 
million hectares is not cultivated. Of the 11.5 million hectares under cultivation, 
about 50 percent or 5.6 million hectares are irrigated, including one million 
hectares in orchards (Kavossi, 1991). Given climate constraints, agricultural 
policies in Iran are important economically and politically in the economic 
development of the country. The agricultural sector (a) employs a large portion of 
the population and (b) is an important source of food for the people. As mentioned 
in chapter 3, the objectives of agricultural policies after the Islamic Revolution in 
1979 was to increase output, improve productivity and achieve food 
self-sufficiency. These are different from pre-revolution objectives not only in 
direction but also in means. 
After 1979, the agricultural sector of Iran-in spite of remarkable increases in 
the use of inputs, such as fertilizers and farm machinery, and emphasis by the 
government on self- sufficiency (especially in wheat, Table 5.1)-experienced 
disappointing performance. The average annual growth rate in agriculture for 
1965-80 and 1980-90 were 4.5 and 4.0 percent, respectively. Also, the population 
Table 5.1. Government subsidy by commodities (Iran) [ 1980/81-1989/90] 
( in billions of Iranian rials ) 
Year 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 
Fertilizer 14.6 20.0 27.0 25.3 27.8 22.0 20.5 19.0 18.3 
Wlieat 3.7 24.0 37.0 24.3 27.0 51.0 68.3 40.2 39.0 
Source: The Ministry of Economy and Finance, Iran (1990). o\ 
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growth rate for those periods were 3.2 and 3.4, respectively (World Bank Report, 
1987 and 1992). Iran is not an exception in the region for the poor performance in 
agricultural policies. Rapidly escalating food demand and sluggish supply response 
in Middle East and North Africa countries have made the area one of the least food 
self-sufficient region in the world. The emergence of this "food gap" does not 
mean (as some have implied) that agricultural supply has stagnated, although this 
has happened in some cases. Rather, it means the measures taken to reduce the 
inequality between the rate of growth of demand and domestic supply and to 
restore food self-sufficiency have fallen short (Richards and Waterbury, 1990) (see 
Table 5.2). 
In searching for the causes of this "food gap" in Iran, we select wheat as a 
strategic agricultural product and as a proxy for food to analyze pricing policy and 
to explore the incentive role of producer prices in the wheat production-
consumption gap. A major point of contention in the agricultural policy debate in 
Iran centers on the influence of oil prices on food production, consumption, 
imports,and self-sufficiency in food. On the one hand, it is argued that increases in 
oil prices lead to increase in food imports, which in turn causes an adverse impact 
on domestic production. Others, however, argue that shortfalls in domestic 
production, independent of oil price changes, are the cause of the increasing trend 
in food imports. In section two of this chapter, the empirical evidence for the 
direction of causality and dynamic linkages between variables influencing the wheat 
Table 5.2. Characteristics of grain imports and production, and food self-sufGciency 
Oil Exporting 1966-80 growth ; in 1981-85 growth in Self-sufficiency ratio 
Countries 
Imports Production Imports Production 1970 1975 1980 1985 
Percent per year Percent 
Algeria 13.1 1.5 7.6 8.3 77.0 79.0 48.0 45.0 
Egypt 2.7 1.5 9.2 2.2 79.0 59.0 49.0 42.0 
Iran 8.3 1.8 1.3 0.1 90.0 79.0 65.0 59.0 
Iraq 20.8 -2.2 9.8 - 2.3 89.0 52.0 44.0 28.0 
Saudi A. 14.1 -3.6 8.9 48.5 46.0 25.0 7.0 28(a) 
Syria 8.7 6.7 7.0 - 5.9 54.0 97.0 107.0 66.0 
Tunisia 6.5 7.1 -7.4 12.9 56.0 78.0 54.0 85.0 
(a) Saudi Arabia was self-sufficent in wheat by 1984. 
Source: Shapouri and Rosen, 1986. 
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Figure 5.1. Production-consumption gap of wheat in Iran 
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consumption-production gap are examined. 
Oil Prices and Wheat Gap 
To analyze the implication of the " Oil Shocks", in the wheat sector, we 
examine the domestic supply and demand and then turn to the consequences of the 
resulting escalating of wheat imports. As mentioned in chapter III, after the first 
"oil shock" in 1973-74, the Iranian government relied on oil revenue to finance 
agricultural imports and the share of agriculture in total government investment was 
reduced. In 1974, Iran produced 4,600 thousand tons of wheat and imported 789 
thousand tons. This wheat consumption-production gap was party due to the 
Shah's land reform program, and was expected. This gap continued to widen and 
was mostly met through an increse in imports, (see Fig. 5.1) 
There are two ways to increase agricultural production: (1) increase planted 
area, in other words bring new land into cultivation, and (2) raise the productivity 
of the existing planted area. Increasing yields have played an important role in 
expanding the domestic supply of wheat in Iran and the entire region. For the two 
decades of the 1970s and 1980s in the Middle East and North Africa, some 55 
percent of the growth in food output was the result of increased yields, whereas, 
extension of cultivated area explains the remaining 45 percent. During the era of 
oil boom (1973-1980), some 88 percent of output growth was caused by higher 
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yields (Khaldi, 1984). 
In Iran, wheat production had an upward trend (except for 1978 and 1981), 
in spite of a decrease in area under wheat production from 6325 hectares in 1974 to 
6192 hectares in 1983. This inverse trend indicates that the decrease in area was 
more than compensated by the increase in yield from 727 kg per hectare in 1974 to 
1076 kg per hectare in 1983. The increase in yield was partly due to the use of 
improved seed and fertilizer which were made available to the farmers at subsidized 
prices largely financed by oil revenues. In the 1974-1991 period, wheat production 
in Iran increased from 4700 thousand tons to 8315 thousand tons. As Table 5.3 
reports, wheat production, which had been steadily growing before the Revolution, 
has experienced some fluctuation since 1979, mainly due to severe drought in 
1979-80 and 1983, and to unusually favorable weather condition in 1985-1986. 
From the food security point of view, the variation of agricultural production in 
general, and cereal production in particular, was high during oil shock periods, i.e., 
1973-1985. The average growth rate for cereal was 3.71, and standard deviation 
was 10.98. In per capita terms they were .67 and 10.67, respectively. The wheat 
production in the 1987-1991 period showed remarkable growth rates (except for 
1989/90), but with accompanying high fluctuation due to scant rainfall in many 
parts of the country during the late 1980s. In the same period, despite the limited 
availability of cultivable land, the area under foodgrains production, of which 73 
percent is devoted to wheat, increased by about 2.5 percent annually. In addition, 
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Table 5.3. Iran wheat production, consumption, and imports 
Production Consumption Per Capita Imports 
Year (1000 mt) (1000 mt) consumption (Kg) (1000 mt) 
1974 4700 5750 180.0 1452 
1975 5500 5790 176.4 1466 
1976 5965 5349 158.7 737 
1977 5500 5926 168.5 1159 
1978 5526 5926 162.8 730 
1979 5946 5884 155.6 400 
1980 5744 6148 156.5 871 
1981 6610 7131 174.7 1615 
1982 6660 8162 192.4 1769 
1983 5956 7878 178.8 2683 
1984 6706 7533 164.4 2618 
1985 6630 8276 173.8 2144 
1986 7577 8482 171.6 1831 
1987 7600 11031 200.8 3712 
1988 7265 10715 200.2 3423 
1989 5511 10610 199.7 5312 
1990 7000 11750 200.0 4818 
1991 8315 12746 200.0 4521 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (Iran). Extracted from Haqverdi (Farsi). 
The data for period 1989-1991 obtained from PAO sources. 
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more resources were allocated to agriculture after the Iran-Iraq war. And other 
institutional factors, such as incentives provided through producer price policy, also 
may have contributed to this upward trend in wheat production in the most recent 
period. Indeed, the growth of agricultural output in Middle East countries is better 
than that of some other developing countries. But the point is that the agriculture 
sector still lags behind in relation to the growth in the demand for agricultural 
products. In other words, the problem in the region is not of stagnation or 
declining output, as is often the case in other developing countries, rather a demand 
growth that exceeds the supply growth. 
All of the estimates of food demand-supply balance in the region agree that 
demand will continue to grow rapidly (see e.g., FAO, and Khaldi). On the demand 
side, Khaldi found that total annual staples consumption grew at 4.8 percent from 
1973 to 1980; while the rate for oil-exporting countries in the region was 6.2 
percent per year. Among others, there are three major determinants of demand 
growth: population growth, per capita income growth, and the income elasticity of 
demand. Due to data limitation for individual countries, we focus our analysis on 
food consumption of oil exporting countries in the region. Apart from sub-Sahara 
Africa, the Middle East and North Africa countries have the highest rate of 
population growth of any region in the world. Rapid population growth did make a 
substantial contribution to increased demand for food. However, much of the 
growth in demand has been caused by expansion of per capita incomes (Richards, 
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1987) (see Table 5.4). The population effect was compounded during the decade of 
oil boom by the rapid growth of income. Even for cereals for direct food 
consumption in the region, income growth accounted for roughly 25 percent of the 
growth of consumption. Cereal demand as a whole grew much more rapidly, 
largely as a result of soaring demand for feeding animals. The changing 
composition of diets in the region came from the expansion of incomes resulting 
from the oil boom. Based on structural changes in consumption of food and some 
political consideration, there is some evidence (Shapouri and Rosen, 1986 and 
Gardner, 1986) that food consumption in oil exporting countries in the region, 
continues to increase despite a decline in income. So there is unlikely to be any 
- 'V 
reduction in the food consumption-production gap, at least in short run, from the 
demand side. Wheat consumption in Iran increased from 5750 thousand tons in 
1974/5 to 12746 thousand tons in 1991/2. Even after a decline in oil prices starting 
in 1986 the consumption trend continued in the upward direction. 
The first response to this food production-consumption gap by governments 
was to increase food imports. For two decades, 1960-1980, the region's food 
import increased about 12% per year. There were four economic reasons for the 
import boom in the region. First, as mentioned earlier, domestic production was 
(and is) highly unstable because of erratic rainfall. Second, the barter terms of 
trade moved sharply in favor of oil exporters/food importers. In 1970 a barrel of 
oil would buy roughly one bushel of wheat; by 1980 the same barrel could buy six 
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Table 5.4. Source of growth of consumption of food, by 
commodity group in the oil exporting in MENA 
A: Staples For Food For Feed All Uses 
g %y g %y g %y 
Region 3.6 25 6.8 60 4.8 44 
Oil Exp, 5.1 39 9.4 67 6.2 50 
B: Cereal 
Region 3.6 25 6.9 61 4.9 45 
Oil Exp. 5.1 39 9.4 67 6.2 52 
C: Animal 
Products 
Total 
g %y 
Chicken 
g %y 
Milk 
g %y 
Region 6.8 60 14.0 81 5.1 47 
Oil Exp. 12.7 76 20.8 85 9.3 66 
g = growth of consumption 
% y = percent of growth of consumption caused by income growth, using the 
formula g = n + y e, where n = poplation growth rate, and e = income elasticity 
of demand. 
Oil Exp, are: Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, libya, Oman, and Saudi Arabia 
Population growth rate in Oil Exp. =3.1 percent. 
Source: Richards and Khaldi 
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bushels. Even in 1986, after the drop in oil prices, a barrel of oil was worth three 
bushels of wheat. Third, most MENA countries had ample supplies of foreign 
exchange, in other words, the balance of payments did not constrain food imports 
in 1970s. The 1980s are another matter. Fourth, since most wheat importers in the 
region are small relative to the size of the international market, increased purchases 
have no impact on world prices. Finally, in some countries urban-consumer tastes 
shifted away fi-om local grains toward bread wheat, whose production was 
sometimes locally difficult (Richards and Waterbury, 1990). 
In all countries in the region increases in export earnings and/or credit led to 
increased imports of agricultural products during the 1970's. After 1980, the story 
begins to change. The annual rate of increase in export earnings in Algeria, Iran, 
and Saudi Arabia, for example, decreased from 21.0, 20.4, and 31.1, in 1966-80 
period to -1.9, 1.6, and - 28.8 in 1981-85 period, respectively. Total imports 
declined almost 2 percent annually during 1981-85, while food imports continued to 
increase but at a slower rate than previously (4% per year). According to Shapouri 
and Rosen (1986) four primary reasons account for this trend: 
(1) Variation in Export Earning 
(2) Growth in Credit 
(3) Government Policies 
(4) Slow Production Growth 
They found, among other things, that import capacity was the most 
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significant variable in explaining the level of food imports , and in turn, it depends 
on export earnings and the availability of credit. They also found that cereal 
imports have become a significant contributor to the overall levels of availability. 
In the case of Iran, the increasing dependency on food imports over domestic 
production in meeting food demand can be traced back to the influence of oil 
revenues in agricultural and food policy. The relationship between changes in oil 
export earnings and agricultural imports during 1970's and 1980's was analyzed by 
the Department of Agriculture in the United States for the period 1969-1988 for 
selected oil exporting countries. The result is reported in Table 5.5. For Iran, a 
one percent increase (decrease) in the price of oil implies a 0.889 percent increase 
(decrease) in agricultural imports. Also, the study indicated that changes in the 
price of crude oil alone accounted for about 90 percent of the change in value of 
agricultural imports for all the countries in the study. This strong link between 
agricultural imports and oil price suggests the proclivity of oil exporting countries 
to satisfy their domestic food demand more with imports rather than domestic 
production. Consequently, the need to expand agricultural production is 
significantly reduced. Moreover, in the case of Iran, the government was under no 
political pressure from established large landlords to provide facility to increase 
agricultural production. The oil revenues allowed the government to defuse the 
power of landlords by purchasing their land for redistribution to landless farmers 
under a land reform program of the 1960s (Shafaeddin, 1988). Fig.5.2 shows the 
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Table 5.5. Elasticity of agricultural imports with respect to nominal 
oil prices 
2 
Country Elasticity R 
Algeria 0.827* 0.95 
Indonesia 0.552* 0.89 
Iran 0.889* 0.94 
Iraq 0.968* 0.94 
Mexico 0.824* 0.89 
Nigeria 0.846* 0.87 
Saudi Arabia 1.011* 0.89 
Venezuela 0.673* 0.92 
* Denotes statistical significance at a p < 0.01. 
Source: USDA (1986). 
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Figure 5.2. Wheat production and import in Iran 
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trend and fluctuations of wheat production and imports for three decades, 1960-
1991, in Iran. 
However, this response of the government to the imbalances in food supply 
and demand can not be sustained over a prolonged period of time. The variability 
in oil revenues presents a major challenge to policy makers in managing the food 
supply (domestic production + imports) in the country (e.g., the oil revenue in Iran 
in 1990 was 10.6% larger than targeted, and was 14.4, 9.1, and 20.6 less than 
targeted for 1989, 1991 and 1992, respectively). An even more serious problem is 
the possibility of foreign exchange constraints in the future. Furthermore, too much 
dependency on foreign suppliers for basic commodities like food may subject the 
country to food embargo for political reasons. For these economic and political 
considerations, the government of Iran attempted other alternatives to reduce or 
ultimately eliminate the food production-consumption gap by intervening in the 
agriculture sector both to boost and stabilize production. The major form of 
intervention included (a) direct investment in agriculture (discussed in Chapter III), 
and (b) pricing policies intended to provided incentives for production. 
Agricultural Price Policy in Iran: Wheat Case 
The government intervention in agricultural price policies has a long history 
in MENA. For example, wheat and barely prices controls by the government in 
Iran started in 1916. The aim of the intervention was to prevent severe fluctuation 
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in the prices of these commodities in the interest of the city dwellers. In fact, like 
many developing countries, price policies in Iran were consumer-oriented until 
recently. Some governments have impeded the growth of output of cereals through 
their output pricing policies. Indeed, some believe that this is the cause of the food 
gap. The argument holds that if only government could "get the prices 
right"~specifically, permit cereal prices to rise to world level-the food gap would 
shrink dramatically (Richards, 1987). But, finding the "right" producer price (i.e., 
the price that is high enough to encourage production) and the "right" consumer 
price (i.e., the price that is low enough or "not too high" to keep consumers happy) 
is a difficult challenge. For one, the government has to balance conflicting 
objectives and interests (Tapsolra, 1990), and the informational requirements are 
tremendous. The actual result of the pricing polices in Iran indicate some bias 
towards the consumer at the expense of turning the terms of trade against 
agriculture, i.e., agricultural products are sold for a fixed price that is determined 
by the government while the price of non-agricultural goods are determined in the 
market and are free to rise in response to market forces. A study by Shafaeddin 
(1988) for the 1965-77 period, indicates that the terms of trade deteriorated against 
wheat and this deterioration was exacerbated by government wheat trade polices. 
For instance, whenever the wholesale wheat price (WPIW) tended to decline, as in 
1966 - 68, due to a good harvest, the government did not make any attempt to 
support it by increasing its purchase. Ironically, it even exacerbated the situation in 
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some period by increasing supply, mainly from subsidized wheat imports. In 
contrast, whenever the wholesale price tended to rise, such as in 1963-65 and 
1972-1974, it supplied wheat to the market in relatively large quantities (see Table 
5.6 ), causing the wheat price to increase less than it would have otherwise. Also, it 
can seen from Table 5.6, the increase in the official sale price has been sluggish 
compared to the wholesale price of wheat (WPIW), that the government's sale price 
rose 30% against 100% for the WPIW, from 1959 to 1977. When considering the 
importance of the government sale in relation to production, the government sale 
policy (unlike its purchase policy) have had significant dampening effect on the 
wholesale price. Wheat purchaseed by the government as a percentage of total 
production in 1974 reached to only 2.5%, but the net government sale repesented a 
bigger share in relation to wheat consumption, 22 percent in 1974. The wholesale 
price of wheat is constructed on the basis of prices generated in the private trading 
of wheat (representing the part of demand not satisfied by government's sale). 
The nominal protection coefficient (NPCs)^'^ is often used to show the degree 
of producer price support by government. In the MENA region only four countries 
(including two oil-exporting countries) had a wheat NPC greater than one in the 
1971-1981 period. Table 5.7. Specifically, in the late 1976 in Iran, farmers 
received around 10 rials a kilogram for wheat, an amount mildly regarded as 
adequate to cover the cost of cultivation. At the same time the government was 
paying 18 rials a kilogram for imported wheat (Looney, 1983). Also, the prices set 
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Table 5.6. Data on wheat domestic puchase and sale by Iranian 
government (1955-1977) 
Year Purchase Sale Official prices wholesale prie 
(1000 tons) (rial/tons) index of wheat 
purchase sale (WPIW) 
1959 36.5 162.5 5000 6200 100.0 
1960 12.2 177.7 5000 6200 105.8 
1961 127.4 263.5 5000 6200 105.4 
1962 56.0 201.7 5000 6200 113.2 
1963 133.9 161.7 5000 6200 103.9 
1964 7.1 257.7 5000 7510 121.9 
1965 15.5 334.0 5000 7510 130.8 
1966 197.2 241.9 5000 7510 114.6 
1967 246.3 400.0 5000 7510 93.0 
1968 244.7 53.3 5500 7500 86.5 
1969 9.3 101.6 5500 6730 101.1 
1970 3.7 310.6 5500 7510 122.2 
1971 0.8 804.4 5500 7510 138.4 
1972 5.0 524.8 6300 7510 118.5 
1973 3.1 593.7 6500 7510 127.1 
1974 116.2 1370.8 8000 7510 204.1 
1975 496.7 1553.8 9000-10000 7510 166.9 
1976 793.9 1641.8 9000-10625 7510 171.4 
1977 980.5 2000.0 11000-12000 8008 200.9 
Source: Shafaeddin (1988). 
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Table 5.7. Currency overvaluation and average producer Prices for wheat 
(1971-1981) 
Index of Currency 
Country Overvaluation 
Average Producer Official 
Exchange Rate 
Price of Wheat Using 
Market Exchange Rate 
Algeria 178 127 71 
Egypt 174 79 45 
Iran 120 110 92 
Iraq 118 88 74 
Jordan 101 102 101 
Libya 143 165 115 
Morocco 104 141 136 
Saudi A. 99 235 237 
Sudan 181 137 76 
Syria 107 93 87 
Tunisia 115 103 90 
Turkey 125 91 73 
Source: Richards and Waterbury, 1990. 
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by the government did not reflect the higher prices of factors of production such as 
fertilizer and machinery. For example, between 1970 and 1977, the price of 
fertilizer rose by about 28 percent and that of tractors by 51 percent (Central Bank, 
1978). 
After the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the government's setting of the price of 
wheat was the most important ingredient of its agricultural price policy. The 
objectives of wheat pricing were to encourage production by increasing the 
producer price on the one hand, and to subsidize bread for urban population on the 
other hand. It is expected that this policy will help country to achieve self-
sufficiency in wheat for food and national security goals. 
As in many other countries, the Iranian government's control over 
agricultural prices is partial and lopsided. At one extreme for example, wheat price 
is effectively controlled by the government while, at other extreme, fruit and 
vegetable (e.g., watermelon) prices are left to market forces. This structure in 
government pricing and the presence of inflation has led to wheat prices lagging 
behind other prices. Therefore, not only has agricultural profitability declined, but 
also the relative prices (internal terms of trade) within agriculture have turned 
against staple food grains. This may lead to more variation or decline in the 
domestic grains production. 
The governments in food-deficit developing countries, in general, in case of 
a decline in foreign exchange reserve and/or possible log-run instability of export 
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earnings and presence of inflation, may be forced to raise the administered prices of 
grains (wheat) to offset increases in farm production cost and to restore production 
incentives and stabilize domestic production. However, more often than not, 
inflation quickly erodes the incentives, and the cycle repeats itself again. 
This cycle in grain pricing policy can be clearly seen in the case of wheat 
prices in Iran. Before the Revolution, particularly after the first "oil shock" in 
1974, when wheat imports almost doubled, the government increased the price of 
wheat substantially. But since the price was kept constant for the next two years 
despite high inflation rates, the real price of wheat declined sharply. Then the 
imports which had decreased in 1976 began to rise again in 1977. In response, the 
government increased prices by about 20 percent, but this was too little, too late, 
and real price of wheat continued to decline. After the Revolution, the price of 
wheat was raised again, but the increases could not match the ongoing inflation. 
So, by 1980, the relative price of wheat was falling and imports were rising. In 
1981 and 1983, the price of wheat was increased by 40 and 30 percent, 
respectively, quickly restoring profitability in producing wheat, but each time the 
price increase was followed by an effective price freeze, so that relative gains were 
quickly lost to inflation (Mojtahed and Esfahani, 1989). The relative price index in 
Table 5.8 indicates that the price of wheat has been particularly lagging behind 
other agricultural prices. To provide adequate incentives it is vital for the price 
policy in Iran not only to avoid the stop-and-go scheme, but also consider the 
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Table 5.8. Farmgate price of wheat offered by the government 
Year 
Farmgate nominal price 
of wheat (rials/kg) 
Index of price of wheat 
relative to : 
Consumer 
prices 
Wholesale 
prices 
1973 5.5 63.3 n.a. 
1974 10.0 100.0 100.0 
1975 10.0 91.0 98.1 
1976 10.0 78.2 79.7 
1977 12.0 75.0 82.2 
1978 14.0 79.3 81.9 
1979 18.0 91.6 80.0 
1980 20.0 82.1 61.6 
1981 28.0 94.0 72.5 
1982 30.0 84.5 68.5 
1983 40.0 95.7 76.5 
1984 40.0 86.6 62.0 
1985 40.0 83.2 57.1 
1986 46.0 79.5 n.a. 
1987 48(a) n.a. n.a. 
(a) In 1987, in addition to the price of 48 rials per kilogram, in-kind " prizes" 
were also offered to farmers for delivering their wheat to the government. 
Source: Mojtahed and Esfahani, 1989. 
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profitability of production. For example, under two different methods of wheat 
production, i.e. semi-mechanization and traditional, the yield and production cost in 
these two methods are different. Therefore, in 1984 when administered price of 
wheat was 30 rials the traditional producer lost 2 rials per kilogram, while other 
producers made 9 rials profit. 
Finally, two factors play important roles in recent years in wheat production: 
(a) increasing price continuously (e.g., official wheat price was 53.0, 57.0, 100.0, 
150.0 and 225.0 rials per kilogram in 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992, 
respectively), and (2) reforming in price policy system fi-om fixing price to 
guarantee price (government guarantee to purchase wheat and some other 
agricultural products at prices announced each year). 
In comparing the performance of price policies in pre-revolution and post-
revolution in Iran, Mojtahed and Esfahani indicate that after the revolution, the 
overall terms of trade have turned in favor of agriculture. However, this type 
grains price polices, is probably the main reason that cereal production has 
fluctuated much more than the total crops production in recent years. Moreover, 
Richards mentioned, that domestic production fluctuations, not price instability, is 
the main source of food insecurity both globally and in MENA region. 
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Oil Price, Wheat Production, and Wheat Imports in 
Iran: a Causality Analysis 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), "food security 
has three specific aims: ensuring production of adequate food supplies, maximizing 
stability in the supplies, and securing access to available supply on the part of those 
who need them." Internal and external factors influence food availability and, thus, 
food security at the national and regional level. In this chapter we consider and test 
the relationship between two important components of food security, wheat 
production and imports, and the price of oil, which plays a vital role in all major 
oil exporting counties. 
Formal investigation of causal relationships of variables impacting food 
security is necessary for policy purposes. Causal relationship can not be 
determined from standard statistical methods. For example, finding a high 
correlation among variables does not necessarily imply the presence of a causal 
linkage among them. It can be spurious-that is, their correlation may actually be 
due to a third factor. On the other hand, functionally (in a non-linear fashion) 
related variables may be uncorrelated (a linear measure of functional relationship). 
Hence, it is the primary goal of this section to explore the causal relationship 
between wheat imports, as a important component in food availability, and wheat 
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domestic production and oil prices in Iran. 
The method employed for analyzing causal relationship is based on the 
concept of "Granger Causality", developed by Granger (1969) in his seminal paper 
entitled "Investigating Causal Relations". The idea is: a time series process X 
"causes" another time series Y if, by incorporating the past history of X, one can 
improve a prediction of Y compared to a prediction based on the history of Y 
alone. 
This notion of causality has spawned a vast and influential literature. For 
example, macro economic studies of Granger causality have included investigation 
of the causal relationships between money and income, between wages and prices 
(see Feige and Pearce for a review of these studies), and between GNP and energy 
consumption (see, for instance, Abosedra and Baghestani, 1991). An example of 
causality investigation in agricultural economics is "Chickens, Eggs, and Causality " 
(Thurman and Fisher, 1988). 
Since "cause" is a loaded term, to avoid misunderstanding some people use 
other terms such as "precedent" as suggested by Leamer (Maddala, 1988), and 
interpret the Granger Causality as meaning knowledge of X (t) increase one's 
ability to forecast Y(t+1) in a least squares sense (Conway et al., 1984). About ten 
years after his initial paper, Granger introduced a distinguishing title for his 
definition and concept of "causality", which is quite different from the general use 
and logically correct, from alternative terms, by suggesting that be called "Granger 
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Causality" (Granger, 1980). 
Assessments of "Granger Causality" have both practical and theoretical value 
(Freeman, 1982). Indeed, in economics, tests for this kind of causality are 
becoming recognized as essential steps in building a model (Sargent, 1981). 
Operationalization and testing 
For a bivariate case, consider a jointly stationary processes X and Y. Let all 
past values of X, and Y, be denoted by and all past and present values of X, 
and Y, be represented as x^and y^. Also, define as minimum prediction 
variance^^l There are number of ways to define causality. Four of the most 
popular cases are presented below; 
I Y Causes X: (X, | y^ , x^ ) < (X, | x", ) 
II Y Causes X instantaneously : (X, | y'^t, x", ) < (X, | y",, x\ ) 
III Feed Back : Y Causes X and X Causes Y. 
IV Independence : (X, | y",, x", )= (Xj | x", ) = (X, | y'^,, x^t ) 
and 
(Y, I y',, x', )= 0^ (Y, I y't ) = 0^ (Y, | x" , y", ) 
Three tests of causality have been proposed within Granger's definition of 
causality: (i) the Direct-Granger test which is based on his definition and applied 
as a one-sided distributed lag, (ii) the Sims (1972) approach based on a two-sided 
distributed lag, and (iii) a cross-correlation between the residual series method 
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suggested by Pierce and Haugh (1977). 
The Granger and Sims tests are theoretically equivalent (Doan,1992), and as 
Freeman pointed out, the Pierce-Haugh technique is really a test for independence 
only. The properties of variants of these three tests of causal direction have been 
studied by, for instance, Geweke, Meese, and Dent. All studies indicate the Direct-
Granger test is preferable to the Sims and Pierce-Haugh tests of causality (Abosedra 
and Baghestani, 1991). 
Among the problems associated with the Direct-Granger method, however, is 
the need to choose a sufficient lag length for the right side of the autoregressive 
representations of a bivariate system: 
y, =sra,y,.,+2? (5. 1) 
X,=%y,.,+qôy%,.y+82, (5.2) 
If an insufOcient number of lags is chosen, there is likely to be serial correlation in 
the residuals and therefore, a biased hypothesis test (Feige and Pearce, 1979). 
Another difHculty with this technique is that estimated residual in the test equations 
(5. l)and (5. 2) are assumed to be independent. If this is not the case and €,t and 
Eg, are contemporaneously correlated, the Zellner-Aitken generalized least squares 
regression estimating simultaneously these two equations provides results that are 
similar to those of the Direct-Granger method (Cuddington, 1980). 
190 
Empirical evidence 
To use the standard Direct-Granger causality test we specify a set of two 
unrestricted equations. We explore the causal linkage between oil price (OP), and 
wheat imports (M) by using equations (5. 3) and (5. 4). On the other hand, 
equations (5. 5) and (5. 6) are used to detect the causality relation between 
domestic wheat production (Q) and wheat imports (M). 
To test for stationarity of these four time series we applied a Dicky-Fuller test. 
The results indicate that only domestic production of wheat (Q) is a stationary 
process. To eliminate the problem of time series serial correlation and "spurious 
regression" all three non stationary processes are transformed into first-order 
difference form. We use the domestic production level of wheat, both with and 
without a time trend. 
We applied these unrestricted equations to Granger causality test for the two 
pairs of variables mentioned above for Iran covering the period 1964-1991. Since 
our data are annual, such test equations might be misspecified if there is a 
OP, .y +e 1, 
OP, =%. OP,+B2, 
-J +H,y 
( 5 . 3 )  
( 5 . 6 )  
( 5 . 4 )  
( 5 . 5 )  
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significant causal relationship with a lag length of less than one year between the 
variables. To overcome this possible problem, it is more appropriate to use the 
Direct-Granger test in the form suggested by Feige and Johannes; that is, we add 
the current value of independent variable in right side of test equations (run for 
j>0). 
The null hypothesis that oil price (OP) does not cause wheat imports (M), is 
tested by examining the joint significance of the coefficients on n past OP in 
equation (5. 3). To test of OP does not cause (M) "at all" (i.e., including 
contemporaneously), we examine the joint significance of coefficients on OP and n 
past OP in equation (5. 3). To test whether "wheat import does not cause oil price" 
we use equation (5. 4) in the same manner. A lag length of 2 for independent 
variables is chosen (n =2) for equation (5. 4). This is deemed adequate since 
annual data are used, and to ensure enough degrees of freedom for better precision 
of estimates. However, in Tables 5.10 and 5.11 since Q needed no differencing, 
the lag length can be increased up to 3 to accomodate more dynamics in the model 
(different lag lenghts were tested, but not reported here). 
Table (5.9) reports the calculated F-value for (i) OP (M) does not cause M 
(OP), (ii) OP (M) does not cause M (OP) "at all". Note that F(A) refers to the F-
statistics for the "at all" causality test (i.e., when considering both the lagged and ' ' 
the contemporaneous variables), and F(S) refers to strict causality test, that is when 
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Table 5.9. Granger-causality F-test 
Causality: from oil price to wheat import 
no. of lag in null F(A)« F(Sy T D-h/t" 
ind. variables hypothesis 
[ 1 ]  O P  n o t  c a u s e  M  3 . 2 8 ( 2 , 2 3 ) ' *  4 . 4 0 ( 1 , 2 4 /  . 2 3  1 . 0 8 / -
[ 2 ]  O P  n o t  c a u s e  M  2 . 2 4  ( 3 , 2 1 ) '  2 . 7 1 ( 2 , 2 2 ) " "  . 2 1  N C / 1 . 8 2 ' '  
Causality: from wheat import to oil price 
no. of lag in null F(A)= F(S)® T D-h/t" 
ind. variables hypothesis 
[ 1 ]  M  n o t  c a u s e  O P  1 . 5 0 ( 2 , 2 3 )  . 9 8 ( 1 , 2 4 )  . 0 3  N C / . 5 3  
[ 2 ]  M  n o t  c a u s e  O P  . 9 1 ( 3 , 2 1 )  . 5 8 ( 2 , 2 2 )  . 0 7  N C / . 7 8  
® F(A) refers to the causality F- statistics for the " at all " causality and F(S) refers to the 
strict causality test. Degrees of freedom are given in parantheses. 
'' Adjusted R-squared and D-h ( Durbin- h) and t-values are from the unrestricted test 
equations. 
" F- critical value at 10% level is 2.36. 
NC indicates that the Durbin- h statistic can not computed. 
* Significant at 5-percent level. 
" Significant at 10- percent level. 
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one just considers the lagged variables. 
An examination of F(A) and F(S) in the first panel in Table (5.9) indicates 
the presence of a unidirectional causality from oil price to wheat imports ( OP =» 
M). in other words, the "past and current " history and also "past" history of oil 
price help predict wheat imports in Iran. The latter appears to have a more 
stronger causal linkage than the former. Examination of the second panel suggests 
no causation between oil price and wheat imports, when the "past and present" 
information is considered, but there is a unidirectional causal relation from oil price 
to wheat imports when we consider "past" information of oil price only. 
The results of the Direct-Granger test, relating wheat domestic production 
(with time trend) and wheat imports for alternative lag lengths, are summarized in 
Table (5.10). These results suggest the presence of strong causality linkage from 
wheat production to wheat imports when both the contemporaneous and lag 
variables are considered. Examination of F(S), however, suggests no causation 
between the two variables, for all different lag structures. The current effect from 
Q to M seems to be significant in all cases. The structure of Table (5.10) is the 
same as Table (5.11), except the level of Q is detrended^^\ 
Again, the examination of F(A) indicates the presence of a strong 
bidirectional (feed back) causality from Q to M. In comparing Table (5.10) and 
(5.11), on the basis of the "F-statistic" values, the effects from domestic production 
of wheat to wheat imports appear to be more pronounced than when we use 
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Table 5.10. Direct - Granger F-Test: Domestic wheat production process with 
time trend 
Causality: from wheat production to wheat import 
no. of lag in null F(A)® F(S)® 
ind. variables hypothesis 
[ 2 ]  [ Q n o t c a u s e M ]  5 . 0 4 ( 3 , 2 0 ) "  2 . 1 4 ( 2 , 2 1 )  . 5 1  
[ 3 ]  [ Q n o t c a u s e M ]  4 . 4 4 ( 4 , 1 7 ) '  1 . 6 0 ( 3 , 1 8 )  . 5 3  
Causality: from wheat import to wheat production 
no. of lag in null F(A)« F(S)= T D-h/t^ 
ind. variables hypothesis 
[ 2 ]  [ M n o t c a u s e Q ]  3 . 4 0 ( 3 , 2 0 )  . 3 7 ( 2 , 2 1 )  . 7 8  N C / . 1 4  
[ 3 ]  [ M n o t c a u s e Q ]  3 . 1 6 ( 4 , 1 7 ) "  . 4 7 ( 3 , 1 8 )  . 7 0  N C / . 5 9  
D-h /t'' 
-1.2/-
NC/1.14 
* Significant at 5 - percent level 
** Significant at 1- percent level 
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Table 5.11. Direct - Granger F-Test: Domestic wheat production process without 
time trend 
Causality: from wheat production to wheat import 
no. of lag in null F(Ay F(Sy T D-h/t" 
ind. variables hypothesis 
[ 2 ]  [ Q  n o t  c a u s e  4 . 6 2 ( 3 , 2 0 ) *  1 . 7 2 ( 2 , 2 1 )  . 4 9  N C / 0 . 1 9  
M] 
[ 3 ]  [ Q  n o t  c a u s e  3 . 5 2 ( 4 , 1 7 ) *  . 9 9 ( 3 , 1 8 )  . 4 8  N C / 2 . 1 7  
M] 
Causality: from wheat import to wheat production 
no. of lag in null F(A)= F(S)= T D-h/t" 
ind. variables hypothesis 
[ 2 ]  (M not cause Q] 3.91(3,20)** .96(2,21) .27 NC 
/0.91 
[ 3 ]  [ M  n o t  c a u s e  2 . 9 8 ( 4 ,  1 7 ) * *  . 5 2 ( 3 , 1 8 )  . 3 1  N C / 2  
Q] 
* Significant at 5 - percent level** Significant at 1- percent level 
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detrended time series value of Q. 
Since the data for oil price includes three "shocks"—1973, 1979 and 1983-
we apply the Chow test to explore whether there is any structural changes in the 
coefficients. The results indicate that causality test are not sensitive to sample 
periods. For testing serial correlation, since the test equations include lags, 
"Durbin-h" is used. In any case where this test could not be computed due to 
T[var(.)]>l, where T is number of observations and var (.) is an estimate of 
squared variance of the coefficient of the first lagged endogenous variable, we 
applied an alternative test called "m-test". Based on reported "D-h" or "t-value" 
for m-test, in Tables (5.9), (5.10), and (5.11) there are no serial correlation problem 
in the unrestricted test equations. 
Conclusion 
Using the Direct-Granger causality test, we have shown, that there is a 
unidirectional causality relation from oil price to wheat import in strict and 
instantaneous sense in Iran. In other words, the "past and present" history of oil 
prices are useful information to improve the prediction of wheat imports. The past 
and current history of domestic production of wheat (with and without time trend) 
is useful to improve the prediction of wheat imports, but this is not the case when 
we just consider the past history of domestic wheat production. As Feige and 
Johannes suggested causality tests may make important contributions to our 
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understanding of fundamental economic relationship if used with caution. 
Checking the robustness of the conclusions under different testing methods is 
desirable. This can be done by using Vector Autoregression (VAR), which can 
investigate the effects of any "shock", thereby showing some causal characteristics. 
198 
Endnotes 
1. Nominal Protection Coefficient is defined as the ratio of the domestic price 
divided by the international price, evaluated at the official exchange rate. 
2. Prediction variance. Given a two variables regression model, Y, =a+j8X,+€, 
t = 1, 2 ,T and e, ~ N (0, o^). If assume a and jS are konwn, the appropriate 
forecast for Yj+i is given by =E(Yt+, )= a , the prediction (forecast) 
error is 6^ .+, =Yt+i -Yt+i . This prediction error has two desirable properties: (a) 
E( Sr+i) = E(Yr+i -Yx+i) = (-€7+1) = 0 and (b) the prediction error variance is the 
minimum variance among all possible forecasts based on linear equations (see 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991). 
3. The time series Q, is a trend-stationary process (TSP) (not a difference-stationar 
rocess(DSP). A TSP can be represented as Y=a + /3t +€,. Deterending involves 
subtracting a (linear) trend (Y - jSt = a+e,), in order to obtain a stationary process 
(Lloyd and Rayner, 1993). 
199 
CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The geo-political economy of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
countries is dominated by three factors: little rain, much oil and rapidly growing 
population. Over the last forty years there has been significant changes in the 
farming sector throughout the region. Many rural societies have transformed the 
traditional subsistence agriculture with adoption of modem production techniques. 
Urban societies, on the other hand, have evolving consumption patterns. 
Characteristic of most countries in the region, oil export earnings is a major 
contributing factor driving these changes. This transition has occurred at different 
time and on different rate, but the significant changes occurred after the first oil 
shock in 1973/4. 
The food security (supply food for all people in all time) situation at the 
national level in the oil exporting countries provide a classical example of 
interaction of a sector (i.e., agricultural) and the macro economy. The two 
favorable oil price shocks in the early and late 1970s, resulted to significant 
increase in per capita income. The high per capita income together with fast 
population growth created a food production-consumption gap. This was 
compounded by natural and socio-economic constraints (such as government price 
policy), particular in these countries, which limited domestic food production. It is 
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in this context that food imports have been used as an important instrument to 
stabilize food availability for national security objectives in general, and for food 
security, in particular. During the last 20 years, food imports have become critical 
to food security program of MENA countries. Despite nearly all countries 
implementing import-substituting agricultural policies (i.e., self-sufficiency in food) 
except for Turkey, Morroco, and Iran, the region still import half their food supply. 
Reliance on imported food exposes these countries to substantial risk should foreign 
exchange availability decline; especially during drought period. The "bread crisis" 
in North Africa (e.g., Tunisia) in the early 1980s is a an example of this risk 
exposure. Therefore, analysis of food security of oil exporting countries which 
focus only on internal factors such as domestic production is not sufficient, because 
of the link oil provides to the domestic maco-economy as well as external forces. 
Today, in most of the MENA countries, food security strategies are at the forefront 
of national development plans and variation of oil price plays a vital role in the 
implementation of these plans. 
This dissertation examined the relative influence of oil price shocks, as an 
external factor, on some internal factors such as income, food production, food 
imports, and variation of food consumption. The later is used as an indicator of 
food insecurity. The study uses a linear non-structural model-vector autoregression 
(VAR)-of five variables impacting the food security of Algeria, Iran, and Saudi 
Arabia. 
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Although closely similar in economic base and many other considerations, 
the three countries took different paths in their policy initiatives relating to food 
security. Algeria followed an industrialization-first policy with very scant attention 
given to domestic agricultural production and high dependency on food imports. 
Iran is also dependent on imports but have given agricultural policy and financial 
support (e.g., in particular, its price policy). Saudi Arabia is the only country of 
the three that heavely invested on production infrastructure in the agriculture sector. 
These different policy initiative directions proved influential in impacting the 
interactions of the variables relevant in food security. 
The use of a time series data is appropriate for examining food security 
issues since more important factors impacting food security such as structural 
change (e.g., transformation of the rural society and rural-urban migration), 
gestation period of infrastructure invesment, and policy regime shifts are likely to 
have longer and persistent lag effect that may escape detection in a cross-section 
data. Also, from a methodological consideration, it allows testing whether the set 
of variables chosen as relevant in food security can be empirically tested for their 
relationship. This is especially important since most of the series have been found 
to be integrated. That is, individually they wander away without any tendency to 
revert to a mean level. However, a cointegration test reveals that a single, long-run 
equilibrium relationship governs the co-movement of these set of variables. This 
suggests that the set of variables are causally related in the long-run. 
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The first question addressed was the presence or absence of any 
Granger-causality linkages between the variables mentioned above. A 5-variable 
VAR model was used to examine this question. Statistical tests indicated that one 
year lag was appropriate for the model with differenced data. The results indicated 
that in Algeria the oil price "Granger-caused" food consumption, while in Iran and 
Saudi Arabia such strong causality relationship are not statistically significant. 
Also, per capita income "Granger-caused" wheat production in Algeria while in 
Saudi Arabia wheat imports "Granger-caused" wheat production. In the case of 
Iran, there is a unidirectional causality from oil price to wheat imports both when 
only past information is used (strict sense) and when current information is also 
included (instantaneous sense). The implication of these different causal relations 
could help planners to better understand food security and help them establish 
priorities in their national food strategies. 
To explore the relative importance of variation in oil price to other 
variables, a forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) is employed. In 
the case of Algeria, in the short-run the percentage of unexpected variations in oil 
price, wheat production, and wheat imports account for 7, 30, and 18 percent of 
variation in wheat consumption. In longer periods, that is after 2 years, oil prices 
appear to play increasing role (37%) in explaining the variation in the wheat 
consumption. In Iran, in the short-run wheat imports predominate the "other" 
variables in explaining the variation in wheat consumption and its share is 
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maintained over time. In Saudi Arabia the short-run wheat consumption is nearly 
exogenous, and even in the long-run, wheat production and oil prices have only a 
modest effect on variation of food consumption. 
This study also empirically examined the dynamic impact of one shock 
in oil price on the other variables in the system for each country. The impulse 
response function for Algeria shows that wheat imports and wheat consumption 
responses follow a similar pattern in the early period. The increase in oil price 
initially increases wheat consumption and then substantially declines after the 
second year. In Iran the impact of oil shock on wheat consumption is large in the 
short-run and disappear after 3 years. In Saudi Arabia responses to oil price shock 
shows that wheat production response is more sustainable and wheat consumption 
increases. This is consistent with Saudi Arabia historical data. 
The longer, larger, and more persistent lag responses shown both in the 
forecast error variance decomposition and impulse response function clearly 
indicates that a single measure of covariability such as the coefficient of variation 
hides the "secondary variability" included as the system adjust back to an 
equilibrium position after the initial shock. These seconderary variability (which 
are more endogeneous in nature) may present to be more inmanageable in terms of 
stabilization policies than the more exogeneous initial shock. 
The results of this study uncover the dominant sources of variation in food 
(e.g., wheat) availability (i.e., domestic production and imports) in Algeria, Iran 
204 
and Saudi Arabia. This information will be very useful in planning food security 
policy initiatives that will reduce the variation in food availability and affordability. 
The main sources of variation of food availability in Algeria for both the 
short-run and long-run are variation in per capita income and domestic production. 
The results of causality test indicate that there is a unidirectional causality 
relationship from per capita income to domestic production. In addition, when 
there is an unexpected change in oil prices, per capita income in Algeria shows a 
large response with long-lived lag adjustment. A general policy implication of 
these results suggest that oil and gas export revenue stabilization strategies via 
diversification could favorably impact on food security condition in Algeria. 
In Iran, the main sources of variation in availability of food in the short-run 
and long-run is the variation in food domestic production. It is also shown that 
there is a inverse relationship between oil prices and domestic production, at least 
in the short-run, and the response of food production to an oil price shock is large 
and persistent. These results suggest that food security objectives in Iran could be 
better achieved by focusing on the production system. In addition, converting the 
subsidy bias which favored consumers to provide adequate incentives to producers 
is desirable. 
In Saudi Arabia the main sources of variation in food availability both in the 
short-run and long-run are variation in oil prices and per capita income. Variation 
in oil prices has a direct and long-lived effect on per capita income. As the largest 
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oil producer among the OPEC countries, Saudi Arabia could help improve its food 
security condition by pursuing oil price stabilization policy. 
The policy emphasis of Saudi Arabia on massive investment in production 
and distribution infrastructure (e.g., irrigation system) financed primarily by oil 
export revenue has improved the country's food security condition. The same 
initiatives are recommended for Iran and Algeria which are better endowed (relative 
' to Saudi Arabia) with resources for agricultural production. 
Empirical contribution 
The empirical contribution of this study is in the application of appropriate 
time series methodology in investigating food security issues in oil exporting 
countries. Food security is primarily concerned with variability of food availability 
(domestic production+imports). The VAR methodology, on the other hand, is very 
powerful in examining the co-variability of variables in a simultaneous model with 
dynamic adjustment. 
First, the non-stationary property of the data series is properly accounted for 
and accommodated in the analysis. It is common knowledge that this property, if 
ignored, can lead to spurious regression and inferences. 
Second, whereas earlier studies used only a single point estimate of 
variability such as the coefficient of variation (cv), the VAR model allows the 
decomposition of variability of variables (innovation accounting in FEVD). 
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Moreover, the variability due to lag adjusment as the system moves toward 
equilibrium in response to initial shock is also captured in the impulse response. 
As a result, the variability of a variable is decomposed both in its sources of 
variability and its variability over time. 
Thirdly, whereas earlier studies examined the influence of factors on food 
security in a single equation regression, thereby automatically imposing the 
direction of influence, the simultaneous system used here capture the rich feedback 
interactions of variables in the system. 
Suggestion for further research 
One problem with standard impulse analysis is that there is no unique 
way to obtain orthogonalized innovations (shocks). Our dynamic response function 
are conditional on the ordering in Choleski decomposition. We use oil price, per 
capita income, wheat production, wheat imports, wheat consumption order. More 
research need when this ordering is changed. A possible approach to this issue is 
to pursue the structural VAR (Bemanke, 1986) in orthogonalizing the shocks. 
Also, with possible more observations in the future, longer lag length can. be used 
to fully capture the dynamic adjusment in the system. 
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